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Abstract 
Exchange Market Pressure refers to money market disequilibrium that arises due to non-zero 
excess demand for domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. Exchange rate changes 
reflect the extent of market pressure in the absence of Central Bank intervention. It is argued 
that nominal exchange rate changes have consequences for domestic macroeconomic 
variables. These include domestic output growth, increase in domestic prices, balance of trade, 
firms’ price-setting behaviour in high inflation countries, foreign debt burden of the country, 
balance of payments and the stability of the domestic financial system. It has been observed 
that the Central Banks generally intervene in the foreign exchange market to avoid these 
undesirable consequences of exchange rate changes. In this thesis, we construct exchange 
market pressure and intervention index for Pakistan using Weymark’s (1995) approach. The 
basic objective is to identify whether it is downward or upward pressure that has remained 
dominant over the entire sample period. Based on intervention index values, we evaluate the 
Central Bank’s monetary policy over the given sample period. In addition, we also calculate 
the actual exchange rate and predicted exchange rate using one period lagged exchange rate. 
We check whether monetary policy is successful in its objective of reducing exchange rate 
volatility. Finally, we also evaluate the determinants of exchange market pressure in a panel of 
ten countries. The first empirical chapter utilises difference data and the two-stage least square 
approach. In the second empirical chapter we adopt Johansen’s (1988) cointegration approach. 
Both of these provide evidence of downward pressure and active Central Bank intervention. 
Furthermore, these chapters show that the Central Bank’s foreign exchange intervention policy 
is fairly successful in achieving its objective of reducing exchange rate volatility. The initial 
empirical chapters use a fixed parameter approach. This has the disadvantage that it does not 
allow the estimated parameters to take account of structural changes. A third empirical chapter 
addresses this issue and uses the Kalman Filter Time Varying Parameter approach. This has 
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the advantage of allowing the parameters to take account of the effects of structural changes 
on parameter constancy. The results show unstable estimated parameters. The constructed 
exchange market pressure and intervention index show downward pressure and the active 
Central Bank intervention. Thus, this chapter further confirms our earlier findings of 
downward pressure and active Central Bank intervention. However, despite unstable estimated 
parameters, Central Bank intervention policy is successful in reducing exchange rate volatility 
which is unexpected. In the earlier empirical chapters, we assumed direct Central Bank 
intervention. However, there may be the case that Central Bank may use interest rate for 
fending off speculative attack. In such a case it is better to include interest rate as component 
of exchange market pressure to truly reflect the extent of foreign exchange market 
disequilibrium. Last empirical chapter overcomes this issue and uses Eichengreen et al. (1996) 
approach for constructing exchange market pressure. It consists of percent changes in 
exchange rate, relative interest rate differential and relative percent changes in foreign 
exchange reserves. Furthermore, in this chapter, we evaluate the determinants of exchange 
market pressure in a panel of ten countries. The results indicate the relevancy of some 
macroeconomic variables and measures of openness.       
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Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction  
 In this thesis, we examine Exchange Market Pressure in the Foreign Exchange Market. 
We consider, although not exclusively, Exchange Market Pressure in Pakistan and evaluate the 
monetary authority’s response to prevailing market pressure. In particular, we focus upon 
whether the Pakistani currency has on average experienced pressure to depreciate or not over 
recent decades. We also consider what fraction of pressure the Pakistan Central Bank relieves 
through the purchase or sale of foreign exchange reserves. We also examine whether the 
Central Bank in Pakistan is successful in achieving its desired objective of reducing exchange 
rate volatility. Furthermore, we evaluate the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure in a 
panel of ten countries.     
  The collapse of the Bretton Wood fixed exchange rate system ushered in a substantial 
change in the international financial architecture. Alternative systems introduced included 
hard pegs, and floating and intermediate exchange rate arrangements. Hard pegs are also 
known as currency union, referring to one country adopting another country’s currency, either 
as part of wider currency union or dollarising by formally entering into currency union. A 
floating exchange rate can refer to either a free float or a managed float. In this system, 
although a Central Bank freely intervenes in a foreign exchange market to avoid undesirable 
exchange rate fluctuations, it does not commit itself to any particular exchange rate level. An 
intermediate system consists of fixed exchange rate, crawling peg, exchange rate band, and 
crawling band. All these exchange rate arrangements involve Central Bank foreign exchange 
intervention to reduce pressure on the domestic currency. Fischer (2001) shows that the 
number of countries with an intermediate exchange rate declined from 98 in 1992 to 63 in 
1999. Despite the falling number in the 1990s, there remain a considerable number of 
countries with an intermediate exchange rate system.  
 11 
 Exchange rate changes have important implications for key macroeconomic variables 
that include domestic output, unemployment, inflation, and balance of payments. Nominal 
exchange rate changes are fully reflected in domestic price changes, if Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) holds. This implies that a rise in the exchange rate (or domestic currency 
depreciation) increases domestic price of tradable goods in the consumer basket. Even if PPP 
does not hold, we could still expect some pass through from exchange rate changes to 
domestic prices. A nominal exchange rate plays an important role in price-setting behaviour in 
high inflation countries (Taylor, 2000). In a high inflation environment, firms pass on to 
customers the increase in cost that results from exchange rate changes. This further increases 
the domestic price level. Furthermore, the depreciation of one country currency results in the 
collapse of exchange rate regime of the second country; for example, in East Asian currency 
crises. Gerlach and Smets (1995) argue that a depreciation of one country’s currency increases 
its competitiveness against its trading partners. This increases the trade deficit of the second 
country, reduces the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank and thus puts pressure on 
its exchange rate regime to collapse. Second, a currency depreciation for one country makes 
its exports cheaper in a second country. This reduces the overall price level and thus decreases 
demand for real money balances in the second country. Given that money supply is fixed, this 
leaves the second country’s residents with excess monetary balances which they swap for 
foreign currency. This depletes the foreign exchange reserve of a second country’s Central 
Bank and thus moves it from having no speculative attack equilibrium to one where it is 
profitable for speculators to launch speculative attacks (Eichengreen et al. 1996).  
Nominal exchange rate changes are associated with movements in the real exchange 
rate when Purchasing Power Parity does not hold.1 The real exchange rate determines both 
                                                 
1
 Nominal exchange rate is defined as the number of units of domestic currency per units of foreign currency. 
Hence. a rise in the exchange rate is also a domestic currency depreciation.  
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internal and external equilibrium and resource allocation in the economy.2 Furthermore, 
changes in the real exchange rate determine a country’s external competitiveness and thus the 
country’s trade balance through its effect on import and export prices.     
Exchange rate changes have an important effect on the balance sheet of domestic 
agents particularly firms and financial institutions, (see Krugman, 1999). Exchange rate 
shocks do not turn into a recession in economies with sound firm, household and financial 
sector balance sheets (Mishkin, 1998). Economies with weak balance sheets are more 
vulnerable to a speculative attack which translates into a severe recession. Foreign currency 
denominated debt of firms and financial institutions play an important role in the transmission 
of exchange rate shocks. Negative exchange rate shocks increase foreign currency liabilities 
and debt servicing of firms and financial institutions. This deteriorates their balance sheet and 
results in the collapse of financial institutions and firms. This leads to output loss and an 
increase in the unemployment rate.  
 
1.2 Exchange Market Pressure 
Two important concepts in this thesis are Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention. 
Exchange Market Pressure refers to foreign exchange market disequilibrium that arises due to 
non-zero excess demand for domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. It is reflected 
in exchange rate changes in the absence of Central Bank intervention; for example through 
changes in foreign exchange reserves or interest rate. In this study, we define Exchange 
Market Pressure as the exchange rate change that would have occurred in the absence of 
Central Bank intervention given the expectation generated by the actual exchange rate policy 
implemented. Frequently, a Central Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to avoid 
                                                 
2
 Real exchange rate can be defined as the relative price of tradable to nontradable goods. Alternatively, it can be 
defined as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative price differential (Edwards, 1989).   
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the undesirable influence of exchange rate changes on domestic macroeconomic variables.3 In 
such a case, actual exchange rate movements do not fully reflect the extent of foreign 
exchange market pressure. The sum of exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes 
can better measure the prevailing pressure in the foreign exchange market when the Central 
Bank uses only foreign exchange reserves changes for relieving pressure on the currency. 
However, when a Central Bank intervenes indirectly by changing interest rate with the sole 
objective of influencing market pressure, then exchange rate, foreign exchange reserve and 
interest rate changes better reflect the extent of foreign exchange market pressure. An 
intervention index based on given exchange market pressure definition can be defined as the 
fraction of pressure that the Central Bank relieves either by selling or purchasing foreign 
exchange reserves or changing the interest rate or any combination of these.   
 Exchange Market Pressure measurement has remained an important part of the 
empirical literature on speculative attacks and currency crises. Blanco and Garber (1986) 
constructed a macroeconomic model that consists of real money demand, purchasing power 
parity and uncovered interest rate parity and applied this to the Mexican experience under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. They showed that devaluation occurs when foreign exchange 
reserves reach critical level and the shadow exchange rate exceeds the fixed exchange rate 
level.4 The empirical Exchange Market Pressure and intervention index literature uses excess 
demand for domestic currency in examining the role that Central Bank allows market forces to 
play in determining the domestic currency value in the foreign exchange market. These studies 
include Girton and Roper (1977), Roper and Turnovsky (1980) and Weymark (1995). All 
these approaches are model-dependent because the components of Exchange Market Pressure 
                                                 
3
 Foreign exchange market intervention can be either sterilised or unsterilised. Sterilised foreign exchange 
intervention offsets the effects of foreign exchange reserve changes on domestic monetary base. On the other 
hand, unsterilised foreign exchange intervention does not offset the effects of foreign exchange intervention on 
domestic monetary base. It results changes in domestic monetary base equal to foreign exchange reserve changes.     
4
 The critical foreign exchange reserve level refers to a level when Central Bank stops intervening in the foreign 
exchange market.  
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are derived using a macroeconomic model. These have the advantage of setting out a clear 
analytic framework that is based upon existing theory. In contrast, Eichengreen et al. (1996) 
Exchange Market Pressure is a model independent because neither the components of 
Exchange Market Pressure nor the weights assigned to them are derived from any 
macroeconomic model. So, for example, it is an entirely empirical matter whether foreign 
exchange reserves or the interest rate are important in calculating Exchange Market Pressure.  
 Girton and Roper (1977) use the monetary approach to the balance of payments and 
derived exchange market pressure index which is simple sum of exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserves changes. Since both exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes 
are equally weighted; therefore, the construction of Exchange Market Pressure is only 
dependent upon the index’s components and does not require the estimation of the macro 
model. Roper and Turnovsky (1980), on the other hand, used an IS-LM framework and 
derived an optimum trade-off that monetary authorities face between domestic credit and 
exchange rate when stabilising domestic output. The weights assigned to the components are 
based upon the estimated parameters. Weymark (1995) made a notable contribution to the 
theory of Exchange Market Pressure. Although Weymark’s (1995) Exchange Market Pressure 
is dependent upon actual exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes, the weights 
assigned to foreign exchange reserve changes are derived from an estimated macro model. 
Thus, to produce an exchange market pressure index, we need to estimate a model and hence 
derive weights assigned to components of the index. This converts foreign exchange reserve 
changes into equivalent exchange rate units. Thus, using equivalent weights ensures that the 
exchange market pressure index is not dominated by the most volatile component.5   
Exchange market pressure is not directly observable. It can be measured through the 
channels that are used for restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium. In Girton and 
                                                 
5
 Roper and Turnovsky (1980) and Weymark (1995) require the estimation of six and two parameters 
respectively from stochastic macro mode for assigning weights to the components of exchange market pressure.    
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Roper’s (1977), Roper and Turnovsky’s (1980) and Weymark’s (1995) studies, it is assumed 
that a Central Bank uses either the exchange rate or foreign exchange reserves or both for 
restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium. Thus, these studies assume direct intervention 
which takes place through the sale or purchase of foreign exchange reserves. However, 
interest rate is another policy instrument that the Central Bank may use for restoring foreign 
exchange market equilibrium (see for example Edison, 1993 and Dominguez and Kenen, 1992 
for the interest rate policies pursued by the European Monetary System member countries to 
keep their exchange rates within the bands prescribed by the Exchange Rate Mechanism). 
Therefore, the studies that do not include the interest rate as a component of exchange market 
pressure may not fully reflect the extent of foreign exchange market disequilibrium. Since the 
Central Bank changes the interest rate to fend off the pressure, Eichengreen et al. (1996) use 
interest rate as an additional component of exchange market pressure index.  
Contrary to Girton and Roper (1977), Roper and Turnovsky (1980) and Weymark 
(1995), Eichengreen et al. (1996) use the inverse of variance approach for assigning weights to 
the components of exchange market pressure. This approach has the advantage of assigning 
low weight to more volatile components and ensures that exchange market pressure is not 
dominated by more volatile components. An underlying intuition behind using the inverse of 
the variance approach is that the linear combination of exchange market pressure index 
components will yield an index dominated by more volatile components (Eichengreen et al. 
1994). In our case, foreign exchange reserve changes are several times more volatile than 
exchange rate changes which in turn are more volatile then interest rate changes. Therefore, an 
unweighted exchange market pressure index will be driven by more volatile components (in 
our case foreign exchange reserve changes). The inverse of variance approach therefore 
assigns low weight to more volatile component and ensures equal weight for all components 
of the Exchange Market Pressure Index.          
 16 
 An important element of this thesis is the behaviour of macroeconomic policy in 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s exchange rate regime has evolved through different phases. After the 
founding of the country, Pakistan adopted the policy of fixed exchange rate and fixed the 
parity of its currency against US dollar at rupee 3.32 in 1948. This was occasionally revised, 
for example in 1973 to rupees 9.9 to the US dollar. This parity remained fixed until 8th 
January, 1982, when Pakistan switched from a fixed to a managed float exchange rate system. 
Since then the Pakistan rupee has depreciated by more then 500% to 59.72 per US dollar in 
2005. On the other hand, the country’s foreign exchange reserves have increased from US 
$553 million in 1976 to US $10, 599, thus growing by 1800%. Therefore, one of the puzzles 
that this thesis aims to consider is why the exchange rate has depreciated by such an enormous 
extent given that country’s foreign exchange reserves have also shown tremendous growth.   
 One of the elements of this thesis is to adopt Weymark’s (1995) approach for 
constructing exchange market pressure and intervention index for Pakistan. This approach is 
adopted because it enables us to verify what fraction of pressure Central Bank relieves through 
the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, Weymark (1995) argues that  
Girton and Roper’s (1977) and Roper and Turnovsky’s (1980) exchange Market Pressure 
indices measure foreign exchange market disequilibrium by the simple sum of exchange rate 
and foreign exchange reserve changes under fixed and float systems. On the other hand, 
foreign exchange reserve changes and exchange rate changes fully reflect the extent of foreign 
exchange market disequilibrium in a managed float or an intermediate exchange rate 
arrangement. Thus, under a managed float or intermediate exchange rate system, measurement 
of foreign exchange market disequilibrium involves converting foreign exchange reserve 
changes into equivalent exchange rate units and then combining them with observed exchange 
rate units  
 17 
 Weymark (1998) further argues that model-independent approaches to exchange 
market pressure are difficult to interpret in terms of their general usefulness. This is because 
neither the components of exchange market pressure nor the weights assigned to them are 
derived from a stochastic macroeconomic model. Furthermore, the volatilities of the exchange 
rate, foreign exchange reserve and interest changes not only depend on the structure of the 
economy but also on the intervention activity of the Central Bank. In such a case, volatility 
smoothing approaches cannot be expected to assign equal weights to all components of 
exchange market pressure index. Weymark (1998) further argues that a poor understanding of 
market participant’s expectation formation process and failure to model this process correctly 
is the primary cause of poor performance of exchange rate models linking macrocosmic 
variables with exchange rate determination at short and intermediate horizon. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
 The plan of thesis is as follows. In the second chapter, we set out and contrast 
empirical exchange market pressure models. In the third chapter, we discuss the empirical 
exchange market pressure literature and see whether the determinants of exchange market 
pressure confirm their theoretical predictions. Chapters Four to Seven are the core of the thesis 
and use Weymark’s (1995) approach. Chapter Eight, on the other hand, uses Eichengreen et 
al.’s (1996) statistical approach for Exchange Market Pressure.   
 In terms of the main empirical chapters in this thesis, Chapter Four uses difference data 
and the instrumental variable technique for constructing exchange market pressure and the 
intervention index for Pakistan using Weymark’s (1995) approach.6 Difference data enables us 
to avoid the spurious regression problem that arises when both dependent and independent 
variables, although independent of each other, are trended together. This gives a high 
                                                 
6
 Weymark (1995) used differenced data and the instrumental variable technique to construct exchange market 
and intervention index for Canada.   
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correlation among them. The instrumental variable, on the other hand, is used to avoid the 
endogenity problem. This arises due to the simultaneous determination of the dependent 
variable and one or more of the independent variables. In such a case, classical linear 
regression approaches do not yield unbiased estimates of the variables of interest. This 
problem is overcomed by the use of instrumental variables that are correlated with the 
endogenous variable but not correlated with the error term. This yields unbiased estimates of 
parameters of interest. In our case, we estimate the weight assigned to the foreign exchange 
reserve using interest rate and exchange rate coefficients. We estimate these parameters using 
real money demand and price equation. It is argued that real money balances and interest rate 
are simultaneously determined. This results in a simultaneity problem which we address using 
the instrumental variable technique.              
 Much of the empirical literature in international finance has gone beyond simple 
differencing of the data to deal with potential spurious relationships and we next utilise these 
methods. In Chapter Five we use Johansen’s (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’ (1990) 
cointegration approach. It is argued that although differencing satisfies stationary properities, 
it results in the loss of vital information about the long-term relationship if the variables of 
interest are cointegrated. A linear combination of non-stationary variables can give a non-
stationary relationship. However, it may be the case that a linear combination of non-
stationary variables yields a stationary relationship when there is evidence of cointegration. 
Such an outcome provides evidence of the presence of a long-term relationship. We test the 
presence of such a relationship using Johansen’s (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’ (1990) 
multivariate cointegration approach. It has an advantage that it not only allows us to test the 
presence of more than one cointegrating vector but also to test the validity of economic 
theories by imposing restrictions on the parameters of interest. Furthermore, the results remain 
invariant with respect to the direction of normalisation.   
 19 
 Our first two empirical chapters, Chapter Four and Five use a fixed parameter 
approach for constructing exchange market pressure and an intervention index for Pakistan. 
However, a fixed parameter approach is criticised because it does not allow the parameters to 
vary to take account of the effects of structural changes over time. Furthermore, it is 
considered as one of the important factors in the poor performance of exchange rate models. 
Chapter Six overcomes this issue by using the Kalman filter time varying parameter approach. 
It takes account of the effects of structural changes that have occurred over the given sample 
period on parameter constancy. These changes include Pakistan’s switch from fixed exchange 
rate to managed float on 8th January, 1982, the introduction of interest free banking system in 
1981 and subsequent replacement of interest rate bearing deposits with a system based on 
principle of profit and loss sharing from July 1st, 1985 (Khan 1994; Ahmad and Khan, 1990),  
the denationalisation of public sector banks, the imposition of sanctions in the wake of nuclear 
explosions and lifting of these sanction and inflow of foreign capital due to Pakistan’s decision 
to cooperate with the international community in its war against terrorism after the September 
11th terrorist attack on US. Consequently, the macro model parameters that are useful for 
constructing exchange market pressure and intervention index may change over time.    
The last three chapters assume direct Central Bank intervention, which takes the form 
of the sale and purchase of foreign exchange reserves. Eichengreen et al. (1996) argue that 
interest rate changes are another mechanism by which the Central Banks can restore foreign 
exchange market equilibrium. In such a case, studies that ignore the interest rate do not fully 
reflect the extent of foreign exchange market pressure. Eichengreen et al. (1996) constructed 
such an exchange market pressure index that includes exchange rate change, relative interest 
rate and relative percent changes in foreign exchange reserves as its components. It uses the 
inverse of the variance approach for assigning weights to the components of exchange market 
pressure. This approach has the advantage of assigning low weight to more volatile component 
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and thus ensures that more volatile components do not dominate the exchange market pressure 
index. Furthermore, it does not require the macroeconomic assumptions made by Girton and 
Roper’s (1977) and Weymark’s (1995) models. 
 Furthermore, in this chapter, we consider the determinants of exchange market 
pressure in a panel of ten countries. For example, we examine whether more open economies 
have greater exchange market pressure. Other issues that we address in Chapter Seven include 
the relevance of policy variables, openness of economy and macroeconomic variables as 
determinants of Exchange Market Pressure in panel framework. Particularly, we test which of 
these variables explains Exchange Market Pressure. Models based on a panel framework use 
repeated observations on the same variable. The use of a panel has the advantage of enabling 
researchers to estimate the complicated models. Chapter Eight summarises the study and 
provides policy implications.     
1.4 Contribution to the literature 
 In this thesis, we evaluate the exchange market pressure on Pakistan rupee in post 1976 
period. We examine whether it is upward or downward pressure that has remained dominant 
over the entire sample period. Based on exchange market pressure index, we evaluate 
monetary authority response function by constructing intervention index. The intervention 
index values reflect the extent that Central Bank allows to market forces in the determination 
of domestic currency value in the foreign exchange market. This has important policy 
implication. The Central Banks that target exchange rate stability loose monetary 
independence. Furthermore, we evaluate the determinants of exchange market pressure in a 
panel of ten countries. We check whether exchange market pressure can be explained by a 
range of macroeconomic variables, policy variables and measures of trade openness. Based on 
these findings, we recommend which variables Central Banks should keep in check if they 
want to avoid pressure on their currencies.     
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Chapter Two 
 
Exchange Market Pressure Models 
 
 
 In the literature, there are two main approaches to exchange market pressure, namely 
the model-dependent and model-independent. The difference between the two is that the 
model-dependent approach uses a stochastic macro model for either deriving the components 
of exchange market pressure or weights assigned to them or both. On the other hand, the 
model-independent approach does not use a macro model for deriving the components of 
exchange market pressure or weights assigned to them. In this chapter, we discuss model-
dependent theoretical models of Exchange Market Pressure and determine how they differ 
from each other in deriving either the components of pressure index or weights assigned to 
them or both.   
 The chapter is outlined as follows. In section 2.1 we derive Girton and Roper’s (1977) 
exchange market pressure index using the monetary approach to balance of payments. In 
section 2.2 we discuss Roper and Turnovsky’s (1980) exchange market pressure model and 
show how both these indices differ from each other in deriving exchange market pressure 
components and the weights assigned to them. Section 2.3 uses a stochastic macro model to 
derive Weymark’s (1995) exchange market pressure and provide a theoretical justification as 
to how it differs from Girton and Roper (1977) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980) in deriving 
market pressure components and weights assigned to them. Furthermore, based on the 
exchange market pressure index, we derive an intervention index which we define as the 
fraction of pressure that Central Bank relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange reserves. Section 2.4 uses a short-term wealth augmented monetary model of market 
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pressure for deriving Pentecost et al.’s (2001) exchange market pressure. Furthermore, this 
section shows how Pentecost et al.’s (2001) market pressure index differs from the preceding 
indices. Section 2.5 concludes.    
 
 2.1 Girton and Roper’s (1977) Monetary Model of Exchange Market Pressure  
  
 The first model we consider is by Girton and Roper (1977). Girton and Roper (1977) 
derived a model of Exchange Market Pressure using the monetary approach to exchange rate 
and monetary approach to balance of payments. They focused their attention on the monetary 
independence that Canadian monetary authorities enjoy as they pursue a fixed exchange rate 
regime. This is based on domestic and foreign monetary conditions and is given as: 
)(exp titt
d
t YPM
αβ −
=          (2.1) 
)(**** *exp titt
d
t YPM
αβ −
=         (2.2) 
tt
s
t DFM +=          (2.3)                                                                                                                                                                                             
∗∗ += tt
s
t DFM
*
         (2.4)                                                     
Equation 2.1 denotes domestic money demand. It shows that the demand for nominal 
money balances ( dtM ) is influenced by domestic real income ( tY ) and interest rate ( ti ). A rise 
in tP  and tY  lead to an increase in demand for nominal money balances. This is because as 
domestic price and income increase, people need more money for financing their increased 
transactions. On the other hand, the interest rate represents an opportunity cost of holding 
money. Therefore, as the opportunity cost of holding money increases, people prefer to hold 
nominal money balances in terms of assets that earn the interest rate instead of cash balances. 
This decreases the demand for nominal money balances. Equation 2.3 shows the sources of 
domestic money supply in the economy. It reveals that domestic money supply ( stM ) is 
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created by either increase in domestic credit (domestic component of base money measured in 
domestic currency, tD ) or through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves ( )tF  or 
both. * denotes foreign counterparts of domestic variables.    
Money market equilibrium conditions imply that any change in money supply must be 
equal to money demand. Therefore, we take the log and first difference of both sides of 
equation (2.1) and (2.2): 
 
d
tttttt
s
t miypfdm ∆=∆−∆+∆=∆+∆=∆ αβ      (2.5)               
*** d
tttttt
s
t miypfdm ∆=∆−∆+∆=∆+∆=∆ ∗∗∗∗∗∗ αβ     (2.6) 
The left-hand side of equation 2.5 represents the sources of domestic money creation and the 
right-hand side indicates the determinants of money demand in the economy. It shows that the 
domestic money supply changes due to changes in domestic credit (
1−
∆
=∆
t
t
t B
Dd ) and changes 
in foreign exchange reserves (
1−
∆
=∆
t
t
t B
Ff ). tB  denotes domestic monetary base. On the other 
hand, the right hand side of equation 2.5 shows the sources of change in money demand that 
include changes in domestic price, domestic real income and interest rate. We assume that 
money multiplier is constant and equal to unity. The money market equilibrium condition 
requires that log money supply change ( stm∆ ) should be equal to log changes in money 
demand ( dtm∆ ).  
 Subtracting the foreign money market equilibrium condition (eqn: 2.6) from the 
domestic money market equilibrium condition (eqn: 2.5) yields: 
*******
ttttttttt
s
t
s
t iiyyppmfdmm ∆+∆−∆−∆+∆−∆=∆−∆+∆=∆−∆ ααββ   (2.7) 
 Girton and Roper (1977) did not assume that absolute Purchasing Power Parity 
holds. Absolute Purchasing Power Parity holds only if deviations from its absolute version are 
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stationary. The non-stationary real exchange rate imply that absolute version of PPP does not 
hold. The relative version of Purchasing Power Parity is given as: 
tttt qspp ∆+∆+∆=∆
∗
 (2.8) 
where ts∆  denotes logged change in nominal exchange rate defined as the number of units of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. Hence a rise in the exchange rate denotes the 
depreciation of domestic currency. In the case of stationary real exchange rate ( tq ), we can 
define in equation 2.8 that changes in foreign price and nominal exchange rate are equally 
reflected in domestic price changes. We re-write equation 2.8 as: 
*
tttt ppqs ∆−∆=∆+∆  (2.9) 
Substitution of equation (2.9) in (2.7) yields: 
*****
ttttttttt iiyyqsmfd ∆+∆−∆−∆+∆+∆=∆−∆+∆ ααββ  (2.10) 
Re-arranging the above equation yields: 
*****
ttttttttt iiyymfdqs ∆+∆−∆−∆+∆+∆−∆−∆=∆ ααββ  (2.11) 
tq∆  denotes deviation from absolute Purchasing Power Parity. If absolute version of 
Purchasing Power Parity is assumed to hold, then tq∆  will automatically disappear. However, 
Girton and Roper (1977) eliminate deviation from Purchasing Power Parity ( tq∆ ) by 
assuming them to be a linear function of domestic credit and foreign money growth (Haache 
and Townend, 1981): 
**
ttt mdq ∆−∆=∆ θθ                  0, * ≥θθ  (2.12) 
Substituting equation (2.12) for deviation from purchasing power parity in equation (2.11) 
gives: 
*******
tttttttttt iiyymfdmds ∆+∆−∆−∆+∆+∆−∆−∆−∆=∆ ααββθθ  (2.13)   
Re-arrange the above equation: 
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****** )1()1( tttttttt iiyyfmds ∆+∆−∆−∆+∆−∆−+∆−−=∆ ααββθθ  (2.14) 
Equation 2.14 shows that the domestic credit and foreign money supply are no longer minus 
and plus unity. Since θ  is unrelated to that part of growth of money supply that results from 
foreign exchange reserve changes, the coefficient of tf∆  is still minus unity (Haache and 
Townend, 1981). Therefore, we can write equation 2.14 as: 
****** )1()1( tttttttt iiyymdfs ∆+∆−∆−∆+∆−+∆−−=∆+∆ ααββθθ  (2.15) 
The sum of exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes appears on the left-hand side 
of the equation 2.15. This suggests that we can measure exchange market pressure ( )tt fs ∆+∆  
without estimating any structural macro model.         
 It is assumed that perfect capital mobility holds and is given as: 
**
1 ttttt mdiis ∆+∆−=∆−∆=∆
∗
+ δδ        (2.16) 
Equation 2.16 is a parity condition which states that the differential between domestic and 
foreign interest rates is fully reflected in expected exchange rate units. The violation of this 
parity provides opportunity to foreign exchange arbitrageurs to make a profit.  
 Substituting equation (2.16) in equation (2.15) gives: 
*******)1()1( tttttttt mdyymdfs ∆−∆+∆−∆+∆−+∆−−=∆+∆ δααδββθθ   (2.17) 
****** )1()1( tttttt yymdfs ∆−∆+∆−−+∆−−−=∆+∆ ββθδαθαδ    (2.18) 
Assuming that: )1(1 θαδφ −−=  and )1( ***2 θδαφ −−=  
Substitution of these values for the coefficients of changes in domestic credit and foreign 
monetary aggregates yields Girton and Roper’s (1977) equation of exchange market pressure: 
ttttttt vyymdfs +∆−∆+∆+∆−=∆+∆ ∗21*21 ββφφ      (2.20) 
tt fs ∆+∆  in equation 2.20 denotes Girton and Roper’s (1977) Exchange Market Pressure 
index. It is equally applicable to all exchange rate regimes. It shows that under a floating 
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exchange rate system, exchange rate changes ( ts∆ >0) reflects the extent of foreign exchange 
market disequilibrium and foreign exchange reserves are held constant ( )0=∆ tf . On the other 
hand, foreign exchange reserves ( ts∆ >0) absorb the entire pressure under a fixed exchange 
rate and the exchange rate is held fixed ( ts∆ =0). However, under a managed float or 
intermediate exchange rate system both exchange rate ( ts∆ >0) and foreign exchange reserve 
changes ( ts∆ >0) restore foreign exchange market equilibrium. 
 The right-hand side of equation 2.20 indicates the determinants of Exchange Market 
Pressure. It shows that an increase in domestic credit ( td∆ ) and foreign income ( *ty∆ ) either 
decreases the value of domestic currency or reduces the country’s foreign exchange reserves 
or both and hence increases pressure. On the other hand, a rise in domestic income or foreign 
money either increases domestic currency value against foreign currency or increases foreign 
exchange reserve or both under managed float and hence reduces market pressure. 
Furthermore, Girton and Roper’s Exchange Market Pressure assigns equal weights to both 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves changes. Hence, it does not require estimating 
any structural exchange rate model or adopting any statistical approach for assigning weight to 
the components of Exchange Market Pressure. It can easily be constructed by summing up 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes. 
 
 2.2 Roper and Turnovsky’s (1980) Model of Exchange Market Pressure 
 Roper and Turnovsky (1980) derived the optimum trade-off that monetary authorities 
face between foreign exchange reserve and exchange rate changes for stabilising domestic 
output in a stochastic IS-LM frame work that includes a foreign sector. The stochastic IS-LM 
framework that is used for deriving optimum trade-off is extended and includes the foreign 
sector. It is given as: 
 27 
ttttt usbibyby 1321 +−−=         (2.21) 
tttt uiayam 221 +−=          (2.22) 
1+
∗ ∆+= tttt sEii          (2.23) 
)(1 ttt SSsE −=∆ + θ  0  <  θ  <  1       (2.24)                                                                                  
=ty  domestic output in period t.  
=ti  domestic interest rate in period t.  
=ts  exchange rate level denoting the numbers of units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency.   
S  = equilibrium exchange rate level.  
1+ts  = expected exchange rate level in the next period. .     
=tm  Money Stock or base money measured in logarithms.   
 
=== ttt vuu 21 Stochastic disturbances. 
 
We assume that all parameters in equation (2.21) are positive except 1b  that satisfies 
additional restriction 10 1 << b .  
 Equation 2.21 describes a goods market equilibrium condition. It states that 
depreciation of domestic currency (i.e. a rise in ts ) makes exportable goods cheaper relative to 
foreign goods and hence increases domestic output level ( ty ). This explains negative sign for 
exchange rate in IS equation. Similarly, a rise in interest rate ( ti ) is associated with decline in 
domestic output level through the investment channel. Equation 2.22 explains domestic money 
market equilibrium conditions. It shows that domestic nominal money balances ( tm ) are 
positively and negatively correlated with domestic income and interest rate respectively. 
Equation 2.23 assumes perfect capital mobility. It states that domestic interest rate is equal to 
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foreign interest rate ( *ti ) plus expected exchange rate changes ( 1+∆ tt sE ). Equation 2.24 
describes the evolution of expected exchange rate. It asserts that if the current exchange rate is 
above the long-term equilibrium rate then one period ahead exchange rate is expected to 
depreciate and vice versa.  
 If we denote the deviations from long-term equilibrium exchange rate by 
)( tt SSs −=  this enables us to write equation 2.24 as: ttt sSE θ=∆ +1 . Given this expression of 
expected exchange rate changes, we can re-write equation 2.23 as: 
ttt sii θ+= *           (2.25) 
Substituting equation 2.25 in equation 2.21 gives: 
tttttt usbsbibyby 132
*
21 +−−−= θ        (2.26) 
tttttt usbsbibyby 132
*
21 )( +−−−=− θ        (2.27) 
ttttt usbsbibyb 132
*
21)1( +−−−=− θ        (2.28) 
)1( 1
132
*
2
b
usbsbib
y ttttt
−
+−−−
=
θ
       (2.29) 
Similarly substituting interest rate expression ttt sii θ+= *  in equation (2.22) yields: 
 ttttt usiayam 2
*
21 )( ++−= θ         (2.30) 
ttttt usaiayam 22
*
21 +−−= θ         (2.31) 
Solving equation (2.29) and (2.31) for tm : 
ttt
tttt
t usaiab
usbsbiba
m 22
*
2
1
132
*
21
)1(
)(
+−−
−
+−−−
= θθ     (2.32) 
ttt
tttt
t usaiab
uasbasbaiba
m 22
*
2
1
113121
*
21
)1( +−−−
+−−−
= θθ     (2.33) 
By re-arranging the above equation: 
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The negative exchange rate sign confirms to what the theory suggests. Monetary authorities 
can change the exchange rate by changing the foreign exchange reserves against domestic 
currency (decreasing tm ). We can re-write equation 2.34 as: 
ttt
t
t m
abba
b
uua
b
iaba
s
θθ 2231
1
211
1
*
221
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+
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Re-arranging the above equation yields: 
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t
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    (2.36) 
Therefore, Roper and Turnovsky’s model yields model-dependent Exchange Market Pressure 
given as: ttt msEMP ∆+∆= η  
 where η=∆∂∆∂ tt me /  and                                                  
=η
θθ 2231
1
)(
)1(
abba
b
++
−
−  
Contrary to Roper and Girton’s (1977) model that assigns equal weight to exchange rate and 
foreign exchange reserve changes, Roper and Turnovsky’s model requires estimating six 
parameters from the IS-LM framework, as outlined above, for assigning weight to foreign 
exchange reserve component of Exchange Market Pressure. These include income elasticity of 
money demand 1a , interest elasticity of money demand 2a , sensitivity of output to its own 
level 1b , interest elasticity of domestic output 2b , output sensitivity to exchange rate changes 
3b  and deviation of exchange rate from its long-term equilibrium level θ . Hence we need to 
estimate three equations for deriving weights to be assigned to foreign exchange reserve 
components of exchange market pressure index. This will ensure that exchange market 
pressure index is not dominated by more volatile component.  
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2.3 Weymark’s (1995) Model 
 
 Prior to Weymark’s (1995) model, Girton and Roper (1977) and Roper and Turnovsky 
(1980) constructed exchange market pressure indices. Girton and Roper (1977) assign equal 
weights to exchange market pressure index components and is a simple sum of exchange rate 
and foreign exchange reserves changes. On the other hand, Roper and Turnovsky (1980) use 
stochastic IS-LM framework for deriving weights to the components of exchange market 
pressure index. However, none of these indices show what fraction of pressure Central Bank 
relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves.  
 Weymark (1995) addressed this issue. Based on estimated exchange market pressure 
index, she constructed an intervention index that shows what fraction of pressure Central Bank 
relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserve. Weymark (1995) 
developed a small, open economy model of Exchange Market Pressure. This consists of 
nominal money demand, price equation, uncovered interest rate parity, money supply process 
and monetary authority response function to exchange rate fluctations. It is given as: 
tttt
d
t vibybpm +−+= 21         (2.37) 
ttt sapaap 210 ++=
∗
        (2.38) 
ttttt sSEii −+= +
∗
1          (2.39)                                                                                                     
=
s
tm
s
tm 1− tt fd ∆+∆+         (2.40) 
ttt sf ∆−=∆ ρ           (2.41) 
 
where:  
tm  = refers to money stock in period t 
  
tp  = domestic price level in period t 
 
ty  = real domestic income in period t 
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ti  = domestic interest rate level in period t 
 
tv  = stochastic money demand disturbance in period t 
 
ts  = nominal exchange rate refers to the number of units of domestic currency per unit of      
       foreign currency.  
[ ] 111 / −−−−=∆ tttttt MDhDhd  where th is the money multiplier in period t, Dt  domestic credit  
 and 1−tM  is the inherited monetary stock in t.  
tf∆  = [ ] 111 / −−−− ttttt MFhFh where tF is the stock of foreign exchange reserves in period  
 
           t, with th  and Mt-1 defined as above 
 
tρ    = the policy authority’s time-variant response coefficient. 
 
The asterisk denotes foreign counterparts of domestic variables. Small letters denote that all 
variable used are in logarithms. The notation 1+tt sE  represents rational agents’ expected value 
of exchange rate one period ahead based on the information currently available.   
 Equation 2.37 shows that domestic money demand ( dtm ) is positively and negatively 
associated with domestic income ( ty ) and interest rate ( ti ) respectively. This implies positive 
and negative sign for estimated real domestic income parameter ( 01 >b ) and interest rate 
parameter ( 02 <b ). Similarly, equation 2.38 shows that domestic prices ( tp ) are influenced 
by foreign price ( *tp ) and exchange rate changes ( ts ). However, the absolute version of 
purchasing power parity is assumed not to hold as it allows for systematic deviation given by 
0a . If 0a =0 and 121 == aa  simultaneously then equation 2.34 breaks down to an absolute 
version of purchasing power parity. 
 Equation 2.39 is uncovered interest rate parity which holds that the domestic interest 
rate equals the foreign interest after adjustments for the expected change in exchange rate. 
Equation 2.40 defines the money supply process. It shows that the current money supply is 
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determined by inherited money stock ( stm 1− ), and by changes in the domestic component of 
monetary base, namely domestic credit (
1−
∆
=∆
t
t
t B
Dd ) and foreign exchange reserves 
(
1−
∆
=∆
t
t
t B
Ff ). tB  denotes domestic monetary base. The money multiplier is assumed to be 
constant and intervention is assumed unsterilised.7 
 Equation 2.41 shows monetary authority’s response function to exchange rate 
movements. The negative sign of monetary authority’s response function indicates that Central 
Bank smooth exchange rate changes by selling and purchasing foreign exchange reserves. It 
purchases foreign exchange reserves ( tf∆ >0) when there is pressure on domestic currency to 
appreciate (i.e. 0<∆ ts ). On the other hand, Central Bank sells foreign exchange reserves 
when the domestic currency is under depreciating pressure. The monetary authority’s response 
function takes values between ∞≤≤ tρ0 . In a country with fixed exchange rate ∞=tρ . This 
implies the Central Bank’s infinite intervention for maintaining fixed exchange rate parity. On 
the other hand, under float exchange rate 0=tρ . In the intermediate exchange rate 
arrangements ∞<< tρ0 . In practice, the monetary authority’s response function tρ   is time-
varying. It is argued that a Central Bank does not intervene each time domestic currency is 
under pressure. It may be the case that monetary authorities abstain from intervening in the 
foreign exchange market and let the exchange rate changes absorbs the entire exchange market 
pressure. In such a case, the monetary authority’s response function equals zero ( 0=tρ ). On 
the other hand, tρ >0 when the Central Bank leans against the wind and purchases foreign 
exchange reserves when there is downward pressure on domestic currency. It may be the case 
that the monetary authority’s response coefficient is negative tρ <0. This occurs when the 
                                                 
7
 Unsterilised intervention implies that Central Bank does not offset the effects of the purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange reserves on monetary base.   
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monetary authority leans with wind – that is, the Central Bank purchases foreign exchange 
reserves ( 0>∆ tf ) when the domestic currency is already under pressure to depreciate 
( 0>∆ ts ) and vice versa. Substitution of equation 2.38 in equation 2.37 yields  
ttttt
d
t vibybsapaam +−+++=
∗
21210       (2.42) 
 
Substitution of equation 2.39 in equation 2.42 yields 
 
tttttttt
d
t vssEibybsapaam +−+−+++= +
∗∗ )( 121210     (2.43) 
ttttttt
d
t vsEibybsbapaam ++−++++= +
∗∗ )()( 1212210     (2.44) 
The monetary approach assumes continuous money market equilibrium at any period: 
t
d
t
s
t mmm ∆=∆=∆          (2.45) 
 
tttttttttt vsEbibybsbapasd ∆+∆−∆−∆+∆++∆=∆−∆ +
∗∗
1221221 )(ρ   (2.46) 
Equation 2.46 shows that the exchange rate change required for restoring money market 
equilibrium subsequent to exogenous disturbance depends upon the monetary authority’s 
response function tρ . The sources of exogenous disturbance that cause domestic money 
market disequilibrium are foreign price change, changes in domestic income, foreign interest 
rate change, domestic credit, expectation about future exchange rate change, and the random 
money demand shock.          
Re-arranging equation 2.46: 
 
tttttttttt vsEbibybpasbasd +∆−∆−∆+∆=∆+−∆−∆ +
∗∗
1221122 )(ρ   (2.47) 
1221122 )( +∗∗ ∆−+∆−∆−∆+∆=∆++− ttttttttt sEbvdibybpasbaρ  
 
)(
1
22 ba
s
t
t ++−
=∆
ρ
[ ]12211 +∗∗ ∆−+∆−∆−∆+∆ tttttt sEbvdibybpa   (2.48) 
 
t
ts β
1
=∆ ( )[ ]12 +∆− ttt sEbX                                                                           
where  
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[ ]22 bat ++−= ρβ  
 [ ]tttttt dvibybpaX ∆−+∆−∆+∆= ∗∗ 211  
Equation (2.48) shows that exchange rate changes may occur due to excessive demand for 
money [ ]ttttt dvibybpaEDM ∆−+∆−∆+∆= ∗∗ 211  or because of agents’ expectations about 
future exchange rate changes 012 >∆ +tt SEb . The actual exchange rate changes also depend on 
the Central Bank’s choice for the value of tρ  and also on exchange rate ( 2a ) and interest rate 
( 2b ). The expression tEDM  also suggest that an increase in domestic credit will not increase 
pressure on domestic currency if it is equally offset by an increase in the demand for domestic 
monetary aggregates.    
Re-arranging equation 2.48 yields: 
][)( 1221122 +∗∗ ∆−+∆−∆−∆+∆−=∆++ ttttttttt sEbvdibybpasbaρ  
][)( 1221122 +∗∗ ∆−+∆−∆−∆+∆−=∆++∆ tttttttttt sEbvdibybpasbasρ  
 Substitution of ttt fs ∆−=∆ρ  from equation 2.41 in the above equation yields: 
][)( 12*21*122 +∆−+∆−∆−∆+∆−=∆++∆− ttttttttt sEbvdibybpasbaf   (2.49) 
Re-arranging equation 2.49 yields: 
][)( 12*21*122 ttttttttt fsEbvdibybpasba ∆+∆−+∆−∆−∆+∆=∆+ +    (2.50) 
Multiplying both sides of equation 2.50 by 
22
1
ba +
 yields: 
22
12211 ][
ba
fEsbdvibybpa
s tttttttt +
∆+∆−∆−+∆−∆+∆−
=∆ +
∗∗
   (2.51) 
and the implied exchange rate elasticity with respect to foreign exchange reserves is given as:   
22
1
baf
s
t
t
+
−
=
∆∂
∆∂
−=η    (2.52) 
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It is assumed that exchange elasticity of domestic price ( 2a ) is greater than interest elasticity 
of money demand ( 2b ). This implies that the elasticity of exchange rate with respect to foreign 
exchange reserves is always negative (i.e. 01
22
<
+
−
=
ba
η ).   
The Weymark (1995) model dependent Exchange Market Pressure is given as: 
tEMP = tt fs ∆+∆ η    (2.53) 
The construction of Exchange Market Pressure requires the estimates of η . This further 
requires the estimates of interest rate elasticity of real money demand ( 2b ) and exchange 
elasticity of domestic price ( 2a ). Thus the construction of Weymark’s (1995) Exchange 
Market Pressure index requires only two estimates, namely interest elasticity of money 
demand ( 2b ) and exchange rate elasticity of domestic price ( 2a ) and contrasts with the Roper 
and Turnovsky (1980) model that requires estimating six parameters. .   
          Under fixed and floating exchange rates, the entire pressure is absorbed by exchange rate 
and foreign exchange reserve changes. However, under a managed float or intermediate 
exchange rate arrangements, monetary authorities have to decide what fraction of pressure 
they are willing to relieve by foreign exchange intervention. Hence under a managed float, 
exchange market pressure is relieved by exchange rate changes 




 ∆
t
t
EMP
s
 and part of it by 
foreign exchange reserves 




 ∆
t
t
EMP
f
. Therefore, the division of equation 2.53 yields: 
1 = 
t
t
t
t
EMP
f
EMP
s ∆
+
∆ η
   (2.54) 
Weymark defines exchange market intervention as a fraction of pressure that the Central Bank 
relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserve and is given as: 
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The intervention index takes values between ∞<<∞− ω . In a fixed exchange rate regime 
0=∆ ts  and the entire pressure is absorbed by foreign exchange reserves ( tt EMPf =∆ ). In 
such a case tω  = 1. On the other hand, under a flexible exchange rate regime, the entire 
pressure is absorbed by exchange rate changes ( tt EMPs =∆ ) and foreign exchange reserve 
changes are held constant ( 0=∆ tf ). Under an intermediate exchange rate system, the time 
varying coefficient takes values between zero and infinity ∞<< ρ0  and therefore, 
intervention index takes a value between zero and unity 0< tω <1.        
2.4 An Alternative Exchange Market Pressure Model   
 Pentecost et al. (2001) derived their Exchange Market Pressure index from a short-
term wealth augmented monetary model of foreign exchange market. The model assumes that 
purchasing power parity does not hold, imperfect substitutability between domestic and 
foreign assets, and non-bank financial wealth as the sole determinant of demand for all assets. 
The model in log linear form is given as:  
*
tttmtttt iiiwypm ∆−∆−∆+∆+∆=∆−∆ δγβϕα      (2.56) 
∆  denotes first difference operator. tm  is nominal money balances, tp  is domestic price level, 
ty  domestic output level, tw  non-bank private sector wealth, mti  own short-term interest rate 
of nominal money balances. α  and ϕ  denote income and wealth elasticity of real money 
demand β , γ and δ denote elasticities of real money demand with money itself, interest rate 
on alternative assets ( ti ) and foreign interest rate ( *ti ) respectively. Equation 2.56 shows that 
the demand for nominal real money balances is positively associated with domestic real 
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income ( ty ), non-bank private sector wealth ( tw ) and the own rate on nominal money 
balances ( mti ). The positive association between real money demand and its own interest rate 
( mti ) reflects the fact that money is held in the form of bank deposits that yield low but 
positive interest rate. Equation 2.56 further indicates that the demand for the domestic real 
money balances is negatively associated with interest rate on competing assets and foreign 
interest rate. All variables in equation 2.56 are given in log form.    
 Domestic credit and foreign exchange reserve changes determine the domestic 
money supply. After assuming a unity multiplier, we can write domestic money supply as  
tt
s
t fdm ∆+∆=∆          (2.57) 
 The continuous money market equilibrium condition implies the equality of changes 
in real money demand and supply equation. Hence we can write continuous money market 
equilibrium condition as: 
 
*
ttttmttttt iiwiypfdm ∆−∆−∆+∆+∆+∆=∆+∆=∆ δγϕβα    (2.58) 
Equation 2.58 indicates the equality between changes in money supply and money demand 
and thus ensures continuous money market equilibrium.   
 The demand for real money balances in a foreign country is identical to domestic real 
money demand function and is given as: 
******
tttmtttt iiwiypm ∆−∆−∆+∆+∆=∆−∆ δγϕβα  (2.59) 
γ  and δ  denote semi elasticity of demand for domestic real money balances with respect to 
domestic and foreign interest rate. Compare to foreign bonds, domestic bonds are assumed to 
be closer substitutes of domestic real money balances. This ensures that the semi-elasticity of 
domestic real money balances with domestic interest rate is higher then the foreign interest 
rate δγ > .  
 The nominal exchange rate that links domestic and foreign money market is given as:  
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Equation 2.60 shows that nominal exchange rate can be defined as real exchange rate adjusted 
for relative price ratio. Real factors determine real exchange rate and are therefore 
exogenously given. Therefore, we can write equation 2.60 as: 
 tttt qpps ∆+∆−∆=∆
*
 (2.61) 
Equation 2.61 permits the deviation from purchasing power parity (PPP) 
 The changes in relative output growth are reflected in changes in real money demand 
which in turn depend on real exchange rate and relative interest rate differential changes. 
Therefore, we can write this relationship as: 
)()( ** ttttt iiqyy ∆−∆−∆=∆−∆ λψ  (2.62) 
Equation 2.62 indicates that relative changes in output depend on real exchange rate changes 
and on relative interest rate differential between domestic and foreign country.  
Solving equation 2.58 for tp∆  yields:  
*
ttttmtttt iiwiyfdp ∆+∆+∆−∆−∆−∆+∆=∆ δγϕβα  (2.63) 
Similarly, the solution of (2.59) for *tp∆  yields 
******
tttmtttt iiwiymp ∆+∆+∆−∆−∆−∆=∆ γδϕβα  (2.64) 
Subtracting 2.64 from 2.63 yields: 
[ ]tttmttt
tttmtttttt
iiwiym
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∆+∆+∆−∆−∆−∆
−∆+∆+∆−∆−∆−∆+∆=∆−∆
δγϕβα
δγϕβα
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tttmt
tttttmtttttt
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ymiiwiyfdpp
∆−∆−∆+∆
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δγϕβ
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***
****
 
 Substituting equation 2.61 for domestic and foreign price differential in the above equation 
yields: 
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Re-arranging the above equation yields: 
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Substituting equation 2.62 in the above equation yields: 
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Re-arranging the above equation: 
[ ] ))(()1()()( *** ttttttmtmtt iiqmdfiis ∆−∆−++∆−+∆−∆=∆−∆−∆+∆ δγαλαψβ  
     )( *tt ww ∆−∆−ϕ     (2.65) 
The left-hand side of equation 2.65 measures Exchange Market Pressure in a wealth- 
augmented monetary model. It is a simple sum of nominal exchange rate changes, changes in 
relative interest rate differential and foreign exchange reserve changes. It shows that interest 
rate is another channel that the Central Bank can use for restoring foreign exchange market 
equilibrium. The positive sign indicates that Central Bank can relieve Exchange Market 
Pressure by increasing interest rate, letting exchange rate to depreciate or by selling foreign 
exchange reserves or any combination of all these variables.   
  Equation 2.65 further shows the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure in a 
wealth-augmented monetary model. It indicates that Exchange Market Pressure can be 
explained by relative changes in monetary aggregates, real exchange rate changes, relative 
changes in long-term interest rate differential and relative changes in non-bank private sector 
wealth. It reveals that growth in domestic monetary aggregates greater than foreign country 
aggregates increases pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. Similarly, the factors that 
increase demand for domestic money relative to foreign money, such as non-bank private 
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sector wealth, reduce pressure. As we have argued above, δγ > ; therefore, a domestic long- 
term interest rate above a foreign interest rate suggests an increase in pressure.  
 
2.5 Central Bank Foreign Exchange Intervention 
 The Central Bank can influence Exchange Market Pressure by intervening in the 
foreign exchange market. This could be direct or indirect intervention. Direct intervention 
refers to the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves with the sole objective of 
influencing exchange market pressure. On the other hand, the use of interest rate to influence 
the prevailing pressure is called the Central Bank’s indirect foreign exchange market 
intervention. In this thesis, we have particularly focused on the Central Bank’s direct 
intervention.   
 Direct intervention can be sterilised and unsterilised. Sterilised intervention refers to 
Central Bank’s offsetting the effect of purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserve on 
domestic monetary base. In other words, under sterilised intervention, domestic monetary base 
remains unaffected by the Central Bank’s actions in the foreign exchange market. In contrast, 
under sterilised intervention, the Central Bank does not offset the effects of its foreign 
exchange intervention on domestic monetary base. Thus domestic monetary base changes by 
the extent of changes in foreign exchange reserves. Since it changes domestic monetary base 
therefore, it is assumed that unsterilised intervention has a significant effect on exchange 
market pressure. On the other hand, the effect of sterilised intervention on exchange market 
pressure is uncertain. Since it leaves the domestic monetary base unaffected its effect on 
market pressure is still to be fully investigated.    
 In this thesis, we have focused on the Central Bank intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. We have then used intervention index values for evaluating the conduct of 
the Central Bank monetary policy over the given sample period. The objective was to check 
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the extent that Central Bank allows to market forces in the determination of exchange rate 
level. We have not paid attention to whether the intervention policy pursued by the Central 
Bank is sterilised or unsterilised.      
 
2.6 Conclusion   
 In this chapter we have discussed theoretical models of Exchange Market Pressure.  
They are called model-dependent models because either the components of exchange market 
pressure or weights assigned to them or both are derived from a stochastic macro model. The 
objective was to check how they differ from each other in terms of their components or 
weights assigned to them or both.   
 Girton and Roper (1977) used a monetary model of exchange rate determination and 
derived exchange market pressure index that is a simple sum of exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserve changes. It assigns equal weights to both exchange rate changes and foreign 
exchange reserve changes.  Hence the construction of Girton and Roper’s (1977) exchange 
market pressure index does not require estimating any stochastic macro model for deriving 
weights to be assigned to components of pressure index. Roper and Turnovsky (1980) on the 
other hand, used an IS-LM framework for deriving the trade off that monetary authorities face 
between exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves when they stabilise domestic output. 
The exchange market pressure that they derive is the sum of exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserve changes. However, both components are not equally weighted. The 
construction of Roper and Turnovsky (1980) requires estimating six parameters for weighting 
foreign exchange reserve changes. 
 Contrary to Girton and Roper (1977) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980), Weymark 
(1995) constructed an exchange market pressure and intervention index. The intervention 
index is defined as the fraction of pressure that the Central Bank relieves through the purchase 
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and sale of foreign exchange reserves. Similar to Roper and Turnovsky (1980), Weymark 
(1995) also used a macro model for deriving the weights assigned to foreign exchange reserve 
changes. Contrary to Roper and Turnovsky (1980), Weymark (1995) requires the estimation of 
two parameters for assigning weights to foreign exchange reserve changes.  
 Girton and Roper’s (1977), Roper and Turnovsky’s (1980) and Weymark’s (1995) 
exchange market pressure indices are simple sums of exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserve changes. However, they differ in weighting schemes. Pentecost et al. (2001), on the 
other hand used a wealth-augmented monetary model and derived an exchange market 
pressure index that is a simple sum of exchange rate, foreign exchange reserve and relative 
interest rate differential changes. The construction of Pentecost et al.’s (2001) exchange 
market pressure index requires the estimation of one parameter for assigning weight to the 
relative interest rate differential component in the exchange market pressure index.    
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Chapter Three 
 
Empirical Exchange Market Pressure Literature 
 
 In this chapter, we discuss the studies that have used Girton and Roper (1977), 
Weymark (1995) and Eichengreen et al. (1996) for evaluating pressure on different countries’ 
currencies and monetary authorities’ response function. Furthermore, we also discuss the 
studies that have used Girton and Roper (1977) and Eichengreen et al. (1996) for evaluating 
the determinants of exchange market pressure in time series and panel frameworks. The 
objective of constructing Exchange Market Pressure and an intervention index is to check the 
direction of pressure and see what fraction of pressure Central Banks relieve through the 
purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, the objective of evaluating the 
determinants of Exchange Market Pressure is to determine whether they confirm their 
theoretical predictions. The results indicate downward pressure and active Central Bank 
intervention. Furthermore, we gather evidence that the determinants of market pressure 
confirm their theoretical predictions.       
 The rest of the chapter is as follows. In section 3.1 we discuss the studies that have 
used Girton and Roper’s (1977) model and its different versions to different countries. Section 
3.2 discusses the studies that have used a VAR approach while using Girton and Roper’s 
approach. Weymark’s (1995) model and its application to different countries are discussed in 
section 3.3. In section 3.4, attention is paid to the studies that have used Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) in time series and panel frameworks. Section 3.5 concludes.      
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3.1 Empirical Studies of variants of the Girton and Roper (1977) Model. 
 
 The first model that we discuss is Girton and Roper’s (1977) theoretical model. They 
applied their model to post-war Canada. Its objective was to construct Exchange Market 
pressure index and measure the degree of autonomy that the Canadian Central Bank has in 
pursuing an independent monetary policy in an open economy. They equated monetary 
autonomy with monetary authorities’ ability in diverging domestic prices and interest rates 
from their foreign counterparts by the use of monetary policy. Girton and Roper (1977) 
measured the monetary independence with the domestic credit parameter in their estimated 
regression equation. A lower domestic credit estimated coefficient suggests that monetary 
authorities can use domestic credit as instrument of monetary policy for influencing domestic 
macroeconomic conditions. On the other hand, higher domestic credit shows that an increase 
in the domestic component of money supply would increase pressure on domestic currency. 
Such a case implies the loss of monetary independence. They regressed tEMP  on Canadian 
dollar on changes in domestic credit ( td∆ ), growth of US money supply ( *tm∆ ), domestic 
output growth ( ty∆ ) and US output growth ( *ty∆ ) respectively and estimated the following 
equation: 
tttttt vyymdEMP +∆−∆+∆+∆−=
*
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*
21 ββββα      (3.1)                      
Where tEMP  consists of Canadian exchange rate defined as number of units of Canadian per 
US dollar changes ( ts∆ ) and foreign exchange reserve changes ( tf∆ ) respectively. A random 
error term tv  is included in the equation to capture the effects of omitted variables from the 
equation and deviations from equilibrium. Similarly, α  is an intercept that measures the 
extent of pressure in case all regressors included in the equation are equal to zero. Girton and 
Roper (1977) estimated equation 3.1 for Canada using annualised data for the period 1952 
through 1974. The estimated coefficient of domestic credit in equation 3.1 was quite high, 
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suggesting that Canadian monetary authorities when under a fixed exchange rate, had little 
scope for pursuing independent monetary policy. In other words, an increase in domestic 
credit reflected in either exchange rate changes ( ts∆ ) or foreign exchange reserve changes 
( tf∆ ) or any combination of both under managed float. Other variables included in the 
regression equation (3.1) confirmed their theoretical predictions. Girton and Roper (1977) 
tested the sensitivity of exchange market pressure index to its components (whether the 
authorities absorb pressure in international reserve changes or exchange rate changes) by 
including a new variable tt fs /=ϑ  in (3.1) and re-estimated it. The newly introduced variable 
was insignificant and the estimates of the rest of the variables remained unchanged. This 
suggests that the constructed exchange market pressure is insensitive to its components (see 
table 3.1). This has the policy implication that the components of Exchange Market Pressure 
can be used for the foreign exchange market intervention necessary for attaining certain 
exchange rate targets (Girton and Roper, 1977). 
A modified version of Girton and Roper’s (1977) model was applied to Brazil by 
Connolly and da Silveira (1979). This modified version depends on four essential ingredients: 
(a) stable money demand function, (b) money supply (c) purchasing power parity, and (d) 
monetary equilibrium. Unlike Girton and Roper (1977), Connolly and da Silveira assume that 
purchasing power parity holds continuously.8 Based on these assumptions, they derived a 
single country exchange market pressure regression equation given as:  
tttt ypdEMP ∆+∆+∆−= 3
*
21 βββ        (3.2)  
 Connolly and da Silveira estimated equation (3.2) for two period: one for 1955-1975 
and then for a shorter sub-period of fourteen years, 1962-1975 for Brazil. The sign of the 
estimated coefficient on the growth of domestic credit was consistent with a monetary model 
                                                 
8
 Purchasing power parity states that domestic prices reflect foreign prices via exchange rate changes. 
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of exchange market pressure and was significant in both periods. This can be interpreted as 
given a stable money demand function; an increase in domestic credit is associated with an 
outflow of foreign exchange reserve or depreciation of exchange rate or any combination of 
these under a managed float. Thus the domestic credit coefficient worked as an offsetting 
coefficient, and reflected changes in domestic credit being offset by either exchange rate 
changes or foreign exchange reserve changes or any combination of these. The estimates of 
both foreign price, 2β  and income ,3β  were not significant from 1955 to 1975, but were from 
1962 to 1975. This shows that an increase in these variables appreciated domestic currency, 
encourages capital inflow or a combination of both, and thus reduced pressure on domestic 
currency. 
 It is argued that the regression equation that uses the exchange rate or foreign exchange 
reserves changes as the sole dependent variable assumes a fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regime. Connoly and da Silveira (1979) verified the performance of the model that uses 
simultaneous changes in exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes by comparing its 
results with those that are obtained using exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes 
as the sole dependent variable. The results of the regression equation that used exchange rate 
and foreign exchange reserve changes compared to those obtained using the sum of exchange 
rate and foreign exchange reserve changes were poor for the entire sample period and worst 
for the sub-sample. This confirmed the opinion that under a managed float, simultaneous 
changes in exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes better explain exchange 
market pressure then exchange rate or foreign exchange reserve changes alone. They also 
tested the sensitivity of exchange market pressure to its components by including 
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)1/()1( −−= ttt fsϑ  exchange rate to foreign exchange reserve ratio.9 The basic objective of 
including this ratio as an additional variable was to check what fraction of pressure the 
monetary authorities relieve by exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes 
respectively. The higher value of the estimated coefficient of tϑ  implied that monetary 
authorities preferred exchange rate changes in relieving pressure. On the other hand, lower 
value is associated with foreign exchange reserve absorbing a major portion of exchange 
market pressure. The estimated coefficient of tϑ  was insignificant and other coefficients 
remained unchanged. The insignificant estimate of tϑ  implied that the monetary authorities 
did not distinguish between exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves in relieving 
exchange market pressure (see Table 3.1 for details).  
The modified version of Girton and Roper (1977) given in equation 3.2 is further 
applied by Modeste (1981) for evaluating the Argentinean monetary experience during the 
1970s. All variables except foreign price confirmed their theoretical predictions. However, the 
estimated coefficient of foreign price was insignificant and yet the F – statistic of 9.41 indicate 
that the three variables together explained substantial variation in exchange market pressure.10 
Modeste (1981) further tested the sensitivity of exchange market pressure to its components 
by including )1/()1( −−= ttt fsϑ  as an additional regressor. The estimated coefficient of tϑ  
was insignificant and the estimated parameters for the remaining variables remained 
unchanged. This supports the view that monetary authorities did not distinguish between 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes in restoring foreign exchange market 
equilibrium. Modeste (1981) further tested the efficacy of monetary model of exchange 
market pressure using exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves as the sole dependent 
                                                 
9
 Girton and Roper (1977) used tt fs /=ϑ  for testing the sensitivity of Exchange Market Pressure to its 
components. It is discontinuous for values of tf  equals to zero.  
10
 The F-test is used to test the null that all estimated parameters in the regression equation are zero. Its rejection 
implies that one of these estimates is non-zero and thus explains some variation in the dependent variable.  
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variables. The use of exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves as the sole dependent 
variable implies flexible and fixed exchange rate system. The estimates of exchange market 
pressure using either exchange rate or foreign exchange reserve changes as sole dependent 
variable were inferior to those obtained from the regression equation that used the sum of 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes as the dependent variables. This confirm 
the view that under managed float, both exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves instead 
of exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves alone better explain market pressure for 
Argentina in 1970s. These finding confirm the superiority of monetary model in explaining 
market pressure under a managed float.         
The studies discussed above focused on the relationship between exchange market 
pressure and its determinants. It is important for the parameters to be stable over time for the 
formulation of effective policy. Hodgson and Schneck (1981) addressed this issue and tested 
the stability of Exchange Market Pressure and its monetary determinants for Canada, France, 
West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. They used quarterly data from 
1959:02 to 1976:01 and two stage least square approach for carrying out their analysis. For the 
United Kingdom, the sample period was 1964:02 to 1976:01, due to the absence of some data 
before 1964. Hodgson and Schneck tested the stability of the relationship between Exchange 
Market Pressure and its determinants using the following equation:  
tttttt dapysEMP ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+= + 543211 βββββα  
                    tttttt vfdapy ++∆+∆+∆+∆ ∗∗∗∗∗ 109876 βββββ    (3.3)    
 The new variables introduced in equation 3.3 are 1+∆ ts  and ta∆ . The former denote future 
spot rate of the same maturity as domestic and foreign interest rate and the latter is the deposit 
expansion multiplier. The future spot rate reflects the linkage between domestic and foreign 
economies through the asset market. It reflects the effects of interest rate differential between 
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domestic and foreign countries on exchange market pressure. The deposit expansion multiplier 
is the inverse of reserve requirements. It reflects the influence of an increase in checkable 
deposits resulting from the changes in the reserves of the commercial banks on exchange rate 
and reserve changes. The world counterparts of the domestic variables are denoted by *. The 
world variables are weighted average of the corresponding variables for the individual 
countries. The weights are the ratio of individual money stocks to world money stocks. The 
world is defined as the sample countries plus United States, Japan and Italy.   
Expected signs of the coefficients are: 
0,,,, 109872 >βββββ  and  0,,, 7654 <ββββ  
The sign of 1β  is uncertain. It reflects the effect of interest rate differential between domestic 
and foreign country on exchange market pressure through uncovered interest rate parity. This 
could be either positive or negative. The positive effect of future spot exchange rate is in 
conformity with the Chicago theory that assumes flexible prices. As a consequence, changes 
in nominal interest rate reflect changes in expected inflation rate. Therefore, an increase in 
domestic interest rate relative to foreign interest rate reflect an increase in domestic inflation 
and hence an increase in pressure on domestic currency to depreciate.      
On the other hand, negative future spot rate is in accord with Keynes theory which 
assumes sticky prices, at least in the short run. Thus the assumption of sticky prices suggests a 
rise in interest rate as a consequence of contraction in domestic money supply without 
matching fall in domestic prices. A domestic interest rate higher than the foreign interest rate 
attracts capital inflows and thus puts pressure on domestic currency to appreciate. Thus 
Keynes theory suggests a negative relationship between future spot rate and exchange market 
pressure. The results indicate that money demand variables were generally insignificant. On 
the other hand, money supply variables like domestic credit and home money multiplier were 
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significant with signs as predicted by theory. The stability test however, suggested a weak 
relationship between exchange market pressure and its monetary determinants.11  
The estimated parameters of domestic income ( ty∆ ), foreign price ( *tp∆ ), foreign 
deposit expansion multiplier ( *ta∆ ) and expansion in the domestic credit of foreign country 
( *td∆ ) results either an increase in foreign exchange reserve or appreciation of domestic 
currency or both and thus reduce pressure on domestic currency. On the other hand, the 
estimated coefficients of changes in domestic price ( tp∆ ), domestic deposit expansion 
multiplier ( ta∆ ), domestic credit ( td∆ ) and foreign income ( *ty∆ ) exert pressure on domestic 
currency to depreciate and that an increase in these variables either reduces domestic countries 
holding of foreign exchange reserves, depreciates the value of domestic currency or both.   
A slightly altered formulation of Connolly and da Silveira’s (1979) version of Girton 
and Roper’s (1977) model was adopted by Kim (1985) for examining Korean foreign 
exchange market conditions for the period March 1980 to July 1983. He estimated the 
following equation: 
ttttt mmypdEMP ∆−∆+∆+∆−=
∗
4321 ββββ      (3.4)                                                         
In addition to standard variables, Kim includes tmm∆  in the equation for capturing the effects 
of money multiplier changes on Exchange Market Pressure.12 The negative estimates of 
domestic credit and money multiplier confirmed theoretical predictions that an increase in 
these variables increased pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. This can be interpreted 
as, when the nominal cash balances of the domestic residents increase, they swap them for 
foreign currency. This increases pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. On the other 
                                                 
11
 Zettelmeyer (2004) evaluated the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rate in Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand during the 1990s. They identified monetary shocks with the reaction of three months market 
interest rate to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day 
and found a negative association between interest rate hike and exchange market pressure.   
12
 The money multiplier reflects the total change in the money supply that results from an increase of one unit of 
money in the economy. 
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hand, positive estimates of foreign price and domestic income support the view that an 
increase in both these variables attracts either an inflow of foreign exchange reserves or 
exchange rate appreciation or any combination of both. Kim reestimated equation 3.4 by 
including )1/()1( −−= ttt fsϑ  as an additional regressor. The objective was to test the 
sensitivity of exchange market pressure to its components. The estimate of coefficient on this 
variable was insignificant and other variables remained unaffected. This suggests that 
monetary authorities did not distinguish between exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve 
in relieving pressure. Finally, Kim estimated equation 3.4 using foreign exchange reserves as 
the sole dependent variable. The estimated coefficient of variation and significance of foreign 
price increased substantially while that of domestic income and domestic credit reduced 
slightly. Kim interprets this finding as the Korean monetary authorities preferring to utilise 
foreign exchange reserves in relieving pressure. This may reflect the Korean monetary 
authorities’ fear that exchange rate movements may unduly influence domestic prices and the 
debt burden of the country.    
 The monetary models that used exchange rate changes as the sole dependent variable  
failed to explain short-term movements of Canadian-US dollar exchange rate in the 1970s 
(Backus, 1984; Lafrance and Racette, 1985). This cast doubt on the validity of the monetary 
approach as an explanation of the short run movements of Canadian-US exchange rate after 
the breakdown of Bretton Wood system. Burdekin and Burkett (1990) argued that the studies 
that use exchange rate as the sole dependent variable implicitly assume a fully flexible 
exchange rate which seems inconsistent with the actual post-Bretton Wood experience of dirty 
float. They therefore used simultaneous changes in exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserve as the dependent variable and re-examined the performance of the Girton and Roper’s 
(1977) monetary model for explaining short-term movements of the Canadian-US exchange 
rate for the period 1963:01 to 1988:01. The objective was to test whether the monetary model 
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adequately explains short-term movements of the Canadian-US exchange rate since its 
floating in June 1970. The proposed dynamic specification of the Girton and Roper (1977) 
model included lagged dependent and independent variables. Other variables included in the 
model are the Canadian and US gross national product deflators and the Canadian and US 
three-month Treasury bill rates. The results indicate that all variables have signs consistent 
with the literature and were generally significantly different from zero. However, some 
variables were insignificant, particularly the Canadian Treasury Bill Rate.        
A modified version of Girton and Roper’s (1977) monetary model of Exchange Market 
Pressure as given in equation 3.4 was further applied by Thornton (1995) to Costa Rica. Costa 
Rica is a small economy in which foreign prices and monetary conditions are taken as given. 
In addition, Costa Rica’s domestic currency and foreign exchange reserves witnessed 
significant changes over the given sample period. This made Costa Rica a suitable country for 
testing the validity of Girton and Roper’s (1977) monetary model of Exchange Market 
Pressure.  
The estimated parameters were in conformity with their theoretical predictions. The 
negative estimate of domestic credit and money multiplier implied that an increase in domestic 
credit increased pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. On the other hand, positive signs 
of foreign price and domestic income suggest that an increase in these parameters is associated 
with decrease in pressure on domestic currency. Thornton (1995) further tested the sensitivity 
of exchange market pressure to its components by including the ratio of the exchange rate to 
foreign exchange reserves )1/()1( −−= ttt fsϑ . The estimated coefficient on this variable was 
insignificant and other estimates remained unchanged. This suggests that monetary authorities 
did not distinguish between exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes in relieving 
pressure. Finally, Thornton (1995) reestimated the model using foreign exchange reserves as 
the sole dependent variable. The overall estimates of the model improved substantially, which 
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the author interprets as the Central Bank of Costa Rica preferring foreign exchange reserve in 
relieving pressure. This may reflect the monetary authorities’ fear that exchange rate changes 
might influence domestic price levels.  
All the studies discussed above, except Burdekin and Burkett (1990), estimated Girton 
and Roper (1977) and its modified version without allowing for a dynamic response. Mah 
(1998) on the other hand, adopted a dynamic approach and re-examined Connolly and da 
Silveira’s (1979) version of Girton and Roper’s model as given in equation 3.2 for Korea. The 
dynamic equation that Mah proposed included lagged values of the independent variables. The 
estimated coefficients showed signs consistent with their theoretical predictions. Furthermore, 
the estimated parameters were significantly different from zero suggesting that dynamic 
specification of equation 3.2 explained exchange market pressure for Korea adequately.    
All the studies discussed above use Girton and Roper’s (1977) model to examine 
individual country Exchange Market Pressure. Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999) on the 
other hand, employed Girton and Roper’s (1977) model for investigating tEMP  for Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and the US. They estimated three different specifications 
of this equation. In addition to the benchmark model as given in equation 3.4, they estimated it 
using exchange rate foreign exchange reserve ratio )1/()1( −−= ttt fsϑ  as an additional 
independent variable. The basic objective of including this ratio was to test the sensitivity of 
exchange market pressure to its component. The third specification used foreign exchange 
reserve changes instead of composite index that includes exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserves as the dependent variable. The estimates of benchmark equation were poor. The 
domestic credit coefficient was insignificant for all countries except Canada and the UK. 
However, when the same equation is estimated using tϑ  as an additional regressor, results 
were substantially improved. The estimate of tϑ  is significant and of negative sign, suggesting 
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that most of the pressure in these countries is absorbed by changes in foreign exchange 
reserves rather than exchange rate changes. Finally, the specification of equation 3.4 that used 
foreign exchange reserves instead of composite variables, including exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserve changes yield the estimates of variables of interest in accord with literature. 
One implication of these findings is that the exchange rate regime of these countries was close 
to fixed instead of freely floating.  
Contrary to the studies discussed above, Pollard (1999), tested Wohar and Lee’s (1992) 
formulations of the Girton–Roper (1977) model using data from Barbados (1968 - 1991), 
Guyana (1964 - 1985), Jamaica (1964 - 1993), and Trinidad and Tobago (1967 - 1993). The 
basic objective of the paper was to identify the international variables that develop pressure on 
Caribbean countries’ currencies. Wohar and Lee’s (1992) formulation of the Girton and Roper 
model is given as: 
ttttttttt veryyqmdmmEMP +∆−∆−∆+∆+∆+∆−∆−= 7
*
654
*
321 βββββββ  (3.5) 
tq and ter denotes deviation from the purchasing power parity and interest rate differential 
between domestic and foreign country.  
 Wohar and Lee (1992) proposed an alternative to this model which is given as:  
ttttttttt veryqipdmmEMP +∆−∆+∆+∆−∆+∆−∆−= 765
*
4
*
321 βββββββ  (3.6) 
The difference between the two equations is the way foreign disturbance enters into the 
economy. In equation 3.5, foreign money supply and income are the sources of foreign 
disturbance. On the other, foreign price and interest rate are the important sources of foreign 
disturbances in equation 3.6.   
 The estimates of both domestic credit and money multiplier are significant and are 
negatively signed, which is in conformity with the literature. Similarly, the estimate of 
differential between domestic and foreign price is positive and is significant, suggesting that 
 55 
purchasing power parity does not hold for Caribbean countries. Similarly, the coefficient of 
domestic income, although of positive sign, is not significantly different from zero.    
The results further showed that growth in US money supply significantly increased 
pressure for Barbados and Guyana and was therefore identified as a major source of foreign 
disturbance for these countries. On the other hand, US inflation significantly increased 
pressure for Jamaica and Trinidad and was therefore identified as an important source of 
foreign disturbance for these countries. For Jamaica, the US interest rate was identified as a 
source that contributed to the build up of pressure on its currency. Finally, Pollard tested the 
composition of Exchange Market Pressure to its components by including another variable 
)1/()1( −−= ttt fsϑ  in the regression equation. The estimated coefficient on this ratio was 
insignificant for Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. However, for Barbados and Guyana the 
estimate was significant and of positive and negative sign. This suggests that in Barbados, the 
monetary authorities preferred exchange rate changes for relieving pressure. On the other 
hand, the negative estimate of this ratio implies that monetary authorities in Guyana 
intervened in foreign exchange market and relieved most of the pressure by selling and 
purchasing foreign exchange reserves.   
Contrary to above studies, Taslim (2003) applied Girton and Roper’s (1977) 
framework to study Australian exchange market pressure and reserve transactions during 
1975-1997. The results indicate substantial reserve transactions even after the switch to a 
floating exchange rate in December, 1983. This shows that Australian monetary authorities 
permitted little flexibility to exchange rate in adjusting towards its underlying market 
equilibrium rate. An implication of the continued intervention is that monetary policy is 
unlikely to be fully independent of balance of payments adjustments.  
Most of the studies that we have discussed have used domestic and foreign 
macroeconomic variables as Exchange Market Pressure determinants. Conversely, Hallwood 
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and Marsh (2004) used expected exchange rate changes within the bands 1+∆ txE  and expected 
exchange rate depreciation from the central parity 1+tEc  along with macroeconomic variables 
as the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure. They evaluated Exchange Market Pressure 
against pound during the inter-war period when it operated a peg to gold and consequently to 
the US dollar and estimated an Exchange Market Pressure model in the following form:13 
ttttttttt vcExEqyyddEMP +∆−∆−∆−∆−∆++−= +
∗∗ )()( 6154321 ββββββα  (3.7) 
tEMP  refers to Girton and Roper’s (1977) measure of Exchange Market Pressure index. Its 
lower value implies greater pressure against pound because there is some reduction in the 
domestic reserves relative to foreign reserves and exchange rate depreciation.  
We include 1+∆ txE  and 1+tEc  as additional regressors. The rationale for including the 
real exchange rate is to evaluate the effect of deviation from purchasing power parity on the 
level of exchange market pressure. An over-valued real exchange rate reduces domestic 
exporters’ competitiveness in the international market and hence puts downward pressure on 
domestic currency. The deviations from central parity ( tc ) and movements of exchange rate 
within the band ( tx ) reflect the effect of expected exchange rate change on the level of 
exchange market pressure. Uncovered interest rate parity suggests that expected exchange rate 
reflects the differential between domestic and foreign interest rate therefore, we include 
deviations from central parity ( tc ) and movements of exchange rate within the band ( tx ) to 
evaluate the effect of interest rate differential on exchange market pressure. The asterisk 
denotes foreign counterparts of domestic variables.  
 The main finding of the paper is that devaluation expectation as denoted by deviations 
from central parity ( tc ) and movements of exchange rate within band ( tx ) and UK 
                                                 
13
 Hallwood and Marsh (2004) used monthly data between May 1925 and August 1931 and McCallum-Wicken’s 
instrumental variable technique, which uses instruments for endogenous variables.  
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macroeconomic fundamentals have significant power in explaining pressure. This has 
important implications in that disciplined management of macroeconomic fundamentals may 
not be enough to maintain a currency peg over a time. A foreign disturbance can put pressure 
on domestic currency and results in the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime.  
 Foreign debt is an important factor that determines pressure on domestic currency. 
However, its effect on market pressure has not been evaluated in the empirical studies 
discussed above. There are two channels through which an increase in foreign debt increases 
pressure. It is argued that the debt burden contributes to market pressure in the form of 
increased debt and debt servicing payments. This is a direct effect of debt burden on market 
pressure. Indirectly, debt burden reduces productivity in the economy. With unchanged 
demand, a drop in the production increases prices of domestic goods and services. With 
unchanged world price level, increase in domestic prices increases pressure on domestic 
currency to depreciate. This makes it necessary to evaluate the effects of debt burden on the 
build up of exchange market pressure.  
 Guyana’s debt showed great fluctuations for the period 1968 to 2000. In 1968, it 
constituted approximately 30 percent of Guyana’s domestic income and had increased to more 
than 800 percent of domestic income by 1991. It fell to 180.5 percent of domestic income in 
2000 due to debt relief given by the donor community. This makes it necessary to consider the 
impact of foreign debt burden on the build up of foreign exchange market pressure for 
Guyana. Modeste (2005) evaluated the impact of the foreign debt burden on Guyana market 
pressure using following equation: 
1554
*
3
*
21 −+−−+−−= ttttttt XuncerrpopBdEMP ββββββα    (3.8) 
We include the foreign debt burden ( *tB ), relative price of crude oil ( trpo ), macroeconomic 
uncertainty ( tuncer ) and lagged real exports ( 1−tX ). Lagged real exports are used to allow for 
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a delay in the response of productivity changes to growth in real exports. It is assumed that 
productivity growth is influenced by foreign debt burden, relative price of crude oil, 
macroeconomic uncertainty, and lagged growth in real exports and is therefore replaced by 
these variables in equation 3.8. The results confirm theoretical predictions. Empirical evidence 
shows that domestic credit, foreign debt burden, relative crude oil price and macroeconomic 
uncertainty are positively correlated with exchange market pressure. On the other hand, 
growth in foreign price ( *tp ) and lagged real exports ( 1exp −t ) reduce pressure on Guyanian 
dollar to depreciate.14  
The studies discussed above confirm monetary approach to Exchange Market Pressure 
which argues that a rise in the domestic component of a monetary base would reduce either the 
foreign exchange reserve or the depreciation of currency. The results obtained in these studies 
further support this interpretation. Particularly, domestic credit is consistently negatively 
related to Exchange Market Pressure, and is significant, apart from in Bahmani Oskooee and 
Bernstein (1999). This suggests that a rise in domestic credit results either in exchange rate 
depreciation or depletion of foreign exchange reserves or any combination of these. This has 
the important policy implication for the Central Bank having to give up its monetary 
independence of attaining domestic objectives when it targets exchange rate stability. The 
estimate of money multiplier has also the same interpretation. Furthermore, the estimates of 
foreign price and domestic income are consistent with their prediction. An increase in 
domestic income and foreign price reduce pressure on domestic currency. All these findings 
are consistent with the monetary model of exchange market pressure.    
 
                                                 
14
 Burket and Richard (1993) evaluated the impact of global and regional developments and found that the shocks 
emanating in the region had greater power in explaining Paraguayan pressure.    
Table 3.1 Summary of Early Empirical Evidence on Girton and Roper (1977) Exchange Market Pressure Model. 
Authors Country Period td  tmm  
*
tm  
*
tp  
*
ty  ty  tq  ter  
*
ti  
Girton and Roper(1977) Canada c  1952A - 1974A -0.96 a   1.14 a   -2.84 a  2.80 a     
Connolly and da Silveira (1979) Brazil c  1955A - 1975A -0.85 a    1.2  2.78    
Modeste (1981 Argentina c  1972Q2 - 1978Q3  -1.46 a    1.1  0.87 a     
Kim (1985) c  Korea 1980M2 - 1983M7 -0.69 a  -0.56 a   0.95  0.06 a     
Thornton(1995) c  Costa Rica 1986M1 - 1992M12 -0.92 a  -0.85 a   4.3 a   0.43 a     
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999)  Canada c  1973Q1 - 1993Q3 -1.37 a  -1.46 a   1.36 a   0.06 a     
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999)  France c  1973Q1 - 1993Q3 -0.42 a  -0.44 a   -0.06  -1.26    
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999)  Germany c  1973Q1 - 1993Q3 -0.43 a  -1.30 a   -0.33  -0.30    
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999)  Italy c  1973Q1 - 1993Q3 0.04 -0.55 a   0.31  0.31    
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999)  Japan c  1973Q1 - 1993Q3 -0.99 a  -1.29 a   0.18  0.37 a     
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999)  UK c  1973Q1 - 1993Q3 1.15 a  -1.45 a   1.13 a   -0.13    
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999)  US c  1973Q1 - 1993Q3 -0.26 a  -0.23 a   -0.01  -0.07    
Polard (1999)  Barbados c  1968A - 1993 -1.04 a  -1.38 a  0.61 a   0.31 2.033 a  0.29 0.01  
Polard (1999)  Guyana c  1964A-1985A -1.02 a  -0.83 a  1.59 a   -0.05 0.51 1.05 a  -0.12 a   
Polard (1999)  Jamaica c  (1964A-1993A) -0.97 a  -1.07 a   1.88 a   1.35 a  1.06 a  0.14 - 0.36 a  
Polard (1999)  
Trinidad 
&Tobago 1967A-1993A -1.01 a  -1.09 a   2.14 a   1.12 a  1.16 a  -0.08 -0.02 
Note: td , tmm , 
*
tm , 
*
tp , 
*
ty , ty , tq , ter  and 
*
ti  denotes domestic credit, money multiplier, foreign money supply, foreign price, foreign income, domestic income, deviations from purchasing 
power parity, interest differential between domestic and foreign country and foreign interest rate. c  denotes that this regression uses independent variable )1/()1( −−= ttt feϑ . The coefficients 
of tϑ  are not reported due to space constraint. The above empirical studies use Ordinary Least Square as estimation method. a  denotes that estimated parameters are significantly different from zero. 
Note:  
3.2 Exchange Market Pressure Studies Based on VAR approach  
 
 In economics, it is common to have variables that not only explain some dependent 
variables but are also explained by the dependent variables. Such a situation is characterised as 
simultaneous equation bias. This issue is generally dealt with by the use of the instrumental 
variables technique which uses instrumental variables for endogenous variables. Furthermore, 
it splits variables between exogenous and endogenous variables. Sims (1980) criticised this 
approach and advocated equal treatment of all variables in the presence of simultaneous 
equation bias. That all variables should be treated as endogenous. It was in this spirit that Sims 
(1980) developed the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) Approach. Since its development, the 
VAR approach has been frequently used in empirical international finance literature.        
The theoretical literature on currency crises emphasises macroeconomic variables and 
shifts in market expectations about the macroeconomic fundamentals as important 
determinants. Karfakis and Moschos (1999) used the VAR framework to examine the 
macroeconomic fundamentals that explain Exchange Market Pressure for Greece, using 
quarterly data from 1975Q1 to 1995Q4. The Granger causality results thus obtained show that 
real overvaluation of the drachma, the reserve adequacy ratio, the current account balance and 
the net capital movements have predictive power in explaining Greece exchange market 
pressure for the given period. On the other hand, variance and historical decomposition results 
show that shocks associated with real over valuation, reserve adequacy ratio, and net capital 
movements were the most important sources of foreign exchange market pressure in Greece. 
These findings have the implication that monetary authorities should monitor the signals given 
by these variables if they want to avoid pressure on the Greek drachma.   
 The independence of monetary authorities in formulating effective monetary policy 
depends on the exchange rate regime. In a fixed exchange rate regime, monetary authorities 
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target the domestic currency value and market determines its quantity. Thus under a fixed 
exchange rate, monetary authorities lose monetary independence as they cannot use monetary 
instruments for attaining domestic objectives. On the other hand, a floating exchange rate buys 
monetary independence but monetary authorities have to give up the freedom of fixing the 
value of domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. In a managed float system, 
monetary authorities can simultaneously target the exchange rate stability and domestic 
objectives. Kamaly and Erbil (2000) used Exchange Market Pressure and a VAR approach for 
gauging the monetary independence for Middle East and North African (MENA) region 
countries (Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey) that maintained a managed float.15 The authors were 
primarily interested in gauging the degree of monetary independence and the monetary 
authorities’ response to exchange market pressure for MENA region.  
The small estimates of domestic credit and interest rate differential may imply a higher 
degree of monetary independence for Turkey. This is also evident from exchange rate changes 
that dominate foreign exchange reserve changes. This provides support that the Turkish 
economy is more open and Turkish monetary authorities can use monetary policy for targeting 
domestic objectives. On the other hand, the large estimates of domestic credit and interest rate 
for Egypt and Tunisia suggest a low degree of monetary independence. The authors’ 
interpretation of this finding is that in an environment of low monetary independence, 
monetary authorities have to vigorously change its monetary instruments for them to have a 
desirable effect on exchange market pressure.     
Contrary to Kamaly and Erbil (2000) who tested the independence of monetary 
authorities, Tanner (2001) examined the responses of monetary authorities to Exchange 
Market Pressure for Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand in VAR framework. 
                                                 
15
 The authors provide two reasons to justify the use of VAR: (a) it circumvents the endogenity problem, and (b) 
it provides an effective tool to analyse how a system reacts to shocks in one of its components through Impulse 
Response Function.   
 62 
Particularly, Tanner was interested in identifying whether monetary authorities sterilised their 
foreign exchange market intervention. The results indicate that contractionary monetary policy 
reduced pressure. However, Mexican and East Asian countries’ monetary authorities sterilised 
their foreign exchange market intervention and thus increased domestic credit in the event of a 
speculative attack on their currencies.     
Tanner (2002) further extended his previous work (Tanner, 2001) and reexamined the 
relationship between exchange market pressure and monetary variables for 32 emerging 
markets in Western Hemisphere, Asia and Europe. Vector Autoregression Approach has the 
advantage of examining the relationship between exchange market pressure and monetary 
policy in both directions. In this study, Tanner (2002) used a modified exchange market 
pressure index that consisted of three elements, namely a real money demand, money supply 
and real exchange rate, as its components.16 The VAR estimates of exchange market pressure 
indicate a positive association between domestic credit and exchange market pressure, a 
finding consistent with traditional monetary theory. The negative estimate of interest rate 
differential for the majority of the countries also confirms their theoretical predictions. This 
suggests that an increase in interest rate differential reduces pressure on domestic currency. 
Shocks to exchange market pressure increase domestic credit and thus confirmed the view that 
domestic monetary authorities sterilised their foreign exchange market intervention.  
Pooled estimates further support individual country vector auto regression estimates.  
They show a positive association between domestic credit and exchange market pressure. 
However, pooled estimates of interest rate differential provide inconclusive evidence. The 
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 Tanner (2002) uses modified exchange market pressure given as: tttt mdemp λ+−= . Here tλ   denotes 
foreign price (
*
tp ) and deviations from purchasing power parity ( tz ). Thus exchange market pressure increases 
with fall in real money demand ( tm ),  increase in domestic component of money supply ( td ) or real exchange 
rate depreciates or foreign inflation falls ( tλ ) 
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augmented model that includes fiscal policy variable estimated for the subset of the countries 
further provides evidence of the positive association between domestic credit and Exchange 
Market Pressure.17  
The East Asian financial crises affected the countries of region to varying degrees and 
the Philippine was no exception to this. The standard International Monetary Fund 
prescription was the same as that embodied in monetary model of Exchange Market Pressure - 
to reduce domestic credit instead of targeting any exchange rate level (Boorman et al. 2000). 
Gochoco-Bautista and Bautista (2005) examined whether the prescription suggested by the 
International Monetary Fund contributed to strengthening the Philippine peso during the 
period. Particularly they focused on whether the monetary authorities’ response of contracting 
domestic credit reduced pressure on the Philippine peso. They used Tanner’s (2000, 2001) 
VAR method and obtained results that supported the traditional view of a positive association 
between domestic credit and Exchange Market Pressure. This supports the view that increase 
in domestic credit expansion either depreciates domestic currency or depletes the foreign 
exchange reserves of Central Bank or both. The results provide further evidence that in the 
non-crisis period, monetary authorities sterilised reserve outflow, fearing that unsterilised 
foreign exchange intervention would cause bankruptcy of the domestic financial system. 
However, in the crisis period, monetary authorities abstained from sterilizing foreign reserve 
outflow and followed a tight monetary policy in the face of exchange market pressure. 
Furthermore, in a non-crisis period, an increase in interest rate differential reduced pressure. 
Conversely to that, in a crisis period, an increase in interest rate differential increased pressure, 
suggesting a perverse effect. This has an important policy implication in that in the crisis 
                                                 
17
 Younus (2005) used Engel and Granger’s (1987) two-step procedure and Vector Error Correction Model for 
evaluating the impact of domestic credit on exchange market pressure for Bangladesh. They found that an 
increase in domestic credit increases exchange market pressure, which is reflected either in exchange rate 
depreciation or foreign exchange reserves depletions or any combination these.    
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period, the use of interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy will not yield the desired 
results.     
 The empirical studies on Exchange Market Pressure that use a VAR approach tends to 
omit the output growth variable. However, the domestic output growth is considered to be an 
important determinant of Exchange Market Pressure. In the Girton and Roper (1977) model, 
growth in domestic output reduces pressure on the domestic currency. Furthermore, the second 
generation currency crises models argue that output growth might inversely affect the 
devaluation expectation and hence reduce pressure on the domestic currency. Due to its 
enormous importance, Garcia and Malet (2007) used a VAR framework and included 
domestic output as an additional determinant in examining Exchange Market Pressure for 
Argentina from 1993-2004.  
The results indicate a positive relationship between domestic credit and market 
pressure – a finding consistent with the monetary approach to balance of payments. Shocks to 
Exchange Market Pressure indicate that Argentinean monetary authorities sterilised reserve 
outflow with a view to providing enough liquidity to the domestic financial system. Second, 
this study finds a positive association between interest rate and Exchange Market Pressure. 
This suggests that interest rate rather than reducing pressure alerted domestic investors to the 
eventual need for depreciation and thus increased pressure. Third, the study provides evidence 
that increase in output reduced pressure on Argentinean currency. This finding confirms the 
second generation currency crises model’s theoretical prediction that worsening fundamentals 
increase pressure on a fixed exchange rate regime to collapse.18  
The empirical literature that analysed exchange market pressure in a VAR framework 
delivers consistent results. It indicates that an increase in domestic credit increases pressure on 
domestic currency. This has an important policy implication for countries that target the 
                                                 
18
 Kumah (2007) examined exchange market pressure and its dynamics for the Kyrgz Republic using the Markov 
Regime switching approach and found that contractionary monetary policy helps reduce pressure.  
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exchange rate stability, in that they would have to give up the independence of using monetary 
policy instruments for attaining domestic objectives such as output growth and stable prices. 
The interest rate effect in some studies is contrary to what the theoretical literature suggests 
and seems to be insignificant. A positive interest rate coefficient implies that monetary 
authorities cannot use the interest rate as a policy instrument for reducing pressure. On the 
other hand, a negative relationship between exchange market pressure and domestic output is 
confirmed in Garcia and Malet (2007). All these studies suggest that monetary authorities 
cannot use the interest rate as a policy instrument in a crisis period. However, if the policy 
authorities wish to reduce pressure, they have to control domestic credit growth and formulate 
policies conducive to domestic output growth.   
3.3 Empirical Studies of the Weymark (1995) Model    
 
 Prior to Weymark (1995), Frenkel and Aizenman (1982) derived an index that 
measures the extent of foreign exchange market intervention. It takes the value of zero and one 
for two extreme exchange rate regimes, flexible and fixed. Based on Frenkel and Aizenman’s 
(1982) index, Weymark (1995) proposed an index of exchange market pressure which she 
later used for developing a quantitative measure of the degree of exchange market 
intervention. It indicates the fraction of pressure that a Central Bank relieves through the 
purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves. Weymark (1995) argues that the intervention 
index values can be used as a tool for analysing the monetary policy being implemented.   
Using a simple macroeconomic model with rational expectations, Weymark (1995) 
constructed a quarterly measure of exchange market pressure and intervention index for 
Canada between 1975 and 1991. A subset of these calculated values was then used to analyse 
the Bank of Canada’s conduct of exchange rate policy over the period 1981–1984. The 
Exchange Market Pressure indicated upward pressure on Canadian dollar between 1975Q2 to 
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1984Q4. In the post-1984 period there was downward pressure. The intervention index mean 
value indicated that on average, the intervention activities of the Central Bank of Canada 
removed approximately 96% of the pressure by purchasing and selling foreign exchange 
reserves. Exchange rate changes relieved the remaining market pressure. Poso and Spolander 
(1997) used the Weymark (1995) model for analysing the Bank of Finland’s conduct of 
monetary policy during the markka’s recent float from September 1992 to October (1996). 
The average exchange market pressure was more often negative than positive. The 
intervention index mean value of 0.99 indicated that the Bank of Finland removed almost all 
the pressure by purchasing and selling foreign exchange reserves and permitted limited 
flexibility for the exchange rate to adjust towards its underlying free float equilibrium value. 
 A Weymark-type model was also applied to Chile and Greece by Kohlschen (2000) 
and Apergis and Eleftheriou (2002), respectively. Kohlschen (2000) modified Weymark’s 
(1995) model slightly and applied exchange market pressure and intervention index to analyse 
pressure on the Chilean peso from 1990 to 1998.19 He slightly modified the index with reserve 
requirement and gathered the evidence that supported the Chilean peso’s experiencing upward 
pressure. Furthermore, the intervention index values suggest that the Central Bank of Chile 
substantially intervened in the foreign exchange market and prevented the Chilean peso from 
appreciation for most of the time. 
An approach slightly modified from Weymark’s (1995) model was also applied by 
Apergis and Eleftheriou (2002) to analyse Greek monetary authorities’ response to Exchange 
Market Pressure from 1975 to 1998. They assumed the absence of a well-developed financial 
system and therefore, the absence of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign 
assets. In other words, they assumed that uncovered interest parity condition does not hold. 
                                                 
19
 In the early 1990s, Chile witnessed a surge in capital inflows equivalent to 10% of GDP, due to lax US 
monetary policy. In order to avoid a conflict between capital inflows and domestic objectives, the Chilean Central 
Bank initially imposed a one-year non-interest bearing reserve requirement on selected capital inflows. Initially, 
it was set up to 10% and was increased to 30% in May 1992.  
 67 
The mean of the exchange market pressure was positive from 1975Q4 to 1989Q4. On the 
other hand, in the post-1990 period, exchange market pressure was negative, indicating 
appreciating pressure on Greek drachma. In the pre- and post-1989 period, the intervention 
index means were 0.89 and 0.97 respectively. This indicates that in the pre-1989 period, policy 
makers let the exchange rate to depreciate to boost the exports. However, in the post- 1989 
period, particularly after 1992, the Bank of Greece frequently intervened in the foreign 
exchange market to stabilise the value of domestic currency as part of the Maastricht criteria 
regarding the limitations of inflationary pressures.20    
Some studies use both model-dependent and model-independent approaches when 
considering exchange rate arrangements. Jeisman (2005) used the model-dependent approach 
proposed by Weymark (1995) and the model-independent approach of Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) for measuring exchange market pressure and intervention index for Australia over the 
post-float period. The resulting exchange market pressure and intervention indices thus 
enabled the author to determine how well the two methodologies explained the conduct of the 
Australian Reserve Bank momentary policy over the given period. The empirical evidence 
shows that the Central Bank assisted pressure on the Australian dollar to depreciate and 
reversed appreciating pressure. Contrary to Jeisman (2005), Leu (2009) found that in the post-
float period, the monetary authority followed a leaning against the wind policy – that is, the 
Australian Reserve Bank sold (purchased) foreign exchange reserves when the Australian 
dollar was under pressure to depreciate (appreciate). The difference in the results could be due 
to the use of different econometric approach. Jeisman (2005) uses the two-stage least square 
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 Chen, Shiu-Sheng and Taketa (2007) assessed the validity of Weymark’s (1995) index of foreign exchange 
market intervention using general changes in foreign exchange reserves and pure intervention data. The 
intervention index that uses general changes in foreign exchange reserve suggests strong intervention. On the 
other hand, the intervention index constructed using pure intervention data indicates that Japanese moentary 
authorities have not frequently intervened in the foreign exchange market over the sample period thus 
investigated.    
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approach, while Leu (2009) used Johansen’s cointegration approach for constructing 
Exchange Market Pressure and intervention index for Australia.21  
 Since its development, Weymark’s (1995) approach has been applied by a number of 
researchers for evaluating the external position and conduct of monetary policy for a number 
of countries. All these studies indicate that the countries thus evaluated were either faced with 
downward or upward pressure. However, almost all studies confirm some form of Central 
Bank leaning against the wind in that the Central Bank frequently intervened in the foreign 
exchange market and relieved depreciating pressure by selling foreign exchange reserves and 
vice versa. This confirms the view that the Central Banks of the countries thus evaluated 
allowed a limited role to market forces in determining the value of domestic currency in the 
foreign exchange market, a finding consistent with the fear of floating.  
3.4 Empirical Studies of Eichengreen et al’s (1996) model 
 
 Before Eichengreen et al. (1996), Girton and Roper (1977), Roper and Turnovsky 
(1980) and Weymark (1995) derived Exchange Market Pressure indices that are simple sum of 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes. However, all these studies differ in 
assigning the weights attached to Exchange Market Pressure components. Girton and Roper 
(1977) assigns equal weight to both exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes. On 
the other hand, Roper and Turnovsky (1980) and Weymark (1995) derived the weight using a 
stochastic macro model. All these studies assumed direct foreign exchange market 
intervention that the Central Bank relieves pressure by purchasing and selling foreign 
exchange reserves. However, it may be the case that Central Bank relieves pressure by 
changing interest rate. In such a case, interest rate constitutes another monetary instrument that 
Central Bank may use for restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium. In such a case, the 
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 We also use two-stage least square and Johansen’s cointegration approach to determine if the results differ or 
complement each other.   
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studies that ignore interest rate do not fully reflect the extent of foreign exchange market 
disequilibrium.     
Eichengreen et al. (1996) used a statistical approach and constructed an exchange 
market pressure index consisting of percentage change in exchange rate, relative interest rate 
differential and percentage change in relative foreign exchange reserves. They used the 
inverse of the variance approach for assigning weights to the components of exchange market 
pressure. This approach assigns low weight to more volatile component and thus ensures that 
all variables are equally weighted.  
First generation currency crisis models argue that inconsistency between domestic 
macroeconomic policies and the exchange rate regime often results in the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate regime. Particularly they argue that increased monetising of budget deficit 
results in speculative attacks and thus the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime 
(Krugman, 1979). Bird and Mandilaras (2006) examined the relationship between fiscal deficit 
and Exchange Market Pressure for Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) and East Asia & Pacific 
(EAP) regions in a panel framework. The results indicate significant effect of fiscal deficit on 
exchange market pressure for Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) countries but not for East 
Asia & Pacific (EAP) countries. The difference in the results is due to low savings, lack of 
investor’s confidence and high and volatile inflation rate in LAC compare to EAP countries. 
These findings have the implication that the same policy prescription cannot be followed in 
both regions to avoid currency crises.  
Moreover, foreign debt is an important factor in causing exchange market pressure. 
There are two channels through which an increase in foreign debt increases pressure. 
Ricardian equivalence points towards a strong association between an increase in taxes and an 
increase in debt. It argues that current higher debt suggest a future increase in taxes. Given a 
future rise in taxes, rational agents would save the amount equal to foreign debt to offset the 
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effects of expansionary macroeconomic policies in future. This will not affect investors’ 
confidence and thus cause pressure on a highly indebted country to rise.  
On the other hand, Keynes argues that domestic economic agents are myopic. They 
base their consumption on disposable instead of permanent income. In such a case they do not 
save the amount required for financing future expansionary macroeconomic policies. In such a 
situation a rise in foreign debt will increase pressure on domestic currency.  Mandilaras and 
Bird (2008) tested which of the above effects of debt burden on exchange market pressure 
held true for Latin American countries from 1970 to 2000. They used Eichengreen et al’s 
(1996) approach for constructing exchange market pressure. However, they assigned weights 
to the components of exchange market pressure by the ratio of inverse of variance of each 
component to the sum of inverse of variance of all components. They used four proxies of 
Exchange Market Pressure for checking the robustness of their results. The first proxy used 
exchange rate changes, relative interest rate differential and relative foreign exchange reserve 
changes. The second specification used exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve as 
components of exchange market pressure. The third specification uses exchange rate changes 
to denote market pressure. In the fourth specification, the authors assumed that purchasing 
power parity holds and used inflation differential to denote devaluation expectations. The 
results indicate that an increase in foreign debt increases pressure on currency to depreciate in 
foreign exchange market. This finding appears to be robust across different proxies used for 
denoting Exchange Market Pressure. 
Finally, Turkey experienced currency crises in 1994 and 2000-2001 as well as 
unsuccessful speculative attacks that were fended off by the monetary authorities. This makes 
Turkey a suitable country to examine the relationship between exchange market pressure and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Katircioglu and Feridun (2011) evaluated this relationship and 
found the relevancy of fiscal and current account balance, domestic credit and excess real 
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money balances to be important macroeconomic determinants of exchange market pressure in 
Turkey. These findings suggest that the monetary authorities in Turkey should constantly 
monitor the growth of these variables if they want to avoid pressure on Turkish currency. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, we reviewed the empirical studies that have applied Girton and Roper 
(1977), Weymark (1995) and Eichengreen et al. (1995) to the experience of different 
countries. The empirical studies that use Girton and Roper (1977) and Eichengreen et al. 
(1995) are primarily interested in evaluating the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure 
both in time series and panel frameworks. On the other hand, the studies that have used 
Weymark’s approach to different countries were primarily concerned with determining the 
direction of the pressure and monetary authorities’ response function. They focused on 
whether downward or upward pressure was dominant over the given sample period and what 
fraction of the pressure a Central Bank relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange reserves.  
 The empirical studies that use Girton and Roper’s (1977) model provide evidence that 
confirms the predictions implied by the monetary approach to Exchange Market Pressure. This 
indicates that in a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in domestic credit increases 
pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. This has an important policy implication in that 
when a Central Bank targets exchange rate stability, it has to relinquish its independence in 
using monetary policy instruments for stabilising domestic output or prices or both. The 
empirical evidence further shows that an increase in domestic prices further increases pressure 
on domestic currency to depreciate. However, an increase in domestic output and foreign 
prices are associated with downward pressure on domestic currency. All these findings are 
consistent with the predictions of the monetary model of exchange market pressure. Similarly, 
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the studies that use Eichengreen et al. (1995) indicates that fiscal deficit, foreign debt burden, 
current account deficit are important determinants of exchange market pressure in a panel 
framework. 
   The studies that applied Weymark’s (1995) approach to different countries provide 
evidence that it is either upward or downward pressure that has remained dominant over the 
entire sample period. Furthermore, they indicate that the Central Bank actively intervened in 
the foreign exchange market and allowed limited flexibility to exchange rate to adjust to the 
equilibrium value as suggested by the market forces. In the chapters that follow, we use 
Weymark’s (1995) approach and determine whether it is downward or upward pressure that 
has remained dominant on the Pakistan rupee over the given sample period. Furthermore, 
based on the exchange market pressure index, we construct an intervention index and use its 
value for analysing monetary authorities’ responses to foreign exchange market 
disequilibrium.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Exchange Market Pressure and the Degree of Exchange Market 
Intervention: The Case of Pakistan 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we construct an Exchange Market Pressure and intervention index for Pakistan 
using the Weymark (1995) approach. We then use the constructed intervention index for 
evaluating Central Bank of Pakistan’s exchange rate policy over the period 1976:Q1 to 
2005:Q2. The empirical evidence suggests that on average there was downward pressure on 
Pakistan’s currency and active Central Bank intervention. The intervention index shows that 
Central Bank used both exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes for restoring 
foreign exchange market equilibrium, which is consistent with a managed float exchange rate 
regime. Thus our characterisation of the exchange rate regime based on Central Bank 
intervention is in conformity with International Monetary Fund Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions instead of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).    
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4.1 Introduction 
 After the collapse of the Bretton Wood system, most industrialised countries adopted a 
system of flexible exchange rate. They argued that the adoption of such a regime would reduce 
exchange rate volatility. In practice, few of them allowed market forces to determine the value 
of their currencies. The International Monetary Fund Annual Report (1998) on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions shows that by the end of 1997 forty- six of 184 
countries allowed their currencies to be determined by market forces. Even then, they 
frequently intervened in foreign exchange market and stabilised their currencies (Spolander, 
1999). The remaining countries either fixed or allowed limited flexibility for their currencies.    
 Countries often adopt extreme ends of the spectrum of exchange rate arrangements 
namely fixed or flexible exchange rates. Frankel (1999) and Fischer (2001) support the bipolar 
view and argue that the countries that adopt either fixed or flexible rates are less prone to an 
exchange rate crisis. They report IMF official exchange rate classification and exchange rate 
arrangements and suggest abolishing the intermediate exchange rate arrangements.22 Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002) examined actual exchange rate practices of thirty- nine countries and 
found increased interest rate and foreign exchange rate volatility - a phenomenon attributable 
to increased exchange rate stabilisation and foreign exchange intervention by monetary 
authorities. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) constructed de facto classification of an 
exchange rate regime that reflects actual instead of announced exchange rate policies. They 
found wide differences in de facto and de jure exchange rate policies. Particularly, the 
countries that claim to float frequently intervene in the foreign exchange market for stabilising 
the external value of their currencies. Furthermore, they found that the countries that declare 
                                                 
22
 Fischer (2001) report International Monetary Fund Annual Report (2000). The report provides evidence of 
vanishing intermediate exchange rate regime. According to this report, in 1991 there were 16 percent hard pegs, 
62 percent intermediate and 23 percent independent float. In 1999 their number reached to 24 percent currency 
peg, 34 percent intermediate and 42 percent independent float. Frankel (1999, p. 7 footnote) also reports an IMF 
classification that breaks down as: 25 pegged to a single currency, 13 pegged to composite, 6 crawling pegs, 12 
horizontal bands, 10 crawling bands, and 26 managed floats.   
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they have flexible rates behaved like fixers in an attempt to avoid exposure of their currencies 
to speculative attacks. They named this kind of exchange rate arrangement ‘hidden pegs’. 
These studies show that there are wide differences between de facto and de jure exchange rate 
practices. They further provide evidence that the countries that declare fixed or flexible 
exchange rate regime, in fact follow intermediate or managed float exchange rate policy. It is 
therefore, largely an empirical matter to assess a country’s exchange rate regime, rather than 
trust public policy pronouncements from a Government or Central Bank.     
 Frenkel and Aizenman (1982) first constructed an index that measures the extent of 
foreign exchange intervention. It may be viewed as the fraction of the money market 
disequilibrium that exchange rate changes eliminate. Under the two extreme systems of fixed 
and flexible exchange rate systems, it takes values of zero and one. In contrast to Frenkel and 
Aizenman, Weymark (1995) derived an intervention index based on the Girton and Roper 
(1977) approach. It defines an intervention index as the fraction of pressure that Central Bank 
relieves by changing foreign exchange reserves. It takes a value of zero and one under the 
system of fixed and pure float exchange rate system and values between zero and one for 
intermediate and managed float exchange rate arrangements.  
 This chapter focuses upon the exchange rate system in Pakistan. Pakistan’s exchange 
rate system has evolved through different phases. Prior to 8th January, 1982, Pakistan followed 
a fixed exchange rate arrangement. Since then, Pakistan’s exchange rate system is 
characterised as managed float (Ahmad and Khan, 1990). In this system, simultaneous 
changes in exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes capture the extent of foreign 
exchange market disequilibrium. 
 In this chapter, we adopt the Weymark (1995) approach for constructing exchange 
market pressure and intervention indices for Pakistan. Particularly, we check the direction of 
pressure and evaluate the monetary authority’s response by constructing an intervention index. 
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This approach has the advantage of allowing us to evaluate the monetary authority’s response 
to market pressure by constructing an intervention index. We then use the intervention index 
values to confirm whether Pakistan’s exchange rate arrangements are in conformity with 
International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Exchange Rate Restrictions or Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) exchange rate classification. The 
International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Exchange Rate restrictions characterise Pakistan’s exchange rate regime as pegged to the US 
dollar for the period 1976 to 1982. A post-1982 exchange rate regime of the country is 
characterised as managed float except for the year 1999. For 1999, the country’s exchange rate 
regime is characterised as multiple one.23 On the other hand, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), 
using de facto exchange rate policy, characterise Pakistan’s exchange rate regime as pegged to 
US dollar for the period 1971 to 1982. For the post-1982 period, it characterises Pakistan’s 
exchange rate regime as a de facto crawling peg to the US dollar with a band width of +/- 2%. 
Using the intervention index mean value, we test whether our characterisation of the exchange 
rate regime is in conformity with the IMF classification or that of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).  
 The results indicate dominant downward pressure and active Central Bank 
intervention. Most of the interventions leaned against the wind and removed most of the 
downward pressure on domestic currency. The intervention index mean value suggest that on 
average Central Bank relieved sixty-one percent of the pressure by selling foreign exchange 
reserves. Exchange rate changes absorbed the remaining pressure. Since both exchange rate 
and foreign exchange reserve changes restored foreign exchange market equilibrium therefore, 
we characterise the country’s exchange rate regime as managed float. Thus our 
                                                 
23
 Pakistan introduced a multiple exchange rate system on 22nd July, 1998 due to sanctions that were imposed on 
the country in the wake of its nuclear explosions. The multiple exchange rate system comprised of (a) official 
exchange rate, (b) floating inter-bank rate (FIBR) and composite rate. State Bank of Pakistan determined official 
exchange rate while the floating inter bank rate was determined by the market forces. The composite rate was 
based on certain specified ratio of official rate and floating inter-bank rate which was initially fixed at 50-50 
(50% official and 50% FIBR) and was changed to 20:80 on 21st December, 1998 and further to 5:95 percent on 
11th March, 1999 (State Bank Annual Reports 1998-1999, p. 130).     
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characterisation of the exchange rate regime based on the Central Bank’s intervention index 
mean value confirms International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions rather than Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) 
classification.           
         The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related past studies on 
exchange market pressure. Section 4.3 addresses the theoretical model of a small open 
economy that engages in stabilising exchange rate fluctuation and in Section 4.4 we analyse 
data using descriptive statistics and graphical evidence. Section 4.5 contains our main 
empirical results. These include unit root tests in section 4.5.1, estimation of the model and 
construction of exchange market pressure and intervention index in section 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 
respectively. Section 4.6 concludes.         
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
 In this section, we review the theoretical models and their empirical application to 
different countries and regions. Particularly we focus on theoretical models and show how 
they differ from each other.  
Before Girton and Roper’s (1977) paper, Whiteman et al. (1975) argued that under a 
managed float, the effective exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes reflect the 
extent of money market disequilibrium although no one has yet constructed a single composite 
index that measures it. Girton and Roper (1977) derived such a measure of market pressure 
and named it Exchange Market Pressure (EMP). It measures the extent of domestic money 
market disequilibrium that arises due to non-zero excess demand or supply of domestic 
currency in the foreign exchange market. It is restored by adjustments in exchange rate or 
foreign exchange reserve changes or any combination of both of them. Since its development, 
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the Girton and Roper (1977) model has been applied by a number of researchers to number of 
developed and developing countries. Girton and Roper’s (1977) model and its modified 
versions have been applied to Brazil’s experience over 1955-1975 by Connolly and Da 
Silveira (1979), sterling’s effective exchange rate over the period 1964 -1978 by Hacche and 
Townend (1981), Korea’s experience by Kim (1985), Costa Rica’s experience by Thornton 
(1995), by Burdekin and Burkett (1990) to Canada, by Mah (1998) to Korea, by Pollard 
(1999) to Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago, by Hallwood and Marsh (2003) to the 
pound sterling during the inter-war period, 1925-31, and by Modeste (2005) to Guyana.      
  Roper and Turnovsky (1980) carried forward Girton and Roper’s (1977) work. Based 
on the assumptions of fixed prices and perfect capital mobility, they derived the optimum 
trade-off that monetary authorities face between exchange rate )(
t
s∆  and foreign exchange 
reserve )( tf∆  changes for relieving pressure on the domestic currency. They allowed the 
intervention to take the form of changes in exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves with 
both of them not equally weighted.  
Contrary to exchange market pressure indices discussed above, Eichengreen et al. 
(1995) derived a model independent exchange market pressure index that includes the 
percentage change in exchange rate, relative percentage change in bilateral interest rates and 
foreign exchange reserves differential.24 They assigned weights to the components of 
exchange market pressure by equalising their conditional volatilities. The Exchange Market 
Pressure index provided by Eichengreen et al. (1995) is called a model-independent index 
because neither the components of exchange market pressure nor the weights assigned to them 
are derived from a structural model of the economy.     
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 Eicehngreen et al. exchange market pressure index is given as:  
)([%08.)([%7% ∗∗ −∆−−∆+∆ ttttt ffiis  
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In contrast to Eichengreen et al. (1995), Pentecost et al. (2001) derived a measure of 
exchange market pressure from a short-term wealth augmented monetary model of foreign 
exchange market.25 It includes exchange rate changes, foreign exchange reserve and relative 
short term money market interest rate differential between domestic and foreign country as its 
components. They used a principal component approach for assigning weights to the 
components of exchange market pressure.26  
Weymark (1998) criticised the model-independent exchange market pressure index 
due to difficulty in its interpretation. She argued that the components which Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) uses relieve exchange market pressure on the domestic currency. The magnitude of 
interest rate and foreign exchange reserve changes are determined by the structure of the 
economy and Central Bank intervention activity, rather than a volatility-smoothing technique 
that ensures the components of Exchange Market Pressure are equally weighted. Therefore, it 
is necessary that exchange market pressure indices must be derived from a model that reflects 
the economy for their proper interpretation (Weymark, 1998).      
Weymark (1995) further argued that Girton and Roper (1977) were primarily 
concerned with the monetary independence enjoyed by the monetary authorities in Canada. 
They equated monetary independence with the relationship between domestic credit and 
exchange market pressure. The significant correlation between these variables suggests that 
the monetary authorities in Canada are not independent in formulating monetary policy. 
Similarly, Roper and Turnovsky (1980) were concerned with deriving the optimum trade-off 
faced by the monetary authorities between exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves for 
eliminating exchange market pressure. Thus the exchange market pressure indices derived by 
Girton and Roper (1977) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980) do not constitute a model 
                                                 
25
 Pentecost et al. (2001) exchange market pressure index is given as: 
)())(()1()(])([ ∗∗∗∗ −−∆−∆−++−+−=−∆−∆+ ttttttttmmt wwiiqmdfiis ϑγγαλαφβ  
26
 Principal Component Analysis is a common technique for finding patterns in data and expresses the data in 
such manners that highlight their similarities and differences (see Pentecost et al.  (2001). 
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independent definition of exchange market pressure. Therefore, Weymark (1995) defined 
exchange market pressure in general terms as the excess demand for domestic currency in the 
international market that would be relieved by exchange rate changes in the absence of foreign 
exchange market intervention, given the expectations about the actual exchange rate policy 
implemented.  
 Based on a model-independent definition of exchange market pressure, Weymark 
(1995) constructed an exchange market pressure index that includes exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserve changes. The weights assigned to the components of exchange market 
pressure are derived from a small open economy stochastic macroeconomic model. Contrary 
to other indices that simply measure exchange market pressure, Weymark (1995) also 
constructed an intervention index defined as the fraction of the pressure that Central Bank 
relieved through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves.   
4.3 A Model 
 In order to measure exchange market pressure upon the Pakistan currency and also the 
foreign exchange intervention policy of the State Bank of Pakistan, we adopt the approach of 
Weymark (1995). Weymark’s simple model is based on money demand, price, interest rate, 
money supply and monetary authorities’ response function and is given as: 
tttt
d
t vibybpm +−+= 21                       01 >b  and 02 >b                                        (4.1) 
ttt sapaap 210 ++=
∗
                                0, 21 >aa                                                 (4.2)                                                      
ttttt ssEii −+= +
∗
1                                                                                                         (4.3) 
=
s
tm
s
tm 1− tt fd ∆+∆+    (4.4)                                                                    
ttt sf ∆−=∆ ρ                                                                                                                  (4.5) 
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 Asterisks denote foreign counterparts of domestic variables and the notation 1+tEs  
represents the rational agents’ expected value of exchange rate at time 1+t , conditional on the 
information available in period t. All variables are logged. 
Equation 4.1 describes domestic real money demand function. It states that the demand 
for nominal monetary aggregates )( dtm  is a positive function of domestic prices )( tp  and real 
income )( ty  and a negative function of interest rate )( ti . The positive relation between income 
)( ty  and nominal money demand )( dtm  is based on the assumption that as income increases, 
people demand more money for financing their transactions. The interest rate represents an 
opportunity cost of holding money. As the opportunity cost of holding money increases, 
people prefer to hold their cash balances in assets that earn interest rate. This reduces demand 
for domestic money balances. Equation 4.1 also has a stochastic money demand disturbance 
( tv ). Equation 4.2 is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) condition. It states that the domestic 
prices )( tp  are an increasing function of both exchange rate )( ts  and foreign price level )( ∗tp . 
The spot exchange rate is defined as the number of units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency. Hence an increase in exchange rate suggests that the domestic currency 
depreciates. Parameter 0a  denotes deviations from purchasing power parity. If a0 = 0 and a1 = 
a2 = 1 simultaneously, the price equation breaks down in absolute PPP, suggesting that 
exchange rate and foreign price changes are reflected equally in domestic prices. 
 Equation 4.3 is Uncovered Interest Parity and suggests that returns on both domestic 
and foreign assets are set equal. In case of difference between the domestic and foreign 
interest rate, exchange rate changes to bring equality on asset returns. Equation 4.4 defines the 
evolution of the money supply process. It states that money supply depends on inherited 
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money stock stm 1− , changes in domestic credit )( td∆ and foreign exchange reserves ).( tf∆ 27 
Equation (4.5) shows that the Central Bank responds to exchange rate fluctuation. For 
example, as the domestic currency depreciates )0( >∆ ts , the Central Bank sells foreign 
exchange reserves )0( <∆ tf . Similarly, when a country has an appreciating currency, the 
reserves of the Central Bank rise )0( >∆ tf .      
We now seek to use the simple model to obtain exchange market pressure and 
intervention indices. Substitution of equation (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.1), taking the difference of 
the resulting equation, combining it with the central bank’s response function and re-arranging 
the resulting equation yields an equation for the changes in the exchange rate: 
22
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   (4.6) 
Taking the partial derivative of exchange rate change with respect to foreign exchange 
reserve changes is given by equation 4.7: 
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The exchange rate elasticity with respect to foreign exchange reserves )(η  is of negative sign. 
It shows that both foreign exchange reserves and exchange rate changes move in the opposite 
direction. An increase in foreign exchange reserve causes the exchange rate to appreciate, and 
vice versa.  
  The log linear small open economy model given above allows us to construct 
exchange market pressure )( tEMP  index given as:  
ttt fsEMP ∆+∆= η                                                                                                        (4.8) 
                                                 
27
 Changes in the domestic credit 111 /][ −−−−=∆ tttttt MDhDhd where th is the money multiplier in period 
,t  tD denotes domestic credit, and 1−tM the inherited money stock. Changes in foreign exchange reserves = ∆ft 
= [htFt – ht – 1Ft – 1] / Mt – 1 where Ft is the stock of foreign exchange reserves in period t. 
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The tEMP  index measures the extent of exchange rate changes required for removing 
exchange market pressure in the absence of Central Bank intervention. It takes a negative or a 
positive sign. A negative sign implies strengthening pressure and vice versa. A zero value of 
exchange market pressure suggests the absence of market pressure. This index contrasts with 
the Girton and Roper (1977) approach that assigns equal weights to ts∆  and tf∆  hence η  = 1. 
Equation 4.8 further shows that as 2a  and 2b  rises, less tEMP  is relieved by tf∆  (i.e. →η 0). 
That is, as the semi-elasticity of real money demand to interest rate rises and the response of 
domestic prices to exchange rate increases, η  approaches to zero and the Central Bank either 
allows exchange rate changes or the interest rate to restore foreign exchange market 
equilibrium. 
 Based on exchange market pressure index, Weymark (1995) constructed foreign 
exchange market intervention index. It measures the fraction of total pressure on the currency 
that Central Bank relieves through the purchase of foreign exchange reserves. Hence, the 
intervention index is the ratio of reserve changes to pressure, adjusted for parameter η . When 
monetary authorities engage only in direct exchange market intervention, the intervention 
index )( tω is given as: 
tt
t
t
t
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f
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f
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η
ηη
ω                                                                                              (4.9) 
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right hand side of the equation 4.9 by 
η/1 gives: 
tt
t
t
fs
f
∆+∆
∆
=
η
ω 1
                                                                                                          (4.10) 
The intervention index takes values between ∞<<∞− tω . Its values can be interpreted as 
follows: when tω = 0, the Central Bank abstained from intervening in the foreign exchange 
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market and exchange rate changes absorbed the entire pressure. This is consistent with a 
flexible exchange rate regime. On the other hand, tω = 1 suggests that foreign exchange 
reserve changes absorbed the entire pressure and exchange rate remained unchanged. This 
suggests fixed exchange rate arrangements. When the intervention index takes values between 
0 < tω < 1, we call it a managed float. This is because both the exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserve absorb the prevailing pressure. tω  < 0 indicates the Central Bank’s leans 
with the wind. That is for example, the Central Bank purchases foreign exchange reserves 
when there is a pressure on the domestic currency to depreciate. Typically a Central Bank will 
only engage in leaning with the wind to attain an exchange rate level rather than to resist 
exchange rate volatility. We adjust the exchange market pressure and intervention index with 
η . It converts foreign exchange reserve changes into equivalent exchange rate changes. The 
underlying intuition of adjusting foreign exchange reserve changes with η  is to avoid 
exchange market pressure and intervention index being dominated by more volatile 
component.       
4.4 Data 
 In order to construct an exchange market pressure and intervention index for Pakistan, 
we use logged quarterly data for the period 1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2. The data on interest rate, 
domestic and foreign price and spot exchange rate were taken from International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics. Quarterly money supply data were taken from the 
Thomson Data stream and denote 1m   monetary aggregate. The State Bank of Pakistan 
provided quarterly data on nominal GDP. The series displayed strong evidence of seasonality 
particularly for real GDP and money supply which were adjusted using X – 12 ARIMA 
seasonal adjustment programme. Call money rate refers to the rate of interest )( ti  that lending 
institutes charge to brokerage firms when extending loans for financing their clients’ financial  
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Figure 4.1 Data in levels 
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Notes: These graphs represent data for Pakistan’s interest rate, money supply, prices, US prices, bilateral nominal 
exchange rate with the US dollar and real income. Sample period is from 1976 to 2007.  
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needs. Similarly, the exchange rate )( ts  refers to number of units of domestic currency in 
terms of US dollars. Consumer price indices for both Pakistan )( tp  and the US )( ∗tp  reflect 
the cost of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services by the average consumer. Money 
)( 1m  refers to currency plus demand deposits. Foreign exchange reserves )( tf  refer to total 
reserves minus gold. Real income is ty  and refers to nominal income adjusted using 
Pakistan’s consumer price index.  
 Figure 4.1 contains the graphs of data in log levels. Following the approach of 
Weymark (1995), the graphs reveal that real money, domestic price level, foreign price and 
real domestic income display an increasing trend over the entire sample period. The call 
money rate plot reveals much persistence. From 1982 to 2001, the exchange rate shows that 
the Pakistan rupee consistently lost its value against US dollar. Subsequent to 2001, the 
exchange rate did not rise so rapidly. This occurred due to an increase in the country’s foreign 
exchange reserves following the lifting of sanctions imposed in the wake of nuclear 
explosions, increased worker’s remittances, rescheduling of external debt, substitution of hard 
loans into soft ones, and Pakistan’s cooperation with international community in its war 
against terrorism. Domestic real income also shows increasing trend except for the year 1998 
to 2001. The fall in domestic real income for the period 1999 to 2000 could be due to 
sanctions imposed on the country in the wake of its nuclear explosions. The data are 
apparently non-stationary in levels and therefore may have implications for the statistical 
properities of our estimators. Therefore, we formally investigate non-stationarities using 
statistical tools.  
Figure 4.2 contains graphs of first difference data on all these variables. The plots do 
not display any systematic pattern which is in conformity with the non-stationarity of the  
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Figure 4.2 Data in first difference 
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Notes: These graphs represent data for Pakistan’s interest rate, money supply, prices, US prices, bilateral nominal exchange 
rate with US dollar and real income. Sample period is from 1976 to 2007 
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stochastic process. This finding is further supported by the values obtained for both 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root test values using log differenced data 
and are given in section 4.5.1.    
4.5 Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
 In this section, we examine the time series properties of the variables used in the 
analysis. The empirical work based on time series data assumes that the underlying stochastic 
process is stationary. This implies that its mean, variance and auto covariance (at various lags) 
remains time-invariant no matter at what point we measure them. When this assumption is 
violated, we say that the time series is non-stationary. A non-stationarity test that has been 
widely used in empirical work on time series process is based on the following Augmented 
Dicky Fuller regression:  
tit
p
i
itt xxx εαβα +∆++=∆ −
=
− ∑
1
110        (4.11)              
Here tx  and tε  denote stochastic time series process and white noise error term respectively. 
The unit root test implies that 01 =β . If calculated t–values are greater than the critical values 
from McKinnon (1996), we do not reject the null of data non-stationarity. Alternatively, if the 
calculated t–values are less than the critical ones, the null of non-stationarity of the data is 
rejected. Due to quarterly data, we use four lags as the maximum number of lag length )(ρ . 
Alternatively, the lag length can be chosen so that the Information Criterion (AIC) value is 
minimised. After selecting the optimal lag length, we use the Augmented Dicky Fuller test for 
testing the presence of unit root.   
 Table 4.1 shows the results of ADF unit root test both in log levels and log first 
difference for random walk model with drift and with drift and trend. It is evident from the  
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 Table 4.1: Unit Root Test28 
ADF Test in Levels 
Variables Constant Constant and trend 
ti
 
-1.442 (1) -1.673(1) 
tm
 
-1.750(1) -2.950(1) 
tp
 
-0.287(1) -2.534(1) 
∗
tp
 
-2.853(1) 
-3.891 a (1) 
ts
 
-0.453(1) -2.496(1) 
ty
 
-1.399(1) -2.571(1) 
5% critical values -2.887 -3.449 
ADF Unit Root Test in First Difference 
Variables Constant Constant and trend 
ti∆  -10.837 a (1) -10.810 a (1) 
tm∆  -12.268 a (1) -12.377 a (1) 
tp∆  -2.908 a (1) -3.033(1) 
∗∆ tp  -3.791
a (1) -4.897 a (1) 
ts∆  -9.386 a (1) -9.531 a (1) 
ty∆  -10.287 a (1) -10.289 a (1) 
5% critical values -2.887 -3.449 
Note: superscript a  indicates the significance of the variables at 5% critical values. * denotes the foreign 
counterparts of the domestic variables. Lag lengths in parentheses (.) are determined by the Akakike Information 
Criterion with maximum number of 4 lags. Variables used are defined as: =ti  Treasury Bill Rate, =tm  M1 in 
Pakistan, =tp  CPI in Pakistan, =
∗
tp  US CPI, =ts spot exchange rate, and =ty gross domestic product 
adjusted with GDP deflator. 5% one-sided critical values are taken from McKinnon (1996). Quarterly data for the 
period 1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2 is used. ∆  denotes first difference operator.   
 
table that log level data yield the t-values that are far greater than 5% critical ones for all 
variables except foreign price ( ∗tp ) in model with constant and deterministic trend. Therefore, 
we are unable to reject the null of unit root in levels for all variables, except foreign price 
( ∗tp ) with drift and deterministic trend.  
Following Weymark’s (1995) empirical strategy, we first difference the data to 
overcome the non-stationarity issues. The difference data ADF unit root test results are, as 
                                                 
28
 We also tested the non-stationarity of all variables in levels using Phillips and Perron test. The results indicate 
that the calculated t-values are less than critical values; therefore, we can not reject the null of non-stationarity for 
all variables in levels. However, Phillips-Perron unit root test applied to difference data yields t-values that are 
greater than critical ones. Therefore, we can reject the null of non-stationarity for all variables at first difference. 
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expected, entirely different from those obtained in levels. The lower part of table 4.1 shows 
that the calculated t-values are lower than the critical ones at 5% significance levels for all 
variables except for domestic price with constant and deterministic trend.29 However, first 
difference domestic price is stationary with drift. This shows that first difference domestic 
price with drift would be more appropriate specification for the estimation. Figure 4.2 further 
confirms our interpretation. It shows that foreign price in first difference does not show any 
deterministic trend and fluctuates around zero mean. Furthermore, the Phillips-Perron unit root 
test (given in appendix) show that all variables are stationary at first difference. All this shows 
that we can reject the null of non-stationarity for all variables in at least one specification.  
 
4.5.2 Estimation of the Model 
 
 We need to estimate ,η  the relative weight of foreign exchange reserve )( tf∆  to 
construct exchange market pressure and intervention index, as discussed in section 3.3. This 
necessitates the estimation of parameters 2a  and 2b  from equation (4.1) and (4.2) given 
below:  
tttt
d
t vibybpm +−+= 21                       01 >b  and 02 >b                                        (4.1) 
ttt sapaap 210 ++=
∗
                                0, 21 >aa                                                  (4.2)   
 The basic objective of constructing an exchange market pressure and intervention index is to 
determine the direction of pressure and evaluate the monetary authorities’ response function 
over the sample period.  
We have used differenced data and the two-stage least square approach for obtaining 
interest sensitivity of money demand )( 2b  and price sensitivity of exchange rate )( 2a  from 
the estimated real money demand (eq. 4.1) and price equation (eq. 4.2). This approach is 
                                                 
29
 We also tested the non-stationarity of all variables using the Phillips-Perron test. The difference data results 
indicate that the null of non-stationarity can be rejected for all variables.  
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adopted to overcome the endogenity problem that arises due to simultaneous determination of 
the dependent variable and one or more of the independent variables. In such a situation, 
ordinary least square approach yields inconsistent estimates of behavioural parameters in the 
regression equations. Two -tage least square (2SLS) uses instruments for obtaining unbiased 
estimates of the endogenous variables.30 Instrumental variable is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the model’s error term but correlated with the endogenous variables. It is argued that the 
instruments used may be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable but may be 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable. This may give insignificant estimates of endogenous 
variable(s) in the estimated regression equation. Furthermore, we do not take into account 2R  
and 2R  values due to lack of consensus on the unique definition of the coefficient of variation 
if the model is estimated by the method other than ordinary least square. Furthermore, the 
objective of using instrumental variable is to obtain consistent estimates of the causal effects 
of endogenous variables on regressand and the use of instruments instead of endogenous 
variables fulfil this task (Verbeek 2008, p. 150). 
Table 4.2 shows the estimates of the real money demand function using log level, log 
first difference and Newey-West adjusted standard errors with Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
and Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) method.31 Contrary to many researchers who have used 
interest rate in levels, we use it in log difference form to test the short-term dynamics of  
money demand function.32  One difference between the log level and first difference models is 
 
                                                 
30
 Following Weymark (1995), we used the US CPI, three-month US Treasury Bill Rate and real domestic 
income as first stage instruments in the real money demand equation. For the price equation, we used US CPI, the 
three-month Treasury Bill rate and the lagged exchange rate as first stage instruments. 
31
 Newey-West test statistic corrects standard errors in presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.   
32
 Fair (1987) argued that the interest rate should be used in levels than in log form. It is because, when the 
interest rate changes from 0.02 to 0.03, the log of the interest rate rises from -3.91 to -3.51, which is a change of 
0.40. If, on the other hand, the interest rate rises from 0.10 to 0.11, the log of the rate rises from -2.20 to -2.21 
which is only a change of 0.09. One generally does not see that a one percentage point rise in the interest rate has 
four times the effect on the log of the desired money holdings when the change is from a base of 0.02 than when 
it is from a base of 0.10. 
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Table 4.2 Real Money Demand Estimation 
 
Equation 
Tech: 
 
Indep: 
Variable 
Coeff: 
 
 T-ratio 
 
T-ratio 
(NW) 
DW 
Stat )4(LM  )4(ARCH  2R  
1 
OLS  
[Level] Const -0.711 -9.51 a  -4.91 a  0.92 
13.81 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.77) 0.98 
  
ti  -0.144 -6.93 a  -4.54 a      
  
ty  1.191 68.03 a  33.75 a      
2 
OLS 
[Diff] ti∆  -0.013 -1.12 -1.43 1.89 
5.34 
(0.00) 
0.97 
(0.43) -0.26 
  
ty∆  0.126 1.98 a  2.01 a      
3 
2SLS 
[Level] Const -0.588 -5.37 a  -2.55 a  0.99 
34.03 
(0.00) 
2.23 
(0.14) 0.97 
  
ti  -0.163 -4.62 a  -2.39 a      
  
ty  1.170 52.47 a  24.83 a      
4 
2SLS 
[Diff] ti∆  -0.080 -1.13 -1.46 2.274 
4.406 
(0.354) 
0.04 
(0.84) -0.46 
  
ty∆  0.129 1.79 1.95 a      
Note: Level, Diff and NW refer to log level data, log differenced data and Newey – West test statistic respectively.  Quarterly 
data for the period 1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2 is used. a denotes significant t – values. )4(LM and )4(ARCH denotes Breusch 
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier and Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity test statistics to test the null of no 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the estimated regression equation.    
 
that former includes an intercept term while differencing removes the constant in the latter.33  
It is evident from Table 4.2 that interest rate and real domestic income estimates are of 
negative and positive signs. The positive domestic real income estimate suggest that as income  
goes up, people demand more money to finance their transactions. On the other hand, a 
negative interest rate estimate suggests that with the rise in opportunity cost of holding money, 
people prefer to hold their cash balances in terms of assets that earn interest rate instead of 
holding them in cash balances. This behaviour of individuals and firms suggests a negative 
sign of interest rate in real money demand equation.34  
                                                 
33
 We also estimated the real money demand function using interest rate in levels. Although the estimated interest 
rate parameter was significant yet the coefficient is wrongly signed and is not different from zero (0.00083). 
34
 Abe Shigeyuki et al. (1975), Mangla (1979), Khan (1980, 1982, 1994), Ahmad and Khan (1990), Hossain 
(1994), and Qayyum (2001, 2005) estimated money demand for Pakistan. Arize (1989) examined demand for 
money in four Asian economies: Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Rehman (2005) examined the stability of the money demand function in Asian developing countries that include 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
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Table 4.2 further shows significant domestic real income estimates in all specifications 
except difference data and two-stage least square method. On the other hand, interest rate 
estimate is insignificant in difference data estimates. A high 2R  with low Durbin-Watson 
statistic suggests spurious regression due to use of non-stationary data (Garnger and Newbold, 
1974). This arises when both dependent and independent variable trend together which causes 
the apparent high correlation. It is further evident from Table 4.2 that the null of no serial 
correlation cannot be accepted for all specifications except difference data and 2SLS 
approach. Rejection of no serial correlation causes the standard errors to be underestimated 
and they are adjusted using Newey-West test statistic. On the other hand, we cannot reject the 
null of no heteroscedasticity in all specifications due to low F-statistic with the probability of 
obtaining it being quite high.   
  Table 4.2 further reveals that the estimates of real money demand function using 
difference data yield reduced and insignificant estimates of real domestic income and interest 
rate. Moreover, use of non-stationary data gives a negative coefficient of variation. However, 
real money demand estimates using difference data yield DW statistics that are quite high 
implying that null of no serial correlation can not be rejected. Because of this, we prefer 
difference data 2SLS estimate of interest rate for constructing exchange market pressure and 
intervention index. Hence we use equation [4] in Table 4.2 for our estimate of the coefficient 
of interest rate.35    
 The estimates of price equation using log level, log first difference data with Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) and Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) are given in Table 4.3. Following 
Weymark (1995), the constant term is introduced in price equation, both in log level and log 
differenced data to denote the deviations from absolute purchasing power parity. Table 4.3  
                                                 
35
 It is somewhat dissatisfying that the interest rate elasticity is statistically insignificant with standard t-statistic 
and Newey-West test statistic. However, it is more re-assuring that specification tests suggest no residual 
misspecification.  
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Table: 4.3 Purchasing Power Parity Equation 
Eq
u
at
io
n
 Tech: Idep: 
variable 
 
Coeff: T-ratio T-ratio 
[NW] 
D.W 
Stat 
)4(LM  )4(ARCH
 2R  
1 OLS 
[level] 
const -0.297 
-4.11 a  -3.01 a  0.16 153.67 (0.00) 
37.07 
(0.00) 
0.98 
  
∗
tp  
0.449 6.89 a  4.46 a      
  
ts  
0.766 22.11 a  11.99 a      
2 OLS 
[Diff] 
const 0.006 5.21 a  4.39 a  1.88 8.11 (0.00) 
1.26 
(0.29) 
0.11 
  
∗∆ tp  0.371 1.89 1.91     
  
ts∆  -0.016 -0.32 -0.29     
3 2SLS 
[Level] 
const -0.266 
-3.47 a  -2.51 a  0.17 98.49 (0.00) 
36.37 
(0.00) 
0.98 
  
∗
tp  
0.422 6.13 a  3.99 a      
  
ts  
0.779 21.54 a  11.96 a      
4 2SLS 
[Diff] 
const 0.001 0.24 0.22 1.77 5.76 
(0.22) 
0.11 
(0.98) 
-2.26 
  
∗∆ tp  0.287 0.79 0.58     
  
ts∆  0.828 1.81 1.65     
Note: Level, Diff and NW refer to log level data, log differenced data and Newey-West test statistic.  Quarterly   
data for the period 1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2 is used. a denotes significant t – values. )4(LM and )4(HetF denotes Breusch 
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier and Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity test statistics to test the null of no 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the estimated regression equation   
 
shows positive estimates for foreign price and exchange rate in all specifications except 
difference data and ordinary least square approach. Positive estimates of exchange rate and 
foreign price are consistent with purchasing power parity. Purchasing Power Parity suggests 
that exchange rate and foreign price changes are positively associated with domestic prices. 
Table 4.3 further shows that log level and ordinary least square approach yield significant 
estimates of both exchange rate and foreign price. Furthermore, the t-values are substantially 
reduced when they are adjusted using the Newey-West test in all models. The table further 
reveals that the use of difference data yields reduced estimated parameters for all variables 
except for exchange rate in the two-stage least square model. High 2R and low DW statistic 
with nonstationary data suggests a potential spurious regression (Granger and Newbold, 
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1974). This occurs due to the fact that although independent and dependent variables are 
random walk and independent of each other, they are trended together and this causes the 
apparent high correlation among them. Autocorrelation test statistics suggest that we cannot 
reject the null of no serial correlation in all models, except difference data and 2SLS. 
However, we cannot reject the null of no heteroscedasticity in difference data estimate of price 
equation. Since serial correlation is fundamental problem of time series data and gives 
underestimated standard errors, they are adjusted using Newey-West test statistic. 
Furthermore, all specifications except log level data and ordinary least square approach yield 
increased Durbin Watson statistics, which may indicate absence of serial correlation. We 
prefer to use an exchange rate estimate of stationary data and 2SLS for constructing of 
exchange market pressure and intervention index. This specification of price equation yields 
non-spurious regression estimates and are therefore preferred over other specifications of price 
equation given in the table 4.3 for constructing exchange market pressure and intervention 
index for Pakistan in the next section.     
 
4.5.3 Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention Index 
 
Following Weymark (1995), we use interest rate and exchange rate estimates obtained 
from first differenced data and two-stage least square approach for constructing exchange 
market pressure and intervention index for Pakistan. We have adopted this approach to 
overcome the endogenity problem that arises due to simultaneous determination of dependent 
and one or more of the independent variables. It necessitates using instruments instead of 
endogenous variables in the estimation of regression equation. The instrumental variables 
must be correlated with endogenous variables but uncorrelated with the model’s error term. 
We construct exchange market pressure and intervention index to check the direction of 
pressure and evaluate the monetary authority’s response. The intervention index estimates are 
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then used to characterise the exchange rate regime of the country from 1976 to 2005. 
Exchange market pressure index is given as: 
ttt fsEMP ∆+∆= η                                                                                                         (4.8) 
The sign of exchange market pressure determines the direction of pressure. A negative 
sign indicates strengthening pressure on the domestic currency. A positive estimate of 
exchange market pressure suggests the depreciation of domestic currency ( 0>∆ ts ) in the 
absence of Central Bank intervention. On the other hand, in a fixed exchange rate regime, the 
Central Bank relieves all the exchange market pressure. In such a case, positive exchange 
market pressure would suggest an unchanged exchange rate ( 0=∆ ts ) and a drop in the 
Central Bank’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves ( 0<∆ tf ).    
 We need the estimate of bilateral elasticity η  to construct a model consistent  
exchange market pressure and intervention index. It is obtained by adding the estimated 
parameter of interest sensitivity of money demand )( 2b  from money demand equation 4.1 in 
section 3.3 and )( 2a  exchange rate estimate from price equation 4.2 in section 4.3. The 
parameter a2 reflects the sensitivity of domestic prices to exchange rate changes. Similarly, b2 
is interest rate sensitivity of money demand. The estimates of both these variables obtained 
from regression equation using difference data and two-stage least square approach following 
Weymark (1995) are: 
a2 = 0.828 and 2b  = 0.080 
Based on these estimates of interest rate and exchange rate, the model consistent 
elasticity η  is: 
η  = 
22
1
ba +
−
 =   101.1
080.0828.0
1
−=
+
−
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η  denotes exchange rate elasticity with respect to foreign exchange reserve changes and is 
used to convert foreign exchange reserve changes into equivalent exchange rate units. We 
assume that interest rate estimate is of negative sign and lower than that of the exchange rate 
estimate. This gives us a negative η , which implies that exchange rate and foreign exchange  
reserve changes move in the opposite direction. An increase in foreign exchange reserves is 
associated with the appreciation of domestic currency against the US dollar in the foreign 
exchange market.          
 Figure 4.3 shows quarterly estimates of exchange market pressure. It is evident from 
the figure that depreciating pressure has remained dominant over the entire sample period. 
This is further supported by exchange market pressure mean value of 0.005. This can be 
interpreted as if the Central Bank had abstained from intervening in the foreign exchange 
market, the domestic currency would have depreciated by 0.5 percent. However, a positive 
Exchange Market Pressure mean value does not imply that in each quarter there was 
downward pressure on domestic currency’s value. There are fifty-one quarters for which we 
have appreciating pressure. For the remaining sixty-six quarters, we have depreciating 
pressure on the domestic currency.   
 It is evident from Figure 4.3 that in the initial sample period, there was downward 
pressure on domestic currency. In this period, there was political uncertainty and a drop in 
economic growth due to the worst flood that had ever hit the country. However, the 1980s 
show a reduced Exchange Market Pressure on domestic currency and a period of relative 
tranquillity. This occurred due to the country’s allegiance with Western Powers in their 
opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan received increased economic 
assistance from Western countries that resulted in almost seven percent economic growth. 
This in turn reduced downward pressure on domestic currency. The rise in exchange market 
pressure from 1993 to 2001Q3 reflects the effects of sanctions that were imposed on the  
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Figure 4.3 Exchange Market Pressure (EMPt) Index 
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 Note: This figure contains the Weymark approach to estimate Exchange Market Pressure between 1976 and 
2005.  
 
country due to its imports of missile technology and pursuit of its nuclear programme. This 
deprived the country of the foreign economic assistance that it received in the 1980s. The post-
September 2001 period shows a substantial reduction in depreciating pressure on domestic 
currency. The drop in exchange market pressure occurred due to (a) increased worker’s 
remittances due to the international community’s crackdown on undocumented currency 
transactions, (b) rescheduling of Pakistan’s external debt, (c) repayment of expensive debt and  
substitution of hard loans into soft ones, (d) robust non-structural inflows, (e) lifting of 
international sanctions that were imposed due to country’s nuclear programme and import of 
missile technology, and (f) improved relations with international financial institutions and 
bilateral creditors due to country’s support of the international community in its war against 
terrorism.  
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Figure 4.4 Intervention Index )( tω  
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Figure 4.4 shows intervention index values. We define an intervention index as the fraction of 
pressure that the Central Bank relieves through purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves 
and is given as: 
tt
t
t
fs
f
∆+∆
∆
=
η
ω 1
    
Its values range between ∞−  and .∞  0=tω  implies the absence of Central Bank intervention 
and exchange rate changes relieving the entire exchange market pressure. This is consistent 
with flexible exchange rate arrangements. 10 << tω  implies that exchange market pressure is 
relieved by exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes. Such a monetary policy 
characterises the exchange rate regime as managed float. 0<tω  reveals the monetary 
authority’s leaning with the wind in that the central bank purchased foreign exchange reserves 
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when there was already a downward pressure on domestic currency. 1>tω  can be interpreted 
as foreign exchange reserve changes being more than that warranted by the pressure. This 
leads the exchange rate to move in the direction opposite to that which would have prevailed 
in the absence of Central Bank intervention.   
Figure 4.4 reveals that there are twenty-four quarters, for which 1=tω . This can be 
interpreted as foreign exchange reserves changes having relieved the entire pressure in these 
quarters. Since the exchange rate did not change, we can term the exchange rate regime fixed 
one for these quarters. Similarly for forty-one quarters we have 1<tω . This reveals that in 
these quarters both exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves changes absorbed Exchange 
Market Pressure, which is consistent with a managed float. For twenty eight quarters 1>tω , 
suggesting that relative changes in foreign exchange reserves were more than those warranted 
by the pressure. This caused the exchange rate to move in the direction opposite to that 
warranted by the pressure. For the remaining twenty -four quarters, we have tω <0. This 
implies the Central Bank’s leaning with the wind policy in that the Central Bank purchased 
foreign exchange reserves when there was already downward pressure on domestic currency 
and sold reserves with a strengthening domestic currency.  
  It is further evident from the exchange market pressure and intervention indices that 
Central Bank’s response varies with the direction of pressure. The intervention index exceeds 
its unity value when there is upward pressure on domestic currency. This may indicate the 
Central Bank’s preferences for maintaining the competitive advantage of domestic exporters 
in the international market. On the other hand, the intervention index value ranges between 
zero and one when there is downward pressure on domestic currency. In this case, the 
exchange rate also changes, but less than is warranted by the pressure. This can be interpreted 
as that the Central Bank may be pursuing multiple objectives of enhancing the competitive  
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Figure 4.5 Predcited ( predictedtS ) and observed exchange rate ( actualtS 1− ) 
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Note: The dotted line denotes the predicted exchange rate, which is more volatile. Solid lines, on the other hand, denote the 
observed exchange rate that would have prevailed in the absence of Central Bank intervention. This is less volatile.    
 
advantage of domestic exporters in international markets and at the same time restricting the 
effects of exchange rate changes on domestic prices and country’s foreign debt burden. The 
intervention index mean value of 0.61 is substantially different from that obtained by 
Weymark (1995) for Canada 946.0=tω  and Apergis and Eleftheriou (2002) for Greece  tω  = 
0.971.36 This shows that foreign exchange reserves and exchange rate changes absorbed sixty-
one and thirty-nine percent of the pressure respectively. Since both exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserve changes absorbed the pressure we can safely characterise Pakistan’s 
exchange rate regime as managed float for the given sample period.     
                                                 
36
 Kohlschen (2000) made Weymark (1995) approach consistent with Chilean monetary experience and obtained 
intervention index mean value of 0.196. Similarly Spolander (1997) analysed Finland central bank  intervention 
policy using Weymark (1995) approach and obtained intervention index mean value of 0.99   
 102 
 Exchange Market Pressure reflects the extent of the domestic money market 
disequilibrium that exchange rate changes restore in the absence of Central Bank intervention. 
We can therefore calculate actual exchange rate that would prevail in the absence of Central 
Bank intervention using the one period lagged observed exchange rate:     
observed
tt
predicted
t SEMPS 1)1( −+=          (4.12) 
where predictedtS  is the unlogged predicted exchange rate which can be interpreted as the level 
of exchange rate that would prevail in the absence of Central Bank intervention. observedtS 1−  refers 
to unlogged one period lagged exchange rate. Comparison of the two gives an idea of the 
extent of foreign exchange intervention. Figure 4.5 shows that the predicted rate is more 
volatile than the observed exchange rate which is further supplemented by their standard 
deviation of 18.499 and 18.380. This suggests that the Central Bank’s foreign exchange 
intervention is successful in achieving its objective of reducing exchange rate volatility.    
4.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we constructed an exchange market pressure and intervention index for 
Pakistan using the Weymark (1995) model. The objective was to check the direction of 
pressure and evaluate monetary authority’s response. The exchange market pressure’s mean 
value of 0.005 provides evidence that depreciating pressure remained dominant over the entire 
sample period. Furthermore, the actual exchange rate is less volatile than the predicted 
exchange rate suggesting that foreign exchange market intervention is successful in achieving 
its objective of reducing exchange rate volatility.  
Intervention index mean value suggests active Central Bank intervention. However, the 
Central Bank’s response is not uniform and varies with the direction of pressure. The 
intervention index exceeds its unity value when the domestic currency is under pressure to 
appreciate and vice versa. The mean value of the intervention index is 0.61, indicating that 
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foreign exchange reserve and exchange rate changes absorbed sixty-one and thirty-nine 
percent of the pressure respectively. Based on the intervention index’s mean value, we can 
safely characterise Pakistan’s exchange rate as managed float over the entire sample period. 
Thus our characterisation of the exchange rate is in conformity with the IMF’s rather than 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002). This is because we characterise Pakistan’s exchange rate 
regime based on the actual policy implemented.      
In this chapter, we used difference data and two-stage least square approach for 
estimating real money demand and price equation. Although it helps to overcome the spurious 
regression problem that arises due to the use of non-stationary data, it results in the loss of 
vital information about the long-term relationship if the variables of interest are cointegrated. 
We address this problem in the next chapter by using Johansen’s (1988) multivariate 
cointegration approach.    
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Appendix 
Appendix A.1 Data 
 We have used logged quarterly data for carrying out our empirical analysis. It is taken 
from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistic for all variables except 
M1 and quarterly real GDP data. The details of the data are: Call money rate (line 60B…ZF) 
refers to the rate of interest charged by the lending institutions when extending loans to 
brokers for the purpose of financing loans for clients of the brokerage firm. In the same way, 
exchange rate (Line DE.ZF) refers to a unit of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency 
mainly US dollar. Consumer price indices, both for Pakistan tp and US 
∗
tp  (Line 64.ZF) 
reflect changes in the price of acquiring a fixed basket of the goods and services by the 
average consumer. Data on M1 is taken from Thomson Data stream and denotes currency plus 
demand deposits. Foreign exchange reserves (Line 1L.DZF) are the sum of the foreign 
exchange reserve position in the fund, and the US dollar value of the special drawing rights 
holding by monetary authorities. Monetary authorities comprise Central Bank and, to the 
extent that they perform monetary authorities’ functions, currency boards, exchange 
stabilisation funds, and treasuries.  
 
Appendix A.2 Instrumental Validity Test 
 
 We use instrumental variable technique to overcome endogenity problem. Instead of 
endogenous variables, we use instrumental variables in the estimation of real money demand 
function and price equation. The instrumental variables should be correlated with the 
endogenous variable but should be uncorrelated with the models’ error term. Sargan 
developed a test to check the validity of instruments used. It is a four step test: (a) estimate the 
original model using the two-stage least square approach, (b) generate residuals from the 
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estimated model, (c) estimate regression equation for residuals using exogenous variables and 
instrumental variables and (d) obtain the number of observations and 2R .  
The test statistic is given as: 
2
nRS =                                                                                                                          (A.1) 
S  and n  denote Sargen tests statistic and number of observations. Under the null hypothesis 
that all instruments are exogenous to model’s error term S is distributed as 2
rm−χ  where rm −  
is the number of instruments minus the number of endogenous variables.   
 We suspect that the interest rate is endogenously determined. Estimates of real money 
demand function using two stage least squares are given in table A.1. The bottom part of Table 
A.1 shows estimates of residual regression equation. From the residual regression equation, 
we obtain  
Table A.1 Real Money Demand and Residual Regression Equation 
Variable Coefficient t-values 2R  
ti∆  -0.080 -1.13 -0.46 
tp∆  0.129 1.79 
 
Residual Regression on instrumental variables 
∗∆ ti  -0.003 -0.115 
2R  
∗∆ tp  0.923 3.624
a
 
-0.058 
ty∆  -0.048 -0.0704 
 
Note: tt pi , and ty denotes interest rate, consumer price index and real domestic income respectively. 
∆  denotes first difference operator. Quarterly data from 1976Q1 to 2005Q2 is used.  
 
 
the number of observations and R2 required for calculating Sargan test. The test statistic is 
given as: 
S = 117 * (-0.057) = -6.669 
Since the calculated Sargan test statistic of -6.669 is less than the critical 2
rm−χ of 5.99 
at two degrees of freedom. Therefore, we can not reject the null that the instruments  
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Table A.2 Price equation and Residuals Regression Equation 
Variable Coefficient t – ratio 2R  
Constant 0.001 0.24 -2.26 
∗∆ tp  0.287 0.79  
ts∆  0.828 1.81  
Residuals Regression on instrumental variables 
∗∆ ti  -0.021 -0.919 -0.01 
∗∆ tp  0.109 0.479  
1−∆ ts  -0.062 -0.679  
ty∆  -0.047 -0.779  
Note: ∗ti , 
∗
tp , 1−ts  and ty  denotes US Treasury Bill rate, US CPI, lagged nominal exchange rate, and 
domestic real income. ∆  denotes first difference operator. Quarterly data from 1976Q1 to 2005Q2 is used.  
 
 
used in the estimation of real money demand function are valid.  Table A.2 contains two- stage 
least square estimates of price equation and residuals regression equations. Residual regression 
equation gives us the number of observations and 2R  required for estimating Sargen test. 
Therefore, the Sargen test statistic is calculates as: 
S = 117*-0.01 = -1.17 
Since the calculated Sargan test statistic of -1.17 is less than the critical 2
rm−χ  of 7.82 at 
two degrees of freedom we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments used in the 
price equation are valid. 
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Appendix A3 Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Phillips and Perron  Unit Root Test in Levels 
Variables Constant Constant and trend 
ti
 
-4.419 a  -4.739 a  
tm
 
-1.797 -2.970 
tp
 
-0.989 -2.373 
∗
tp
 
-4.738 a  -2.558 
ts
 
0.005 -2.558 
ty
 
0.768 -3.319 
5% critical values -2.886 -3.449 
Phillips and Perron  Unit Root Test in First Difference 
Variables Constant Constant and trend 
ti∆  -17.338 a  -17.271 a  
tm∆  -12.183 a  -12.286 a  
tp∆  -9.672 a  -9.675 a  
∗∆ tp  -3.769
a
 -5.209 a  
ts∆  -9. 403 a  -9.368 a  
ty∆  -14.318 a  -14.337 a  
5% critical values -2.886 -3.449 
Note: a  indicates the significance of the variables at 5% critical values. * denotes the foreign counterparts of the 
domestic variables. Lag lengths in parentheses (.) are determined by the Akakike Information Criterion with 
maximum number of 4 lags. Variables used are defined as: =ti  Treasury Bill Rate, =tm  M1 in Pakistan, 
=tp  CPI in Pakistan, =
∗
tp  US CPI, =ts spot exchange rate, and =ty gross domestic product adjusted 
with GDP deflator. 5% one sided critical values are taken from McKinnon (1996). Quarterly data for the period 
1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2 is used. ∆  denotes first difference operator. 
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Appendix A.4  
Real Money Demand and Price Equation (intercept is dropped form the estimation).   
Real Money Demand 
Indep: Variable Coeff: 
T-Ratio 
[NW] DW Stat )4(LM  )4(ARCH  2R  
ti∆  -0.080 -1.461 2.274 
4.406 
(0.354) 
3.942 
(0.005) -0.66 
ty∆  0.129 1.945     
Price Equation 
Indep: Variable Coeff: 
T-Ratio 
 
DW Stat )4(LM  )4(ARCH  2R  
*
tp∆  0.319 0.339 1.765 
4.406 
(0.007) 
0.123 
(0.97) -2.761 
ts∆  0.916 2.707 a      
Note: NW refers to Newey-West test statistic. The variables used are interest rate  ( ti ), foreign price ( *tp ), 
nominal exchange rate ( ts ) and domestic real income ( ty ). ∆  denotes first difference operator. Quarterly data 
for the period 1976Q2 to 2005Q2 is used. a  denotes significant t-values. )4(LM  and )4(HetF  denotes Breusch 
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier and Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity test statistics to test the null of 
no autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the estimated regression equation   
  
 
Table A.4 shows real money demand and price equation in difference data. It shows that all 
the variables have the signs consistent with the theory. However, except nominal exchange 
rate, the estimated parameters for all the remaining variables are insignificant. The estimates 
of Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention index based on the real money demand and 
price equation given in Table A.4 shows dominant downward pressure and active Central 
Bank intervention. Exchange Market Pressure and intervention index mean values of 0.005 
and 0.579 further support this interpretation. Thus the results that we have obtained by 
dropping constant term are quite similar to those that are obtained from estimated real money 
demand and price equations that include constant term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 109 
Appendix A5  
Real Money Demand and Price Equation (Uses interest rate in level).   
Real Money Demand 
Indep: Variable Coeff: 
T-Ratio 
[NW] DW Stat )4(LM  )4(ARCH  2R  
ti∆  0.00083 6.025 a  2.180 
4.398 
(0.354) 
2.324 
(0.061) -0.05 
ty∆  0.043 0.943     
Price Equation 
Indep: Variable Coeff: 
T-Ratio 
 
DW Stat )4(LM  )4(ARCH  2R  
*
tp∆  0.519 2.920 a  1.771 
9.687 
(0.046) 
67.085 
(0.00) -1.401 
ts∆  0.639 3.246 a      
Note: NW refers to Newey-West test statistic. The variables used are interest rate  ( ti ), foreign price ( *tp ), 
nominal exchange rate ( ts ) and domestic real income ( ty ). ∆  denotes first difference operator. Quarterly data 
for the period 1976Q2 to 2005Q2 is used. a  denotes significant t-values. )4(LM  and )4(HetF  denotes Breusch 
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier and Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity test statistics to test the null of 
no autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the estimated regression equation   
  
Table A.5 shows the estimates of real money demand and price equation when both Pakistan 
and US interest rate are used in levels. The table shows that although the estimated domestic 
interest rate parameter is significant yet it is wrongly signed. In addition, the estimated 
parameter of domestic real income although of positive sign is not significantly different from 
zero. However, the estimated parameters of both foreign price and exchange rate are positive 
and significant when the price equation is estimated using the US interest rate in levels as an 
instrument for exchange rate. The constructed exchange market pressure and intervention 
index based on the use of interest rate in levels show that on average domestic currency was 
under pressure to depreciate and active Central Bank intervention. Exchange Market Pressure 
and intervention index mean values of 0.004 and 0.594 further support this interpretation. 
These finding shows that our estimates of Exchange Market Pressure and intervention index 
obtained using difference data and the real money demand and price equation containing 
intercept are robust to different specifications.        
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Chapter Five 
Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention Index: case of Pakistan.  
Evidence from Cointegration Approach 
Abstract 
  To work with a model based approach to Exchange Market Pressure, estimation on level data 
may be spurious. This chapter utilises a cointegration framework to estimate the parameters of 
a Weymark’s (1995) model. We also construct an intervention index. Additionally, we utilise 
the same framework to estimate Girton and Roper’s (1977) monetary model of Exchange 
Market Pressure. The objective is to check the direction of pressure, evaluate monetary 
authorities’ response to prevailing pressure and test the independence of Central Bank in 
pursuing independent monetary policy over the given sample period. The results indicate 
monetary independence, dominant downward pressure on the Pakistan’s currency and active 
Central Bank intervention. An intervention index suggests that foreign exchange reserve 
relieved seventy-three percent of the pressure. Exchange rate changes absorbed the remaining 
pressure.    
.    
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5.1 Introduction    
 Exchange market pressure is defined as money market disequilibrium that arises due to 
nonzero excess demand of domestic currency in foreign exchange market (Taslim, 2003). 
Since it is directly unobservable, exchange market pressure is measured by changes in the 
macroeconomic variable that are used for restoring money market equilibrium. In fixed 
exchange rate system, it is reflected in foreign exchange reserve changes. On the other hand, 
exchange rate changes measure the extent of foreign exchange market disequilibrium in a free 
float. In a managed float or intermediate exchange rate system, simultaneous changes in 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve measure foreign exchange market disequilibrium.      
 Girton and Roper (1977) first derived an Exchange Market Pressure index using a 
monetary approach to the balance of payments. It refers to the volume of intervention 
necessary to restore foreign exchange market equilibrium. Such an intervention takes the form 
of money market operations and exchange rate changes under two extreme exchange rate 
regimes of fixed and flexible exchange rates. Under a managed float, both money market 
operations and exchange rate changes simultaneously characterise the volume of intervention 
necessary for restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium. In Girton and Roper’s (1977) 
model, both these components are equally weighted.       
 Weymark (1995) made a notable contribution to the theory of exchange market 
pressure. She used a stochastic macroeconomic model for deriving the weights assigned to the 
components of exchange market pressure index. It converts foreign exchange reserves changes 
into equivalent exchange rate units. Since its development, many researchers have applied the 
Weymark (1995) approach to different countries for checking the direction of pressure and 
have evaluated monetary authorities’ response to it. These studies include Poso and Spolander 
(1997) to Finland, Kohlscheen (2002) to Chile, Taslim (2003) to Australia, Akiba and Ida 
(2004) to Singapore and Jeisman (2005) to Australia. Kohlscheen (2002) slightly modified 
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Weymark’s (1995) approach to incorporate the Chilean policy of reserve requirements on 
foreign capital inflows.37 On the other hand, Poso and Spolander (1997) used pure intervention 
data for evaluating the Finnish Central Bank’s response to exchange market pressure.38 
Empirical evidence shows that the Central Banks of these countries actively intervened in the 
foreign exchange market to avoid undesirable exchange rate fluctuations. Apergis and 
Eleftheriou (2002) on the other hand, assumed interest rate insensitivity of money demand and 
imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets. Their empirical evidence supports the 
predominance of downward pressure and active central bank intervention. 
 In this study, we use Girton and Roper’s (1977) and Weymark’s (1995) methodology. 
Girton and Roper’s (1977) approach is used to test the monetary authorities’ independence in 
formulating an effective monetary policy. On the other hand, Weymark’s (1995) approach is 
used to check the direction of pressure and evaluate the monetary authorities’ response by 
constructing an intervention index values. We adopt Weymark’s (1995) approach because 
contrary to Frenkel and Aizenman’s (1982) approach, it enables us to evaluate the monetary 
authority’s response to undesirable exchange rate fluctuations by constructing an intervention 
index.39 It refers to the fraction of pressure that a Central Bank relieves through the purchase 
and sale of foreign exchange reserves. The objective is to provide estimates of an exchange 
market pressure and intervention index which can be used as tools for analysing monetary 
policy in Pakistan.      
We use Johansen’s (1988) multivariate cointegration approach for empirical analysis. 
We use Johansen’s (1988) approach because there is potentially a spurious regression with 
                                                 
37
 Due to increase in capital inflows, the Chilean monetary authorities imposed a twenty percent non-interest 
bearing reserve requirement on selective capital inflows which was increased to thirty percent in May, 1992. This 
was reduced to ten percent in June, 1998 and was eliminated three months later.   
38
 Pure intervention includes those purchasing and selling foreign exchange reserves by the Bank of Finland 
which are aimed at affecting the markka exchange rate 
39
 Frenkel and Aizenman (1982) defined optimal exchange rate regime in terms of stochastic shocks affecting the 
economy. The real shocks induce fixity of exchange rates. On the other hand, monetary shocks are consistent 
with the desire for flexibility of exchange rate. Furthermore, the desire for flexibility of exchange rate diminishes 
if the share of non-traded relative to traded goods is higher.     
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non-stationary data when used with classical regression. An important exception arises when a 
linear combination of nonstationary variables is stationary. In such a case, we say that there 
exists a long run cointegrating relationship among the variables and there is not a spurious 
regression. Johansen (1988) developed a multivariate cointegration approach that is widely 
used in the literature for analysing long run relationship among the nonstationary variables. 
Indeed we go substantially beyond the previous chapter by not only using Johansen (1988) to 
estimate a money demand and price equation in a single system. But to do so within system 
full information maximum likelihood should improve our estimated results. The results 
indicate monetary independence and downward pressure on domestic currency over the entire 
sample period. Furthermore, the gathered evidence suggests that the Central Bank actively 
intervened in the foreign exchange market for avoiding undesirable exchange rate changes.   
 The rest of the chapter follows as: in section 5.2 we derive the Exchange Market 
Pressure and intervention index using Weymark’s (1995) method. In section 5.3, we analyse 
the data which includes data discussion and graphical analysis. In section 5.4 we outline 
Johansen’s multivariate cointegration approach and in section 5.5, we discuss the results. The 
results include testing of nonstationarity of the data on the variables of interest in section 5.5.1, 
discussion of vector error correction model estimates of real money demand and price 
equation in section 5.5.2. In section 5.5.3 we construct exchange market pressure and 
intervention index for Pakistan using Johansen’s multivariate estimates of real money demand 
and price equation. Section 5.5.4 is addressed to the summary of results obtained from log 
levels and log difference data with Johansen multivariate cointegration approach and two stage 
least square method. Section 5.6 concludes.       
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5.2 The Model  
 We firstly set out the Weymark (1995) model used to construct exchange market 
pressure and an intervention index for Pakistan. It is given in logarithmic form as:  
tttt
d
t vibybpm +−+= 21                01 >b  and 02 >b                                         (5.1) 
ttt sapaap 210 ++=
∗
                             0, 21 >aa                                               (5.2)                                                      
ttttt ssEii −+= +
∗
1                                                                                                    (5.3) 
=
s
tm
s
tm 1− tt fd ∆+∆+                                                                                                                                              (5.4) 
ttt sf ∆−=∆ ρ                                                                                                             (5.5) 
Asterisks denote foreign counterpart of domestic variables. Equation (5.1) explains that 
an increase in real income )( ty  increases the demand for nominal money balances )( dtm  
because there is a larger volume of transactions to be financed. An increase in interest rate )( ti  
raises the opportunity cost of holding money and thus reduces the demand for money (Kreinin 
and Officer, 1978). Equation (5.2) defines the evolution of domestic price level.  The 
exchange rate )( ts  is defined as the number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency such that a rise in the exchange rate is associated with a depreciation of domestic 
currency. Equation (5.2) states that domestic price level is positively influenced by foreign 
price )( ∗tp  and exchange rate )( ts  changes. Absolute purchasing power parity is assumed to 
hold, if 0a  is constrained to zero and 1a  and 2a  are assumed to be equal to unity (Spolander, 
1999). Equation (5.3) is Uncovered Interest Rate Parity. Given that the domestic financial 
institutions are well developed, it explains that any divergence between domestic and foreign 
interest rate )( ∗ti  is reflected in expected exchange rate changes. The notation 1+tt sE  
represents the value that rational agents expect in period t+1 given the information in period t. 
Equation (5.4) defines money supply )( stm  in terms of its sources. It states that inherited 
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money stock ( stm 1− ), domestic credit ( td∆ ) and foreign exchange reserve ( tf∆ ) determine 
money supply in period t. Equation (5.5) is monetary authority’s response to exchange rate 
fluctuations. It indicates the way the central bank changes foreign exchange reserves in 
response to exchange rate fluctuations (Chen and Taketa, 2007).      
Substitution of equation (5.2) and (5.3) in (5.1), taking the difference of the resulting 
equation, combining it with the Central Bank’s response function and re-arranging the 
resulting equation yields: 
22
12211 }){(
ba
fSEbdvibybpa
s ttttttttt +
∆+∆−∆−+∆−∆+∆−
=∆ +
∗∗
                   (5.6) 
Equation (5.6) shows that changes in foreign price, domestic income, foreign interest rate, and 
domestic credit, expected change in the spot exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves 
determine exchange rate changes. The elasticity of exchange rate with respect to foreign 
reserves η  is given by equation (5.7): 
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η  converts foreign exchange reserve changes into equivalent exchange rate units.  
Exchange market pressure index based upon the macroeconomic model given in 
equation (5.1) to (5.5) is given as: 
ttt fsEMP ∆+∆= η                                                                                                  (5.8) 
Exchange market pressure index indicates the distribution of pressure between exchange rate 
and foreign exchange reserve changes. It further reveals that in the absence of central bank 
intervention, the entire pressure is absorbed by exchange rate changes. Based on exchange 
market pressure index, Weymark (1995) defines foreign exchange intervention index as:  
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right hand side of the equation (5.9) by 
η/1 gives: 
tt
t
t
fs
f
∆+∆
∆
=
η
ω 1                                                                                                   (5.10) 
The intervention index reveals the fraction of the pressure that the Central Bank relieves 
through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves. Its values range 
between ∞<<∞− tω . tω  equal to zero represents that the Central Bank abstained from 
intervention. When tω  equals to one there was fixed rate. tω  between zero and one implies 
changes in both exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves. tω < 0 shows the Central Bank’s 
leaning with the wind policy. This can be interpreted that the Central Bank purchased foreign 
exchange reserves when there was a downward pressure on domestic currency. tω >1 shows 
that the Central Bank response was more than that warranted by the pressure )( tt EMPf >∆ . 
This leads the exchange rate to move in the direction opposite to that warranted by the 
pressure.  
5.3 Data 
 Quarterly data on all variables except nominal money (M1) for Pakistan and US. 
Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are obtained from International Monetary Fund 
International Financial Statistic. The authorities at Statistical Department, State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) provided us quarterly data on nominal GDP. Similarly, we obtained M1 data 
from Thomson data stream. M1 data for US is taken from Federal Reserve Bank webpage.  
Due to unavailability of quarterly GDP deflator data, we adjusted the nominal GDP and 
nominal money balances (M1) for Pakistan and US using their CPIs. Since the data on real 
GDP and money (M1) showed seasonality problem, it was adjusted using X – 12 ARIMA 
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seasonal adjustment programme as available in Eviews standard version. In the analysis that 
follows, all the variables are used in logarithmic form.      
Call money rate )( ti  refers to rate of interest that domestic financial system charges to 
brokerage firms to finance their clients financial needs. Similarly, exchange rate )( ts  refers to 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. tp  and 
∗
tp  refers to domestic and foreign 
price respectively. Money )( tm  denotes currency in circulation and demand deposits.40 
Foreign exchange reserves )( tf  refer to total reserves minus gold. ty  is real income obtained 
by adjusting nominal GDP with Pakistan consumer price index.    
 Figure D1 (given in Appendix D) shows graphs in log levels. It indicates that except 
interest rate, all variables display nonstationarity. Interest rate on the other hand, varies over a 
time with a tendency to rise and fall. Exchange rate plot indicates that prior to 1982, it has 
remained fixed. It further shows that a shift in the level of exchange rate took place in the first 
quarter of 1982 and fourth quarter of 2001. The former shift occurred due to country’s switch 
from fixed to managed float exchange rate regime on 8th January, 1982. The latter shift 
occurred due to Pakistan’s cooperation with the world in its war against terrorism.   
Figure D2 (given in Appendix D) contains the graphs of differenced data on all these 
variables. It indicates that the differenced data does not display such a clear stochastic trend 
and fluctuates around constant mean which confirms that the data is stationary. This is further 
confirmed by the values obtained for Augmented Dicky–Fuller unit root test using differenced 
data, as given in section 5.5.1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 US M1 is defined as currency, travellers’ checks, demand deposits, and other checkable deposits.  
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5.4 Econometric Method 
 
In this section, we present an empirical methodology. If the data is nonstationary, we 
can not use classical estimation methods due to spurious regression problem (Granger and 
Newbold, 1974).41 A simple approach to deal with this problem is first difference the data as is 
the case with previous chapter. Although differencing satisfies stationarity properities of time 
series variables for estimation yet it also results the loss of vital information about long run 
relationship, if the variables involved are cointegrated. This problem can be overcomed by 
using either Engle and Granger (1987) or Johansen (1988) approach. 
In this paper, we test the presence of cointegrating relationship using Johansen’s 
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius’ (1990) multivariate cointegartion approach. We prefer this 
approach to Engle and Granger’s (1987) method due to (a) Engle and Granger’s (1987) do not 
distinguish between the presence of one or more cointegrating vectors (Hafer and Jansen, 
1991), (b) Engle and Granger’s (1987) being a two-step procedure. At first stage, we estimate 
our model using ordinary least square approach and in the second stage we test the stationarity 
of the residuals. Stationarity of the residuals implies the presence of cointegrating relationship. 
However, the error committed at the first stage influence the second stage results. On the other 
hand, Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) not only permits us to examine the 
question of cointegrating vectors in the multivariate system, it also allows us to test the 
number of cointegrating vectors as well. In addition, due to endogenity of all variables, the 
results remain invariant with respect to the direction of normalization. The Johansen (1988) 
and Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure is based upon the following relationship:    
tktXktXtX ε+−−Π++−Π= 111 LLL  ),,1( Tt LL=    (5.11) 
                                                 
41
 If 2R  exceeds Durbin Watson statistic, it suggest that the regression is spurious (Granger and Newbold, 1974) 
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Where iΠ  is a vector of parameters, tX  is a vector of variables and tε  is a vector of error 
terms with zero mean and constant variance given as Λ . Generally, the above model is 
estimated in difference form to avoid spurious regression problem. Although it satisfies 
stationarity property yet it also results the loss of vital information about long run relationship, 
if variables involved are cointegrated.     
Taking first difference of equation (5.11), Johansen and Juselius (1990) suggest 
writing it in the form given as: 
tktXktXktXtX ε+−Π−+−∆−Γ++−∆Γ=∆ 1111 LLL                                             (5.12) 
Where 
 )1( ki Π−−Π−Ι−=Γ LL          ),11( −= ki LLL  
and  
)1( kΠ−−Π−Ι−=Π LL     
Equation (5.12) is first order vector auto regression model except for the final matrix ktX −Π  
which contains information about the long run relationship. The equality of the rank of Π  
denoted as r and the number of variables p  indicate the stationarity of all the variables. 
Therefore, any combination of stationarity variables yields stationary variables i.e., 
cointegrated. Zero rank )0( =r of matrix Π  suggests that all the elements of the matrix are 
nonstationary and first difference may be recommended. When pr < , it implies that there are 
p x r matrices α  and β  such that '.αβ=Π  Here β  denotes the matrix of  cointegrating 
vectors, and α  represents the matrix of weight with which each cointegrating vector enters 
each of the tX∆ equation. Johansen and Juselius (1990) demonstrate that β , the cointegrating 
vector, can be estimated as the eigenvector associated with r  largest and significant 
eigenvalues found by solving    
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kkkk SSSSλ                                                                                              (5.13) 
where 00S  denotes the residual moment matrix from the regression of tX∆  on its lagged 
values, kkS  is the residual moment matrix from an ordinary least square regression of ktX −  on 
1+−∆ ktX , and kS0  is the product of moment matrix. Given these eigenvalues, we can test the 
null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors by calculating two test statistics known as 
trace test and maximum eigenvalue test give as: 
)1log()(
10 ∑ += −−=
N
ri itrace
Tr λλ                                                                               (5.14) 
and  
)1log()( 10max +−−= rTr λλ                                                                                       (5.15) 
Here trace and max refers to trace and maximum eigenvalue test respectively. The trace test is 
used to evaluate the null hypothesis that there are r  or fewer cointegrating vectors against a 
general alternative hypothesis. On the other hand, maximum eigenvalue test, tests the null 
hypothesis that r = 0 against the alternative hypothesis that .1≤r    
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Unit Root Tests 
 The presence of cointegrating relationship requires that the time series data on the 
variables of interest should be integrated. This implies that the data should be nonstationary in 
levels and stationary at first difference. Dicky Fuller test identifies the integrating order of the 
time series data and is given as:     
tit
p
i
itt xxx εγθγ +∆++=∆ −
=
− ∑
0
10        (5.16) 
where ∆  is the difference operator, tx  is the logarithm of the variable being tested, iγ , θ  are 
the parameters to be estimated and tε  is an error term. The null of nonstationarity of tx  series 
is rejected if calculated t – values are less than the critical values. On the other hand, if  
   Table 5.1: Unit Root Test in log levels and first difference42 
ADF Unit Root Test in log levels ADF Unit Root Test in First Difference 
Variables Constant Constant and trend Variables Constant Constant and trend 
ti
 
-1.442 (1) -1.673(1) 
ti∆  -10.837 a (1) -10.810 a (1) 
tm
 
-1.750(1) -2.950(1) 
tm∆  -12.268 a (1) -12.377 a (1) 
*
tm  -1.431(1) -2.479(1) *tm∆  -3.950 a  (1) -3.932 a  (1) 
tp
 
-0.287(1) -2.534(1) 
tp∆  -2.908 a (1) -3.033(1) 
∗
tp
 
-2.853(1) 
-3.891 a (1) ∗∆ tp  -3.791 a (1) -4.897 a (1) 
ts
 
-0.453(1) -2.496(1) 
ts∆  -9.386 a (1) -9.531 a (1) 
ty
 
-1.399(1) -2.571(1) 
ty∆  -10.287 a (1) -10.289 a (1) 
*
ty  0.255(1) -2.546(1) *ty∆  -7.066 a  (1) -1.069(1) 
temp  -10.241 a  (1) -10.221 a  (1) 
   
5% critical values -2.887 -3.449 5% critical values -2.887 -3.449 
Note: a  indicates the significance of the variables at 5% critical values. * denotes the foreign counterparts of the domestic variables. Lag lengths in parentheses (.) 
are determined by the Akakike Information Criterion with maximum number of 4 lags. Variables used are defined as: =ti  Treasury Bill Rate, =tm  M2 in 
Pakistan, =tp  CPI in Pakistan, =
∗
tp  US CPI, =ts spot exchange rate, and =ty gross domestic product adjusted with GDP deflator. 5% one sided critical 
values are taken from McKinnon (1996). Quarterly data for the period 1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2 is used. ∆  denotes first difference operator 
                                                 
42
 We also tested the nonstationarity of all variables in levels using Phillips and Perron test. The results indicate that the calculated t-values are less than critical values; 
therefore, we can not reject the null of nonstationarity for all variables in levels. However, Phillips-Perron unit root test applied to difference data yields t-values that are greater 
than critical ones. Therefore, we can reject null of nonstationarity for all variables at first difference.    
 
calculated t–values are greater than the critical ones, we do not reject the null of 
nonstationarity of time series. Table 5.1 reports calculated t–values of variables of interest in 
log levels and log first difference with drift and drift and trend model. The results show that 
we are unable to reject the nonstationarity null for all variables in log levels except foreign 
price  ∗tp  with drift and deterministic trend model and exchange market pressure with both 
drift and deterministic trend model. This means that foreign price is drift nonstationary but 
trend stationary in levels. However, Phillips- Perron unit root test (given in appendix) provide 
evidence that foreign price ∗tp  is drift stationary and trend nonstationary in levels. In addition, 
US income is of positive sign with drift model. This can be interpreted that the data generating 
process is explosive. This implies that the US income does not converge to its equilibrium 
value over the given sample period. Table 5.1 further indicates that all variables except 
domestic price with trend model are stationary at first difference. However, first difference 
domestic price is stationary with drift. This shows that first difference domestic price with 
drift is appropriate specification for estimation. This is further confirmed from the figure D2 
(given in appendix). It indicates that first difference domestic price does not show any 
systematic trend and fluctuates around its zero mean. Furthermore, we also estimate Phillips 
and Perron unit root test (given in appendix) which shows all variables are stationary at first 
difference. All this shows that we can reject the null of nonstationarity for all variables at least 
in one specification.  
5.5.2 Vector Error Correction Model Results  
 
 We test the presence of long run relationship using Johansen (1988) cointegration 
approach. The linear combination of two or more of I(1) variables yields nonstationarity 
variable as well. An important exception arises when linear combination of nonstationarity 
variables yields stationary outcome than these variables are said to be cointegrated. Stationary 
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linear combination of these nonstationary variables suggests the presence of long run 
cointegrating relationship. 
 In this section, we have adopted an approach that improves upon Weymark (1995). 
Instead of separately estimating real money demand (5.1) and price equation (5.2) using 
Johansen (1988) cointegration approach, we examine six dimensional vector process that 
allows us to test whether there is evidence that distinct money demand and price equation 
relations prevail in the data. The variables used in the analysis are defined in the data section. 
As a priori, we can think of two cointegrating vectors governing the long run 
behaviour of these variables. First cointegrating vector is expressed in terms of real money 
demand function and is given as: 
ttttt vibybpm +−=− 21                                                                                   (5.1) 
where 1b  and 2b  denotes the income and interest rate elasticity. It is expected that 1b  is close 
to unity, corresponding to a unitary elasticity, and that 2b  > 0. Second, if the real exchange 
rate is stationary, we can expect that:  
ttt sapaap 210 ++=
∗
                                                                                            (5.2) 
corresponds to second cointegrating relationship with 121 == aa . In addition to estimating 
real money demand and price equation using single vector error correction model, we also 
estimate Girton and Roper (1977) model to test the domestic monetary authority’s 
independence in pursuing an independent monetary policy. The Girton and Roper model is 
given as: 
*
53
*
21 tttttt yymmfs ββββα −++−=∆+∆       (5.17) 
It is assumed that an increase in domestic money supply and a rise in foreign income put 
pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. On the other hand, an increase in domestic 
income and foreign money supply reduces pressure on domestic currency.  
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Table 5.2 Diagnostic statistics 
Diagnostic test Test Statistic 
Real Money Demand and Price Equation 
LM(1) 37.563[0.397] 
LM(2) 27.495[0.845] 
LM(3) 20.387[0.737] 
LM(4) 49.498[0.067] 
LM(5) 34.161[0.556] 
LM(6) 42.185[0.221] 
2
)(Hetχ  1546.414[0.263] 
)4(2Norχ  1.561[0.458] 
Girton and Roper Model 
LM(1) 37.625[0.051] 
LM(2) 31.265[0.181] 
2
)(Hetχ  11.819[0.92] 
)2(2Norχ  4.396(0.111) 
Note: LM denotes Lagrange Multiplier test for residual serial correlation up to third order. 2χ  normal is a chi-
square test for normality. F het is an F test for heteroscedasticity. Numbers in square brackets are the probability 
values of the test statistics.   
 
 
For estimating six dimensional vector process ( i.e. =tX  ,tt pm −  ,tp  ,ty  ,ti  ,∗tp  
)ts  using Johansen multivariate cointegration approach, we first need to determine the optimal 
lag length. Instead of using some information criterion for determining optimal lag length, we 
estimated the unrestricted Vector Autoregression model up to eight lags and checked the 
residuals properities which were satisfied at the chosen lag length of six. For estimating Girton 
and Roper (1977) model, we used two lags at which the residuals of unrestricted vector 
Autoregression model satisfied required properities. Table 5.2 shows the results of statistical 
tests used to check residuals properities of estimated unrestricted VAR. It is evident from the 
table that the null of no serial correlation and homoscedasticity can not be rejected. Similarly, 
we can not accept the null of non-normal distribution of residuals.   
   Prior to estimation of long run relationship, we impose restrictions on intercept and 
trend in the short run and long run with a view of selecting appropriate model. The first 
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possible specification includes intercept but no trend in cointegration equation, no intercept or 
trend in VAR. Thus data do not contain linear trends and therefore, the differenced data has 
zero mean. Moreover, cointegrating equation and VAR in model three includes intercept but 
no trend. In this case, data does not contain trend but the specification is allowed to drift 
around an intercept. Intercept in VAR cancels intercept in the cointegrating equation. This 
leaves only one intercept in the short run. Finally, model four contains intercept in both VAR 
and cointegrating equation, linear trend in cointegrating equation, no trend in VAR. Trend in 
cointegrating equation takes account of exogenous growth.  
 We select the appropriate model by moving from the most restrictive to least restrictive 
model by comparing trace or maximal eigen value test statistic to their critical values. We 
select the model when the null that there are r cointegrating vectors is not rejected for the first 
time (Asteriou and Hall, 2007).     
Table 5.3 reports the results of cointegration test using the specification that includes 
real money balances, real domestic income, interest rate, domestic and foreign price indices 
Pakistan’s nominal exchange rate, US money supply and US real income. Two test statistics 
are used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors. The decision about the number of 
cointegrating vector is based upon the calculated and critical statistics. The null hypothesis is 
not rejected if the calculated values are less then the critical ones. If calculated maximum or 
trace statistics are less than their 95% critical ones, we do not reject the null of presence of 
cointegrating relationship.   
It is evident from Table 5.3 that Maximum eigenvalue and trace test statistic provide 
evidence of two and three cointegrating vectors for the specification that uses real money 
demand and price equation in single vector error correction model. We prefer maximum eigen 
value test statistic in selecting the number of cointegrating vector because of its strong 
alternative hypothesis compare to trace test statistic (Enders, 2010). On the other hand, both 
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trace and maximum eigen value suggest one cointegrating vector for specification that uses 
exchange market pressure, domestic and foreign real money balances and domestic and 
foreign real income. 
Next we impose exact – identifying (also called non – testable) restrictions for 
identifying cointegrating vectors. These restrictions are imposed to identify the cointegrating 
space and are equal to the number of cointegrating vectors (Ostero and Milas, 2001). On the 
other hand, over-identifying restrictions (also called testable restrictions) are the additional 
restrictions and are imposed on the cointegrating vectors. We test the validity of these 
restrictions using standard likelihood ratio test statistic (Milas, 1999). The presence of two 
cointegrating vectors in six dimension vector system suggests imposing two non –testable 
restrictions on each of the cointegrating vector. In order to do so, the two cointegrating vectors 
associated with  tX  = [ ptmt − , tp , ti , ty , ∗tp  , ts ] are given as: 
111 [φ=Π , 12φ , 13φ , 14φ , 15φ , 16φ , 17φ ] and 
212 [φ=Π , 22φ , 23φ , 24φ , 25φ , 26φ , 27φ ] 
Here 1Π and 2Π  denote first and second cointegrating vector which denote the real money 
demand ( tt pm − ) and price equation ( tp ) respectively. Each cointegrating vector contains 
seven elements, they represent the coefficient of each of the endogenous variable  
[ tt pm − , tp , ti , ty , ∗tp  , ts ] and intercept term, µ  respectively. The non–testable restrictions 
imposed for identifying cointegrating vectors are given as: 
11φ  = 1, 12φ  = 0 (real money demand equation) and  
21φ  = 0,  22φ  = 1 (price equation) 
Table 5.3: Cointegration test based on Johansen maximum likelihood method 
Real Money Demand and Price Equation Girton and Roper Model 
Null Hypothesis Alternative 
 Hypothesis 
maxλ rank value 5% critical 
values 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
maxλ rank value 5% critical values 
maxλ rank test    maxλ rank test  
  
:0H 0=r  :aH 0>r  46.593 40.957 :0H 0=r  :aH 0>r  50.398 33.877 
:0H 1≤r  :aH 1>r  42.155 34.806 :0H 1≤r  :aH 1>r  22.766 a  27.584 
:0H 2≤r  :aH 2>r  23.144 a  28.588 :0H 2≤r  :aH 2>r  16.586 21.132 
:0H 3≤r  :aH 3>r  15.674 22.299 :0H 3≤r  :aH 3>r  7.596 14.265 
:0H 4≤r  :aH 4>r  9.178 15.892 :0H 4≤r  :aH 4>r  0.372 3.841 
:0H 5≤r  :aH 5>r  6.428 9.165     
traceλ  rank test  traceλ  rank value  traceλ  rank test    
:0H 0=r  :aH 1=r  143.142 103.847 :0H 0=r  :aH 1=r  97.718 69.819 
:0H 1=r  :aH 2=r  96.549 76.973 :0H 1=r  :aH 2=r  47.320 a  47.856 
:0H 2=r  :aH 3=r  54.393 54.079 :0H 2=r  :aH 3=r  24.554 29.797 
:0H 3=r  :aH 4=r  31.279 a  35.193 :0H 3=r  :aH 4=r  7.968 15.495 
:0H 4=r  :aH 5=r  15.606 20.261 :0H 4=r  :aH 5=r  0.372 3.842 
:0H 5=r  :aH 6=r  6.428 9.165    
 
Note: a denotes the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected for the 95% significance level. Model 2 contains intercept but no trend in the cointegarting 
equation, no intercept or trend in VAR. Model 3 includes intercept in the cointegrating equation and VAR, no trend in cointegrating equation and VAR. Model 4 includes 
intercept in cointegrating equation and VAR, linear trend in cointegrating equation and no trend in VAR. Variables used in the VAR are: tt pm − , ti , ty , ,tp   and ts  
which denotes real money balances, inter bank call money rate, domestic real income. Domestic prices, foreign prices and Pakistan’s nominal exchange rate. VAR is 
estimated using three lags from 1976Q1 to 2005Q2. n  and r  indicates the total number of the cointegrating vectors and the rank of the cointegrating matrix. * denotes foreign counterparts of 
domestic variables.    
 
The non-testable restrictions imposed on the first cointegrating vector 11φ  reveals that we 
express it in terms of real money demand tt pm −  ( 11φ  = 1) and drop the long run estimates of 
price equation tp ( 12φ  = 0). The remaining variables are included unrestrictly. Similarly the 
non-testable restrictions imposed on the second cointegrating vectors 21φ  allows us to express 
it in terms of price equation tp  ( 22φ  = 1) and drop long run estimates of real money demand 
equation tt pm −  ( 11φ  = 0). This also allows us to include the rest of the variables unrestricted 
in the second cointegrating vector.            
The over – identifying restrictions (also called testable restrictions) the validity of 
which is to be tested, are given as: 
:0
aH  15φ  = 16φ  = 0 (on the real money demand equation) 
15φ  and 16φ  denote foreign price and exchange rate estimates and are dropped from the first 
cointegrating vector with a view to normalize it in terms of real money demand equation.  
Similarly, the testable restrictions imposed on the second cointegrating vector are:  
:0
bH  23φ  =  24φ  = 0 (price equation)  
23φ  and 24φ  represent interest rate and income estimates and are dropped from the second 
cointegrating vector with a view of expressing it in terms of price equation. The estimated 
Likelihood Ratio statistic for testing the validity of over – identifying restrictions on the two 
cointegrating vectors at two degrees of freedom are 10.296[P value = 0.801] and 3.676 [P 
value = 0.999] respectively.43 Insignificant estimates of likelihood ratio test statistic 
distributed as 2χ  suggest that that the testable restriction imposed on the two cointegrating 
                                                 
43
 Degree of freedom is equal to the total number of restrictions minus the number of just – identifying 
restrictions.   
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vectors can not be rejected. Since the testable restrictions imposed are accepted therefore, we 
can express two cointegrating vectors in terms of real money demand and price equation as 
given in Weymark (1995) model and are given as: 
tttt yipm 191.1010.0724.0 +−−=−        (5.20) 
  (-4.788) a   (-0.462)   (2.561) a  
ttt spp 634.1701.1474.2 * +−=        (5.21) 
     (2.035) a   (5.632) a    (5.305) a  
Equation (5.20) and (5.21) shows the long run estimates of real money demand and price 
equation. Real money demand equation shows insignificant and significant interest rate and 
real domestic income estimates with having negative and positive signs which is in accord 
with the literature. Similarly, price equation shows significant estimates of both foreign price 
and exchange rate.44 However, contrary to theoretical prediction, foreign price estimate is of 
negative sign which is inconsistent with the literature.45    
 
5.5.3 Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention Index  
 
 In this section, we construct quarterly exchange market pressure and intervention 
indices for Pakistan using real money demand (5.1) and price equation (5.2). Table 5.4 shows 
the estimate of real money demand and price equation using log differenced and log level data 
with two stage least square and Johansen multivariate  cointegration methodology. It also 
contains Johansen estimates of Girton and Roper (1977) model (equation 5.17). Johansen 
estimates are obtained by normalising real money demand estimates by -1. We do this to 
express the remaining cointegrating vectors in terms of real money demand function (Hafer 
and Jansen, 1991). Negative and positive estimates of interest rate and domestic real income in 
                                                 
44
 We obtain the t-values by dividing the restricted estimates of parameter of interest with their corresponding 
standard errors from unrestricted contegrating vector.    
45
 Separate VAR estimates of real money demand and price equation are given in appendix. 
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Table 5.4 are in accord with literature.46 It is further evident from Table 5.4 that we obtain 
insignificant and significant estimates of interest rate and domestic income using two stage 
least square and Johansen approach respectively. However, the insignificant estimate of 
interest rate in two stage least square approach could be due to the use of differenced data. In 
addition, the use of instruments instead of interest rate may account for its insignificant 
estimate in two stage least square approach. This occurs when instruments although strongly 
correlated with the endogenous variable have weak correlation with the dependent variable. 
This gives increased values of standard errors which results in insignificant t–values. 
Insignificant interest rate coefficient in 2SLS approach implies that the short term interest rate 
does not have any significant impact on nominal money holdings (Khan, 1980).47  
 Negative interest rate coefficient is based on the assumption that as interest rate 
increases; people prefer to hold their cash balances in terms of assets that earn interest rate 
than holding them in cash balances. This gives negative relationship between interest rate and 
real money balances. Compare to Hetzel and Mehra (1980) who obtained -0.76 and -2.2 for 
M1 and M2 monetary aggregates for the US, our interest rate estimate of -0.010 for Pakistan is 
quite low. However, it is slightly greater than that obtained by Hafer and Jansen (1991) for M2 
monetary aggregate for the US. Low interest rate coefficient has implications for monetary 
policy. This implies that monetary authorities will have to bring greater changes in the interest  
rate for inducing desired changes in demand for M1  (Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh, 1996). 
                                                 
46
 The interest rate has also been used in the levels due to different results obtained in log form for the same 
change. For example, if interest rate rises from 0.04 to 0.05, the log of the interest rate rises from -3.21889 to 
2.99573, which is a change of 0.223144. If, on the other hand, the interest rate rises from 0.08 to 0.9, the log of 
the interest rate rises from -2.40795 to -2.52573, which is only change of 0.0117783. It is generally not expected 
that one percent increase in the interest rate to have more than two times effect on the log of the desired real 
money balances when the change from the base of 0.04 than when it is from a base of 0.08 (Fair, 1987). Despite 
that, we used log interest rate to maintain consistency between the first and second chapter.  The real money 
demand equation based on the interest rate in levels is given as: 
tttt yipm 068.1007.0157.0 +−−=− . 
The estimated parameter of interest rate although negative is not significantly different from zero.   
 
47
 Mangla (1979) and Nisar and Aslam (1983) used call money rate and obtained insignificant and significant 
interest rate coefficients for Pakistan.  
 131 
Table 5.4 Real Money demand, Price and Girton & Roper (1977) model estimates 
Technique Variables 
Real Money Demand Constant ti  ty  ti∆  ty∆  
2SLS[Diff] 
   
-0.080 
(-1.46) 
0.129 
(1.95) a  
Johansen -0.724 (-4.788) a  
-0.010 
(-0.462) 
1.191 
(2.561) a    
      
Price Equation  
∗
tp  ts  
∗∆ tp  ts∆  
2SLS[Diff] 0.001 (0.22)   
0.287 
(0.58) 
0.828 
(1.81) 
Johansen 2.474 (2.035) a  
-1.701 
(-5.632) a  
1.634 
(5.305) a    
  
Girton and Roper (1977) 
model 
 
tm
 
*
tm  ty  
*
ty  
Johansen  -0.419 (1.165) 
-0.456 
(20.66) a  
0.026 
(0.055) 
-1.322 
(2.380) a  
Note: t – values are given in parenthesis. a  denotes significant t-values. 2SLS denotes two stage least square. 
Johansen is in levels and 2SLS is first difference. Constant is included following Weyamrk (1995). ∆  denotes 
first difference operator. * denotes foreign counterparts of domestic variables.      
 
 
The income coefficient is positive in both specifications as expected. It can be interpreted that 
as income increases, people demand more money for financing their increased number of 
transactions. The income coefficient of 1.191 is slightly greater than some of the recent studies 
by Bahmani–Oskooee and Shabsigh (1996), Hwang (2002) and Peytrigent and Stahel (1998) 
who obtained income elasticity estimate that range from 0.69 to 1.039 for Japan, Korea and 
Switzerland.48  
The middle part of Table 5.4 shows estimates of price equation obtained from log level 
and difference data along with two stage least square and Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) multivariate cointegration methods. The long run estimates are obtained by 
normalizing cointegrating vectors for Pakistan’s consumer price index to -1. This is done to 
                                                 
48
 Nagayasu (2003) studied the stability of the Japanese money demand function using quarterly data for the 
period 1958 to 2000 and concluded that the standard money demand function is instable.   
Bhamani – Oskooee and shin (2002) studied the stability of Korean money demand function using quarterly data 
from 1973 to 1997 using cointegration approach and CUSUM and CUMSUMSQ test to the residuals. They 
concluded instable money demand function for the period thus analyzed.    
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express the remaining cointegrating vectors as price equation. Table 5.4 indicates that the 
price equation estimated parameters for 2SLS are insignificant, whilst they are significant for 
Johansen. The insignificant estimates of price equation from two stage least square method 
could be due to the use of difference data and instrumental variables for endogenous variables.  
Positive estimate of exchange rate is in accord with the literature. This suggests that 
increase in exchange rate is reflected in positive domestic price change. However, the foreign 
price estimate does not confirm the literature that suggests positive sign. In addition, the 
homogeneity condition–that changes in exchange rate and foreign price cause domestic price 
level to change by the same proportion–and symmetry condition–the coefficient of exchange 
rate and foreign price are equal–are not satisfied. These findings support a weak-version of 
price equation.49 Furthermore, cointegration approach yield negative estimate of foreign price 
which is unexpected.  
The lower part of Table 5.4 shows the estimates of the Girton and Roper (1977) 
monetary model of exchange market pressure. It indicates that all the estimated parameters 
have signs that are in accord with the literature. However, the estimates of domestic income 
and domestic real money balances are insignificant. This indicates that changes in domestic 
real income and domestic real money balances do not have any influence on Exchange Market 
Pressure. This can be interpreted in terms of independence of domestic monetary authorities in 
pursuing an independent monetary policy. 50  
Following the Weymark (1995) approach, Exchange Market Pressure )( tEMP  is given 
as: ttt fsEMP ∆+∆= η . Given exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit 
                                                 
49
 Weak – version of purchasing power parity places no restrictions on the cointegrating vectors and simply 
requires that the exchange rate and relative prices be correlated (see MacDonald, 1993, and 2007). 
50
 The literature that has tested the null of monetary independence for different countries has used domestic 
component of monetary base namely domestic credit instead of changes in domestic money balances. This could 
be the reason that we get insignificant estimate of real money in the estimates of Girton and Roper (1977) model 
for Pakistan (See Girton and Roper, 1977).  
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of foreign currency, we can interpret positive and negative estimates of exchange market 
pressure with downward and upward pressure on domestic currency. It is evident from 
Exchange Market Pressure equation that we need estimates of η  for constructing exchange 
market pressure index. It is obtained using the formulae given as: 
22
1
ba +
−
=η  which shows 
that we need the estimates of interest rate ( 2b ) and exchange rate ( 2a ) for obtaining the 
estimate of η . These in turn are obtained by estimating real money demand (5.1) and price 
equation (5.2) using Johansen (1987) multivariate cointegration approach and are given as: 
2a  = 1.634 and 2b  = 0.010 
Based on interest rate and exchange rate estimates, we construct model consistent 
elasticity Johansenη  as: 
Johansenη  =  010.0634.1
1
+
−
 = -0.608 
η  converts foreign exchange reserves changes into equivalent exchange rate units. Its negative 
sign implies that the Central Bank purchases foreign exchange reserves when domestic 
currency strengthens against the US dollar in the open market. 
Figure 5.3 shows quarterly estimates of exchange market pressure using log level and 
log difference data with Johansen (1988) multivariate cointegration and two stage least square 
approach. Both approaches show that it is downward pressure on domestic currency that has 
remained dominant over the entire sample period. Exchange market pressure mean value of 
0.005 obtained from both approaches further support this finding.51 Furthermore, two stage  
                                                 
51
 Two stage least square and Cointegration yield exchange market pressure mean values of 0.0047666 and 
0.0057904 which are almost the same.  
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Figure 5.3 Exchange Market Pressure 
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Note: EMPCI and EMP2SLS refer to Exchange Market Pressure obtained from cointegration and two stage least 
square approach.    
 
least square estimates of exchange market pressure appear to be more volatile than Johansen 
cointegration approach. This could be due to the use of different estimation techniques that 
yield different estimates of exchange rate elasticity of foreign exchange reserves.52 Figure 5.3 
further shows that prior to September 2001; downward pressure has remained dominant. 
However, post September 2001 shows upward pressure on domestic currency. This is evident 
from negative sign for ten of fifteen quarters. This has occurred due to (a) increased workers 
remittances due to international community’s crackdown against undocumented currency 
transactions, (b) rescheduling of Pakistan’s external debt, (c) repayment of expensive debt and 
substitution of hard loans into soft ones, (d) robust non – structural inflows, (e) lifting of 
international sanctions that were imposed in the wake of nuclear explosions, and (f) improved  
                                                 
52
 Two stage least square and Johansen (1988) multivariate cointegration estimates of exchange rate elasticity 
with respect to foreign exchange reserves are -1.337 and -0.618 respectively.   
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Figure 5.4 Intervention Index )( tω  
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Note INTVCI and INTV2SLS refer to intervention index values obtained from cointegration and two stage least 
square approach respectively. 
 
relations with international financial institutions and bilateral creditors due to support of 
international community in its war against terrorism (Post 2001 State Bank Quarterly 
Reports).   
 Figure 5.4 show two stage least square and Johansen (1988) multivariate cointegration 
estimates of intervention index. Intervention index is described as the fraction of pressure that 
Central Bank relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves and is given 
as: 
tt
t
t
fs
f
∆+∆
∆
=
η
ω 1          (5.10) 
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 Both two stage least square and Johansen multivariate cointegration estimates suggest 
active Central Bank intervention in foreign exchange market for avoiding undesirable 
exchange rate fluctuations. 2SLS and cointegration approach estimates of intervention index 
mean value of 0.61 and 0.73 respectively, further support this interpretation. This suggest that 
under two stage least square approach, exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves relieved 
thirty nine and sixty one percent of the pressure respectively. Similarly, under Johansen 
cointegration approach, exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves absorbed twenty seven 
and seventy three percent of the pressure.  
 Exchange market pressure reflects foreign exchange market disequilibrium that arises 
due to nonzero excess demand of domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. Based on 
this definition of Exchange Market Pressure, we can calculate the exchange rate level that 
would prevail in the absence of Central Bank intervention using one period lagged exchange 
rate: 
observed
tt
predicted
t SEMPS 1)1( −+=         (5.22) 
where predictedtS  refers to unlogged exchange rate that would prevail in the absence of Central 
Bank intervention. 1−tS  denotes one period lagged observed unlogged exchange rate. The 
difference between the two exchange rates reflects the extent of Central Bank intervention. It 
is evident from figure 5.5 that observed exchange rate is less volatile than the predicted 
exchange rate. Standard deviations of 18.521 and 18.484 for predicted and observed exchange 
rate further support this interpretation. Furthermore, correlation coefficient of 0.99 shows 
strong association between observed and predicted exchange rate. Since the observed 
exchange rate is less volatile than the predicted exchange rate, it provides evidence that the 
Central Bank intervention is successful in reducing exchange rate volatility.   
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Figure 5.5 Predicted and actual exchange rate 
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 Note: dotted line denote predicted exchange rate which is more volatile. Solid lines, on the other hand, denotes observed 
exchange rate. This is less volatile.    
 
5.5.4 Summary of Results from Two Methods 
 
 In this section, we present summary of results of two stage least square and Johansen 
multivariate cointegration approach. It is apparent from Table 5.5 that η  has negative sign 
indicating that foreign exchange reserves and exchange rate changes move in the opposite 
direction. This shows that the Central Bank relieves pressure by purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange reserves. Positive mean values of Exchange Market Pressure shows the extent of 
exchange rate changes required for restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium in the 
absence of Central Bank intervention. This suggests that in the absence of Central Bank 
intervention in the foreign exchange market, exchange rate would have depreciated by five 
percent under both approaches. Mean value of intervention index suggest active Central Bank  
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Table 5.5 Summary of Results from 2SLS and Johansen Approach  
 
2SLS Johansen 
η  
-1.101 -0.608 
tEMP  0.005 0.005 
tω  0.61 0.73 
0<tω  24 Quarters 24 Quarters 
1=tω  24 Quarters 24 Quarters 
tω <1 41 Quarters 41 Quarters 
tω >1 28 Quarters 28 Quarters 
tEMP  -0.019 -0.010 
tω  1.031 1.035 
tEMP  0.022 0.017 
tω  0.303 0.523 
Note: 2SLS refers to two stage least square method. η  denotes exchange rate elasticity with respect to foreign 
exchange reserves. Similarly EMP refers to exchange market pressure. tω  and tω  intervention index mean 
value for the entire sample period, and intervention index different values. + and - indicates appreciating and 
depreciating pressure 
 
intervention. It signals the extent of the pressure that is relieved by exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserve changes respectively.   
  Table 5.5 further reveals 0<tω  for twenty four quarters. This shows the Central 
Bank’s leaning with the wind - that the Central Bank purchased foreign exchange reserves 
when there was already a pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. 1=tω  for twenty four 
quarters. This shows that in these quarters, proportionate changes in foreign exchange reserves 
were equal to the prevailing pressure. This did not allow the exchange rate to depreciate which 
is consistent with the fixed exchange rate regime. 10 << tω  for forty one quarters. This 
implies that in these quarters, simultaneous changes in exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserves restored foreign exchange equilibrium. This kind of monetary authority’s response to 
Exchange Market Pressure is consistent with a managed float. 1>tω  for twenty eight quarters 
shows that in these quarters, proportionate changes in foreign exchange reserves were more 
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than that warranted by the pressure ( tt EMPf >∆ ). This moved the exchange rate in the 
direction opposite to that which would have prevailed in the absence of the Central Bank 
intervention.   
Table 5.5 further reveals that Central Bank’s response varies with the prevailing 
pressure. It exceeds to its unity value when there is upward pressure. This led the domestic 
currency to depreciate rather then appreciate against the US dollar as implied by the prevailing 
pressure. On the other hand, the proportionate changes in foreign exchange reserves were less 
than that warranted by the weakening pressure. This caused the exchange rate to change as 
well though less than that warranted by the pressure. The evidence obtained from the 
cointegration approach about exchange market pressure and intervention index is quite similar 
to that obtained using two stage least square in the previous chapter. The active Central Bank 
intervention revealed by both two stage least square and Johansen (1988) multivariate 
cointegration approach may reflect monetary authorities fear that exchange rate changes may 
influence domestic prices and further deteriorate countries’ foreign debt burden.  
5.6 Conclusion  
 
 In this chapter, we adopted the Girton and Roper (1977) and the Weymark (1995) 
approach. The former approach aimed at testing the independence of domestic authorities in 
pursuing independent monetary policy. On the other hand, we used Weymark (1995) approach 
with a view of checking the direction of pressure and evaluate monetary authorities’ response 
function. The innovation in this chapter was to use Johansen approach to account for data 
nonstationarity. Girton and Roper (1977) estimates shows the independence of monetary 
authorities in conducting monetary policy. The results obtained from Weymark (1995) 
approach indicate downward pressure on domestic currency over the entire sample period. The 
results further indicate active Central Bank intervention. This is further evident from 
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intervention index mean value of 0.73 which shows that exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserve changes absorbed twenty seven and seventy three percent of the pressure respectively.    
 Furthermore, Johansen estimates of intervention index reveal that it varies with the 
prevailing pressure. The proportionate changes in foreign exchange reserves were more than 
that warranted by upward pressure on domestic currency. This caused the exchange rate to 
depreciate rather than appreciate as implied by the prevailing pressure. On the other hand, 
changes in the foreign exchange reserves were less than that warranted by the weakening 
pressure on the domestic currency. In such a case exchange rate also changed although less 
than that warranted by the pressure. Johansen’s estimates of exchange market pressure are 
almost the same as obtained from log differenced data and two stage least square approach. 
This further supports our findings in first chapter.  
 The estimated parameter of interest rate is insignificant in chapter four and five. This 
could be that inter bank call money rate is called the short term interest rate. It is the interest 
rate that commercial banks charge to brokerage firms for financing their clients’ financial 
needs and therefore, may not represent the true opportunity cost of holding real money 
balances in the long run. We also used Treasury Bill Rate as the opportunity cost of holding 
real money balances. It gave us significant estimate for the interest rate. However, the basic 
issue with Treasury Bill Rate is that it has remained fixed for more then half of the sample 
period. Therefore, we were left with the choice of either to use Treasury Bill Rate that does 
not show variation – a basic requirement for the time series data and obtain significant interest 
rat estimate or to use inter bank call money rate and get insignificant estimate. We adopted the 
latter approach and estimated real money demand function using inter bank call money rate.     
 In the last two chapters, we used fixed parameter approach in constructing Exchange 
Market Pressure and intervention index for Pakistan from Weymark (1995) model. However, 
fixed parameter approach does not allow the estimated parameters to take account of the 
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effects of structural changes on parameter constancy. In addition, it has been considered as one 
of the important factor for the failure of exchange rate models. Furthermore, Pakistan 
economy has seen structural changes over the given sample period. This necessitates using an 
approach that overcomes the disadvantages of fixed parameter approach and evaluate the 
effects of structural changes on parameter constancy. We overcome this issue by using 
Kalman Filter time varying parameter approach in the next chapter.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Table 5.1: Unit Root Test in levels and first difference 
PP Unit Root Test in log levels PP Unit Root Test in First Difference 
Variables Constant Constant and trend Variables Constant Constant and trend 
ti
 
-4.419 a  -4.739 a  ti∆  -17.338 a  -17.271 a  
tm
 
-1.797 -2.970 
tm∆  -12.183 a  -12.286 a  
*
tm  -1.088 -1.779 *tm∆  -5.055 a  -5.029 a  
tp
 
-0.989 -2.373 
tp∆  -9.675 a  -9.672 a  
∗
tp
 
-4.738 a  -2.558 ∗∆ tp  -5.209
a
 -3.769 a  
ts
 
0.005 -2.558 
ts∆  -9.368 a  -9. 403 a  
ty
 
0.768 -3.319 
ty∆  -14.337 a  -14.318 a  
*
ty  0.223 -2.254 *ty∆  -7.149 a  -7.148 a  
temp  -9.919 -9.958 
   
5% critical values -2.886 -3.449 5% critical values -2.886 -3.449 
Note: a  indicates the significance of the variables at 5% critical values. * denotes the foreign counterparts of the domestic variables. Lag lengths in parentheses (.) are 
determined by the Akakike Information Criterion with maximum number of 4 lags. Variables used are defined as: =ti  Treasury Bill Rate, =tm  M2 in Pakistan, =tp  
CPI in Pakistan, =ts spot exchange rate, and =ty gross domestic product adjusted with GDP deflator. 5% one sided critical values are taken from McKinnon (1996). 
Quarterly data for the period 1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2 is used. ∆  denotes first difference operator 
 
Appendix B 
tttt yipm 061.1235.0031.0 +−−=−        
 (-0.144)  (-4.273) a    (22.104) a  
.059.2675.2569.3 * ttt spp +−=        
     (3.468) a   (-3.114) a    (5.509) a  
Appendix C 
Figure C1 data in levels 
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Figure C2 data in first difference 
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Chapter Six 
Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention Index for Pakistan. Evidence 
from a Time-Varying Parameter Approach 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter we use the approach of Weymark (1995) for constructing exchange market 
pressure and intervention index for Pakistan and to account for potential linearity. A rolling 
regression indicates unstable real money demand and price equation estimates. Consequently, 
we use a Kalman filter approach to evaluate the effects of structural changes that have taken 
place over the entire given sample period on parameter constancy. The results indicate 
unstable real money demand and price equation parameters. Kalman filter-based exchange 
market pressure and intervention index show downward pressure and active Central Bank 
intervention. Exchange Market Pressure and intervention index mean values for the first half 
are higher than in the second half of the sample period, which indicates the post-reform period 
as more tranquil. The intervention index mean value for the entire period suggests that foreign 
exchange reserves and exchange rate changes absorbed seventy-one and twenty-nine percent 
of the pressure respectively.   
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6.1 Introduction 
 A stable relationship among the variables of interest is a prerequisite for the 
formulation of effective policy. This implies that an effective response to exchange rate 
fluctuations in the context of a fixed parameter exchange rate model rests on stable real money 
demand and price equation.53 This implies that monetary policy will have any predictable 
effect on exchange rate stability only if real money demand and price equation are stable. This 
makes it necessary to investigate the stability of our model’s equilibrium relationship.  
 Weymark (1995) used a fixed parameter approach for constructing an exchange market 
pressure and intervention index for Canada. However, a fixed parameter approach in the face 
of structural instability is considered as one of the most important factors for the poor 
performance of exchange rate models. Lucas (1976), Meese and Rogoff (1983) and Wolf 
(1987) consider changes in policy regime, unstable money demand functions, changes in 
global trade patterns and productivity differential as the important factors for the out-of -
sample poor performance of exchange rate models. Frenkel (1981) particularly attributes the 
1970s collapse of purchasing power parity for France, Germany, UK and US to the volatile 
nature of the decade that resulted from real shocks, supply shocks, commodity booms and 
shortages, shifts in the demand for money, differential productivity growth and the uncertain 
future course of political and economic events which induced sharp and frequent changes in 
expectations. Therefore, it seems important that when estimating real money demand and price 
equation we take account of the potential time-varying nature of estimated parameters.  
 Pakistan economy has seen major structural changes over recent decades. These 
changes include: (a) Pakistan switched from a fixed to a managed floating exchange rate 
regime with effect from January 8th, 1982, (b) introduction of an interest-free banking system 
in 1981and subsequent replacement of interest–bearing deposits with a system based on profit 
                                                 
53
 Arnold (1994) attributes money demand instability to three sources: (a) institutional changes, (b) international 
payments and (c) Monetary Policy.  
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and loss–sharing principle from July 1st, 1985 (Khan, 1994; Ahmad and Khan, 1990), (c) 
denationalisation of public sector banks54, (d) enhancement of Central Bank authority over the 
financial system of the country55 and, (d) the imposition of sanctions on the country in the 
wake of nuclear explosions.56 
 We therefore adopt a time-varying parameter approach for evaluating the effects of 
structural changes on parameter constancy. Contrary to F – test or dummy variable, a non-
linear approach has the advantage of not requiring any prior knowledge of a point in time 
when a shift in the parameters of equation is suspected (Laumas, 1977). Based on time- 
varying estimates of real money demand and price equation, we construct an exchange market 
pressure and intervention index for Pakistan from 1976Q1 to 2005Q2. The objective is to 
check the direction of pressure and use intervention index values as a tool for analysing the 
monetary policy thus implemented. This will allow us to determine the extent which Central 
Bank allows market forces to determine the exchange rate.    
To our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to construct Exchange Market 
Pressure and intervention indices based on time-varying estimates of real money demand and 
price equation. It attempts to check the effects of structural changes on parameter constancy 
and will enable the monetary authorities to formulate an effective policy response to exchange 
rate fluctuations. The results indicate that the estimated parameters are time-varying and show 
                                                 
54
 A total of 24 commercial banks (7 domestic and 17 foreign) were operating as of 30th June, 1990. The domestic 
banks were under the strict control of the government and owned 90% of the total assets and deposits of the 
banking system.  
Prior to financial liberalisation, all the domestic banks operated under the strict supervision of the government 
and were merged to from five large public sector banks by the mid-1970s (Ataullah, et al. 2004).  
Domestic banks were nationalised in 1974 and were merged in to six major national commercial banks (Hardy 
and di Patti, 2001).     
55
 The state bank of Pakistan guided and regulated the banking system of the country. Other institutions that 
shared the authority of central bank in supervising the financial system were: (a) Pakistan Banking Council 
(PBC) dealt with the matters related to public sector banks and development financial institutions (DFIs), (b) The 
Corporate Law Authority (CLA) that regulated non-bank financial institutions.   
56
 The state bank of Pakistan took extraordinary measures to mitigate the uncertainty about Pakistan’s economy. 
These include: (a) freezing the foreign currency accounts, (b) introducing multiple exchange rate regime (c) 
preventing speculative activity in inter-bank forex market, (d) discouraging capital outflows, (e) containing 
import demand and (f) discouraging overdue export bills.    
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large fluctuations, thus implying parameter instability over the given sample period.  The 
time-varying estimates of Exchange Market Pressure and intervention index show downward 
pressure on domestic currency and active central bank intervention. The intervention index 
mean value indicates that foreign exchange reserves rather than the exchange rate changes 
absorbed most of the pressure facing exchange market.  
 The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 6.2 we review the empirical 
work that has addressed the issue of real money demand and price equation stability. In 
section 6.3, we briefly discuss the structural changes that have taken place in the economy 
over the given sample period and how they influence the real money demand and price 
equation stability. In section 6.3.1, we discuss financial sector reforms and the enhancement of 
Pakistan’s Central Bank authority in regulating the financial sector of the country. In Section 
6.4 we derive Weymark’s (1995) macroeconomic model. Section 6.5 details the methodology 
that includes rolling regression results of real money demand and price equation and 
discussion on Kalman filtering approach. Section 6.6 discusses the data while in Section 6.7 
we present Kalman filter estimates of real money demand and price equation. In Section 6.7.1, 
we construct exchange market pressure and intervention index for Pakistan using Kalman 
filter estimates of real money demand and price equation and Section 6.7.2 provides summary 
of results obtained from three approaches. Section 6.8 concludes.    
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6.2. Literature Review 
The formulation of an effective monetary policy to deal with exchange rate 
fluctuations requires stable real money demand and price equation. This implies that monetary 
policy will have a more predictable impact upon exchange rate fluctuations, if there is a stable 
relationship among the variables of interest. In addition, the linear estimation methods in the 
previous chapters have occasionally indicated insignificant parameters signifying potential 
parameter instability. This makes it necessary to investigate the stability of real money 
demand and price equation.  
A large number of studies have examined the stability of money demand function. 
Khan (1974) tested the stability of the US money demand function from 1901 to 1965. The 
residuals -based test developed by Brown and Durbin (1968) shows stable US money demand 
function for the given period. Laumas and Mehra (1976) applied Cooley and Prescott’s (1973) 
time-varying parameter approach for testing the stability of the US money demand function. 
The results indicate stable money demand function for the 1952Q2 to 1973Q4 period. Laumas 
(1977 and 1983) also found a stable US money demand function from 1953Q1 to 1975Q2 
using the same econometric approach. Similarly, Bahmani-Oskooee and Bohl (2000) 
evaluated the effect of German monetary unification on German M3 money demand function. 
The evidence they gathered from CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests in the context of 
cointegration and error correction modelling suggests unstable M3 money demand function for 
the post-unification period. Hwang (2002) considered two alternative monetary aggregates, 
M1 and M2, two alternative interest rate, short-term rate and long-term rate, and one scale 
variable, real GDP, for Korea. He found a long-term cointegrating relationship between M2 
and its determinants. A stability test applied to residuals did not reject the stability hypothesis. 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Shin (2002), while applying the same approach found a long-term 
cointegrating relationship between M2 and its determinants for Korea. However, the residuals-
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based stability tests like CUSUM and CUSUMSQ did not support the stability hypothesis. The 
difference between the results of Hwang (2002) and Bahmani-Oskooee and Shin (2002) could 
be due to the latter study including exchange rate as a determinant of real money demand.57         
As far as Pakistan is concerned, a large number of studies have focused on different 
aspects of money demand function such as (a) which monetary aggregate (M1 or M2) should 
be used as a proper definition of money, (b) whether income, permanent income or wealth 
should be used as a scale variable, (c) if interest rate represents opportunity cost of holding 
money then which interest rate or interest rates should be used. However, a few studies have 
focused on the issue of money demand stability. Mangla (1979) applied Chow’s test statistic 
to ordinary least square estimates of money demand function and found evidence in support of 
stability. Khan (1980) evaluated the effects of country’s split in two wings in 1971 on the 
stability of money demand function using a covariance analysis.58 The results suggested a 
structural shift due to country’s disintegration. However, a Chow test statistic in Khan’s 
(1980) provided evidence that supported stable money demand function from 1971 to 1978. 
Nisar and Aslam (1983) also used covariance analysis for testing the stability of money 
demand function. The results indicate a stable term-structure specification of M2 money 
demand but not for the conventional one. The studies discussed above are spurious regression 
due to the use of non-stationary data and ordinary least square approach. They also use Chow 
and covariance test statistics that do not tell if the instability in the estimated macroeconomic 
model is due to change in intercept or slope or both. Furthermore, the Chow test assumes prior 
knowledge of structural breaks (Gujarati, 2003).  
                                                 
57
 Bahmani-Oskooee and Chomsisengphet (2002) tested the stability of short run dynamics of M2 monetary 
aggregate in the context of cointegration and error correction approach using CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test 
statistic. The result supported the null of stability for Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and USA. However, in case of the UK and Switzerland, empirical estimates show 
some sign of instability.   
58
 Prior to December 1971, Pakistan consisted of two wings namely East and West Pakistan. However, East 
Pakistan separated from West Pakistan in 1971 and emerged as a new country called Bangladesh.   
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Contrary to above studies, Ahmad and Khan (1990) tested the stability of M1 and M2 
money demand function for the period 1959-1960 to 1986 –1987 using Cooley and Prescott’s 
(1976) time-varying parameter technique. The results obtained show stable M1 and M2 money 
demand function for the period 1959/1960 to 1980/1981 and unstable M1 and M2 money 
demand function thereafter. Hossain (1994) investigated the stability of narrow and broad 
monetary aggregates for Pakistan using Johansen’s (1988) multivariate cointegration approach 
and equated long-term relationship with the stability of money demand function. However, 
Bhamani-Oskooee and Shin (2002) criticised the interpretation of the presence of a 
cointegrating vector with the stability of money demand function. They argued that the 
presence of a cointegrating vector and stability of money demand function are two different 
things and it is important to apply statistical tests to check if the long-term as well as the short-
term estimated elasticities are stable over time. Qayyum (2001) applied Chow’s test to 
cointegration and error correction estimates of aggregate, business and personal demand for 
M2 and obtained results that did not reject the null of stability of all these money demand 
specifications. Qayyum (2005) estimated aggregate M2 money demand function using 
Johansen’s cointegration and error correction modelling. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests 
applied to the short-term dynamics supported the stability hypothesis. To summarise, the fixed 
parameter approach supports stable money demand function for Pakistan. The above 
discussion indicates that all studies except Ahmad and Khan (1990) and Hossain (1994), have 
applied either Chow or covariance tests to the residuals of fixed parameter estimates and found 
evidence that support stable real money demand function. On the other hand, Ahmad and 
Khan (1990) evaluated the stability of real money demand from 1959/1960 to 1986/1987 
using Cooley and Prescott’s (1976) time-varying approach. Hossain (1994), on the other hand, 
inappropriately equates the evidence of cointegrating vector with the stability of real money 
demand function.  
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 There is extensive literature on purchasing power parity from the perspective of 
developed countries. However, it has not received adequate attention from the developing 
countries perspective. Baillie and Selover (1987), Corbae and Ouliaris (1988) and Taylor 
(1988) examined the recent float period for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US 
and West Germany using Engle and Granger’s (1987) residual-based cointegration approach. 
Although they found evidence of unit root in exchange rate and relative prices, the null of non-
stationarity of the residuals was not rejected. This implies that exchange rate and relative 
prices drift apart and do not converge at their equilibrium level. Taylor and McMahon (1987) 
on the other hand, applied the same approach to bilateral rates between the US dollar, UK 
pound, the French franc and the German mark and found evidence that supported the validity 
of an absolute version of PPP for all countries except the UK from February, 1921 to May, 
1925. Kim (1990) also obtained the same results for France, Italy, Japan, UK and US using a 
wholesale price index. However, for consumer price index, the results do not support the 
validity of long-term purchasing power parity. The difference in the results could be due to 
larger weights assigned to non-traded goods in CPI than WPI. Contrary to these studies, Dutt 
(1998) applied the Harris-Inder null of cointegration approach to real exchange rate and found 
evidence supportive of PPP for European Monetary System member countries.59   
Frenkel (1981) instead of adopting a cointegration approach tested the validity of 
purchasing power parity for the US, the UK France and Germany using the two-stage least 
square approach. He found evidence that supported PPP for the period 1920 to 1925. 
However, 1973 to 1979 estimates do not support the validity of PPP. Frenkel (1981) attributed 
the collapse of purchasing power parity during 1970s to the volatile nature of the decade that 
resulted from real shocks, supply shocks, commodity booms and shortages, shifts in the 
demand for money and differential productivity growth. He re-estimated PPP equation for 
                                                 
59
 Harris-Inder tests the null of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root. It makes a distinction between 
series with unit and near unit roots.    
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exchange rates that do not include US dollar or US prices and found evidence that was more 
supportive of PPP. The difference in the results could be due to transport cost, change in US 
commercial policies and non-tariff barriers on trade, US price controls and their gradual 
removal during the first half of the 1970s and institutional arrangements like SNAKE and 
European Monetary System.60 Therefore, it seems important that when estimating price 
equation, we take account of potential time-varying parameters.             
 The above studies provide mixed evidence on long-term validity of purchasing power 
parity. This may be due to failure of the fixed parameter approach to take account of the 
effects of structural changes on parameters. A time-varying parameter model allows us to 
evaluate the effects of structural changes on parameter constancy. Corbae and Ouliaris (1991) 
and Flynn and Boucher (1993) evaluated the effects of structural breaks on real exchange rate 
using Augmented Dicky Fuller (1984) and Perron (1989) modified unit root tests. The results 
show that the hypothesis of unit root in real exchange rate cannot be rejected. On the other 
hand, Liu and Burkett (1995) relied on a Kalman filtering approach for testing the stability of 
short-term adjustment to long-term purchasing power parity and found evidence that did not 
support the null of stability for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Contrary to these 
studies, Canarella et al. (1990) re-examined the cointegration property of exchange rate and 
relative prices in a time varying parameter framework.61 Based on monthly data for Canada, 
Germany, Japan and United Kingdom vis-à-vis United States, they show that a cointegration 
approach in a time-varying framework yields results that support the validity of long-term 
purchasing power parity.  
                                                 
60
 EMS was signed in 1979 between several European countries that linked their currencies in an attempt to 
stabilise their exchange rate. Later on this was replaced by European Monetary Union in 1999, which established 
the common currency called the Euro. 
61
 Moodley et al. (2000) evaluated the Canada-US trade agreement (CUSTA) from the perspective of market 
integration using Johansen cointegration and Kalman filtering approach. The results indicated the convergence of 
the price indices and the evidence of long run purchasing power parity relationship for the two countries.    
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6.3 Structural Change in Pakistan 
 An efficient financial system is a prerequisite for economic development. It channels 
private savings to firms to enable them to finance their investment projects. Furthermore, it 
enhances the efficient use of country’s resources and is thus pivotal for countries’ economic 
development. Pakistan embarked on denationalisation of the domestic banking system in the 
decade of 1990s. Its objective was to realise its potential in the development of the country. 
Furthermore, it aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the banking system and thus making it 
more competitive by liberalising the interest rates and credit ceilings, enhancing the State 
Bank of Pakistan’s supervisory capacity and promoting economic growth.      
 Prior to financial sector reforms, several important events took place in the economy, 
including the following. (a) The introduction of a partial interest-free banking system in the 
country. Banks were allowed to open separate interest-free counters. The basic objective was 
to gradually Islamise the banking system of the country. The public was offered profit and loss 
sharing and term deposits accounts to invest their money. (b) Pakistan switched from a fixed 
exchange rate to a managed float on 8th January, 1982. 
     
6.3.1 Financial Sector Reforms 
 
 Prior to 1990s, Pakistan’s financial system was predominantly state-owned. There 
were twenty-four banks doing business in the country.62 Ninety percent of the total assets and 
total deposits were owned by the government-owned banks. Domestic banks were 
characterised by high government borrowing, bank-by-bank credit ceiling, interest rate 
controls and directed credit to state chosen sectors. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 
also worked in parallel to banking sector. Development financial institutions, housing finance 
companies, and mutual funds constituted fifteen out of 36; even then, they controlled 90 
                                                 
62
 Out of twenty-four banks, seven were foreign-owned. Remaining seventeen banks were under the strict control 
of government.  
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percent of the total business. Furthermore, the Central Directorate of National Saving also 
worked in the country. It operated different National Saving Schemes (NSS) and had 
mobilised Rs 131.9 billion till 30th June, 1990. It worked through a network of 363 national 
Saving Centres and also some nationalised Commercial Banks and Pakistan Post Office acted 
as its agents.     
 Similarly, three different organisations were responsible for supervising the financial 
sector of the country. State Bank Act 1956 authorised the State Bank of Pakistan to supervise 
the banking sector of the country. At the same time, Banks (Nationalized) Act authorised 
Pakistan Banking Council to oversee the NBFIs and commercial bank activities. And the 
Corporate Law Authority established in 1984 was given powers to oversee capital markets. 
This resulted substantial overlapping of regulatory power among these organisations.      
 The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) used bank-wise credit ceiling for the conduct of 
monetary policy.63 Even the domestic credit was rationalised; government-preferred sectors 
were given priority in the disbursement of domestic credit. All the commercial banks, under 
cash reserve requirement condition were required to maintain five percent of demand and time 
liabilities in cash with State Bank of Pakistan. Furthermore, under Statutory Liquidity 
Requirement (SLR) each bank kept 35 percent of its time and demand liabilities in cash or 
government securities. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) also exercised strict control over the 
functioning of foreign exchange market. Although Pakistan switched from fixed to float 
exchange rate on 8th January, 1982, the Foreign Exchange Committee of the SBP frequently 
made adjustment in rupee/dollar parity. The SBP also exercised strict controls on interest rates 
offered on different deposits. The basic objective was to provide cheap credit to government 
priority sectors as the increase in interest rates was considered socially and politically 
                                                 
63
 Credit ceilings depended on the bank’s share in total deposits during previous year, size of the capital fund, 
foreign currency deposits and previous year’s utilisation of credit ceiling.  
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undesirable. Therefore, the real interest rate on different deposits remained negative for most 
of the time.    
 With these characteristics, it was realised that the prevailing domestic financial system 
was not serving the interests of the country. It was with this background that a comprehensive 
financial sector reform programme was introduced at the end of 1989. Its objective was to 
reduce market segmentation, enhance competition, strengthen the supervision and switch to 
market based monetary and credit policies. Although the reforms were introduced in the early 
1990s, they only gathered momentum in 1997, when a comprehensive reform package aimed 
at strengthening institutions, restructuring banks and development financial institutions and 
improving supervisory framework was introduced.  
 A number of steps were taken in the 1990s to privatise the nationalised commercial 
banks (NCBs). Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1947 was amended. It enabled the government to 
transfer the ownership rights in case of sale of 51 percent of the share to the private sector. 
This amendment facilitated the privatisation and transfer of management of the Muslim 
Commercial Bank (MCB), Allied Bank Limited (ABL) and United Bank Limited to their 
buyers. In addition, new banks were permitted to commence business. Accordingly, in August 
1991, ten new banks started commercial activities.64 In the subsequent years, 11 new banks 
started their banking activities in the country.65   
 The amendment of Banks (Nationalization) Act in 1997 enhanced SBP authority to 
supervise and effectively regulate the financial sector of the country. Pakistan Banking 
Council was dissolved and its powers were transferred to State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). SBP 
consultation was made necessary in the appointment of the members of board of directors of 
                                                 
64
 These banks included: Bank Al-Habib Limited, Soneri Bank Limited, Union Bank Limited, Mehran Bank 
Limited, Indus Bank Limited, Prime Commercial Bank Limited, Askari Commercial Bank Limited, Bolan Bank 
Limited, Capital Bank Limited, and Republic Bank Limited.     
65
 These included: Metropolitan Bank Limited, Habib Credit & Exchange Bank Limited, Schon Bank Limited, 
Faysal Bank Limited, Platinum Commercial Bank Limited, Prudential Commercial Bank Limited, Gulf 
Commercial Bank Limited, Bank Al-Falah Limited, Bank of Ceylon, Oman International Bank and Trust Bank 
Limited.     
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nationalized commercial banks and development financial institutions. Furthermore, in 1997 
the Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan was established and replaced the Corporate 
Law Authority. Initially, it regulated the corporate sector and capital market. Later, its 
authority was extended to supervise and regulate insurance companies, non-bank financial 
institutions and private pension funds. 
Prior to financial sector reforms, SBP used direct instruments for the conduct of 
monetary policy. These include administratively-set interest rates, credit ceilings, directed and 
subsidised credit and direct involvement of government in formulation of and implementation 
of monetary policy. However, in the post-reform period, SBP relied on indirect instruments for 
the conduct of monetary policy. In January 1992, an open market operation was introduced 
and since then has become an important tool of monetary policy. Additionally, it was made 
necessary for the banks to keep certain fraction of total demand and time liabilities as special 
cash deposit with SBP. However, this condition was withdrawn on 1st July 1996. The policy of 
providing subsidised credit to government priority sector was withdrawn and banks were 
permitted to set their lending rates based on demand and supply conditions in the market.  
 In May, 1998 Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. This created uncertainty among the 
investors about the country’s ability to meet its external sector obligations. In order to meet its 
external obligations, SBP imposed controls on the capital movement to meet its external 
obligations. It imposed restrictions on the withdrawals of hard currency from foreign currency 
accounts. The SBP even suspended the encashment of foreign currency certificates. In July, 
1998 a multiple exchange rate system was introduced. It consisted of an official exchange rate 
and floating inter-bank exchange rate (FIBR). State Bank of Pakistan fixed the former and the 
later was determined in the inter-bank market.   
The post-September 2001 events proved turning points for Pakistan economy. The 
sanctions that were imposed in the wake of nuclear explosions were lifted. Pakistan was also 
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provided with enormous funds on account of its cooperation with international community in 
its war against terrorism. Furthermore, foreign exchange reserves of the country increased 
tremendously due to transfer of funds by Pakistanis living abroad through official channels. 
This is also evident from a surge in foreign exchange reserves which peaked to US $ 14 
billion. All these developments have resulted in the slight appreciation of domestic currency 
against US $ in the wake of terrorist attack on US and improved credit rating of the country.    
The financial sector reforms that were implemented during the decade of 1990s, lifting 
of sanctions and increased capital inflows in the wake of US terrorist attack and improved 
credit rating has changed the structure of the economy. We are of the opinion that structural 
changes discussed above may have influenced the parameters stability of the variables of the 
interest. This makes it necessary to adopt a time-varying approach to evaluate the effects of 
these structural changes on parameter constancy.  
 
6.4 Time-Varying Parameter Model 
 In this section, we derive exchange market pressure and intervention indices for 
Pakistan using Weymark’s (1995) macroeconomic model with the time-varying parameter.  
This is given as below:     
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 Asterisks denote foreign counterpart of domestic variables. The t subscripts show that 
the estimated parameters are time varying. This indicates that we allow the parameters to vary 
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over a time to take account of the effects of new information that becomes available on 
parameter constancy. This differs from the previous chapters that use a fixed parameter 
approach and do not allow the estimated parameters to take account of the effects of structural 
changes on parameter constancy.   
Equation 6.1 is the money demand function, which is a positive and negative function 
of domestic income and interest rate. Similarly, equation 6.2 is purchasing power parity, 
which indicates that domestic prices are positively influenced by changes in foreign prices and 
exchange rate. Equation 6.3 is uncovered interest rate parity, which shows that the difference 
between domestic and foreign interest rate is reflected in expected exchange rate changes. 
Equation 6.4 shows the evolution of domestic monetary base. It indicates that domestic 
monetary supply ( stm ) is determined by inherited money stock ( stm 1− ), changes in domestic 
credit ( td∆ ) and foreign exchange reserves ( tf∆ ). Equation 6.5 is the monetary authority’s 
response function. It shows that the Central Bank intervenes in foreign exchange market to 
reduce pressure. This explains the negative sign for exchange rate changes.  
The macroeconomic model given in equations 6.1 to 6.5 provides the Exchange 
Market Pressure index given as: 
ttt
TVP
t fsEMP ∆+∆= η     (6.6) 
 Based on the above definition of the Exchange Market Pressure index, Weymark 
(1995) defines the intervention index as:  
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of the equation (6.7) by tη/1  
gives: 
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TVP
tω  is the fraction of pressure that Central Bank relieves through purchase and sale of 
foreign exchange reserves. It takes values between ∞<<∞− TVPtω . 
TVP
tω = 0 indicates 
absence of Central Bank intervention. This shows a flexible exchange rate system. TVPtω = 1 
indicates that the Central Bank relieved the entire pressure by purchasing and selling foreign 
exchange reserves. This is consistent with fixed exchange rate regime. 0 < TVPtω < 1 shows that 
the Central Bank used both exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves for restoring foreign 
exchange market equilibrium. TVPtω < 0 shows that Central Bank purchasesd foreign exchange 
reserves when there was already a downward pressure on domestic currency. TVPtω >1 suggests 
TVP
tt EMPf >∆ . This is called the Central Bank’s leaning against the wind-that the Central 
Bank’s response was more than that warranted by the pressure. This caused the exchange rate 
to move in the direction opposite to that warranted by the pressure.  
     
6.5 Methodology 
 In the last two chapters, we used a fixed parameter approach for estimating real money 
demand and price equation. This assumes parameter constancy over time and does not take 
into account the effects of structural changes on the parameter constancy over the given 
sample period. In this chapter we relax this assumption and allow the parameters to vary using 
Kalman filter time varying parameter approach. This will enable us to evaluate the effects of 
structural changes on parameter constancy.   
 Prior to discussing Kalman filter approach, we use a rolling regression method based 
on three-quarter window to justify the use of the time-varying parameter approach. Initially, 
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Figure 6.1: Rolling Regression Estimates  
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Note: Sample period used is from 1976Q1 to 2002Q3. Three-quarter window is used for rolling regression. These 
graphs represent the time -arying estimated coefficients for equation 6.1 on income ( ty ) and interest rate ( ti ) 
and equation 6.2 on foreign price ( *tp ) and exchange rate ( ts ) 
 
we use the first twelve observations for estimating coefficients using the OLS approach. Since 
serial correlation is a fundamental problem of time series data therefore, we adjust the 
standard errors of estimated coefficients using Newey-West test statistics. The first 
observation is then dropped and another one added (in this case the thirteenth observation) and   
re-estimated. We continue this process until the last observation is used in the analysis. Figure 
6.5.1 shows rolling regression estimates of coefficients for both real money demand and price 
equation. It is evident from the figure that estimates of both real money demand and price 
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equations are not constant but time-varying, thus justifying the use of the Kalman filter 
approach.  
 
 6.5.1 Kalman Filter Approach   
 
 In this section we outline Kalman Filter algorithm-based time-varying parameter 
approach. We have adopted this approach because it allows us to evaluate the effects of 
structural changes that have taken place in the economy over the given sample period on the 
parameter stability. The Kalman filter is based on the following: 
tttt xy εβ += '           (6.9) 
where ty  denotes dependent variables, tx  is a vector of explanatory variables, tβ  is  k x 1 
vector of time–varying coefficients and tε  is a disturbance term. The error term tε  is assumed 
to be normally distributed with mean 0)( =tE ε  and variance ])[var( 2,tRt σε =  Equation (6.9) is 
also called observation or measurement equation. Generally, the elements of tβ  are not 
observable and are generated by the first order Markov process (Harvey, 1989): 
ttt u+= −1ββ           (6.10)  
Equation (6.10) is called transition equation because it describes the transition of state 
equation from period t – 1 to period t (Lutkepohl, 2005). The matrix tβ  is a coefficient matrix 
that depends on its past values and the error process tu . It is assumed that the transition 
equation error term is normally distributed with mean 0)( =tuE  and variance ])[var( 2 ,tQtu σ= . 
Furthermore, it is assumed that tε  and tu  are independently distributed: that is )( ttuE ε = 0 
and tε , tu  and tβ  are independent of each other. Equations 6.9 and 6.10 are called the state 
space system that can be estimated recursively using Kalman filter algorithm.    
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 The basic objective of the Kalman filter is to update the knowledge of the system each 
time a new observation is brought in (Durbin and Koopman, 2001). If it is assumed that the 
errors tε  and tu  have normal distribution and that the coefficient matrix tβ  has a prior 
distribution with mean )0|0(β  and covariance matrix )0|0(p  then the conditional 
distribution )|( tt Yp β  and )|( 1 tt Yp +β  are also normal. If we denote the mean and the 
covariance of the state vector by )|( tt Yp β  by tt /β  and ttP /  respectively and those of 
)|( 1 tt Yp +β  by tt /1+β  and ttP /1+  then the Kalman filter recursion which is commonly referred 
to as Kalman filter are given by equations 6.11 to 6.14 (Abraham and Ledolter, 1983): 
ttt ββ =+ /1                (6.11) 
QPP tttt +=+ //1                 (6.12) 
)( /1' 11/11/1 ttttttttt xyk ++++++ −+= βββ                 (6.13) 
tttttttt PxkPP /1
'
11/11/1 ++++++ −=          (6.14) 
where  
1'
1/11
'
1/11 ][ −++++++ += RxPxxPk tttttttt        
Equation (6.11) and (6.12) are one step ahead estimate of the state vector and its covariance 
matrix. Equation (6.13) and (6.14) are updated means and variances of state vectors once new 
observation 1+ty  becomes available. The revised estimate is simply the sum of estimates of 
state vector up to period t and a linear combination of the one step ahead forecast error. The 
matrix 1+tk  is the Kalman gain matrix and determines the weight assigned to the most recent 
forecast errors.  
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6.6 Data 
In this section, we discuss the data used in the estimation of real money demand and 
price equation. Quarterly data for the period 1976Q1 to 2005Q2 were obtained from 
International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistic for all variables except nominal 
Gross domestic Product ( ty ) and monetary aggregate. We obtained quarterly nominal GDP 
data from the Statistical Department of State Bank of Pakistan. Nominal monetary aggregate 
( tm ) data is taken from Thomson datastream. Real GDP and real monetary aggregate data is 
obtained by adjusting their nominal counterparts using Pakistan CPI. Real GDP and money 
(M1) were seasonally adjusted using X–12 ARIMA seasonal adjustment program in Eviews. 
All variables are in logarithmic form. 
  
6.7 Results 
 In the last two chapters, we have constructed exchange market pressure and 
intervention index using fixed parameter approaches. These approaches assume parameters 
constancy and do not incorporate the effects of structural changes on parameter constancy in 
the estimation process. In this section, we relax parameter constancy assumption and allow the 
parameters to vary using Kalman filter time varying parameter approach. This permits us to 
evaluate the effects of structural changes that have taken place over the given sample period 
on parameter constancy. 
Figure 6.2 shows one-step ahead SE2±  estimates of interest rate, foreign price, 
exchange rate and domestic real income. It is evident from the figure that at the very 
beginning, SE2±  interval is quite large. However, once more information becomes available 
predicted values converge to their mean values at faster rate and hence SE2±  interval 
becomes smaller and smaller. This suggests faster convergence of predicted values of the 
variables of interest to their mean values over a time. 
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Figure 6.2 One Step Ahead Time varying parameter estimates of real money demand 
and price equation 
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Note:  dotted lines show β ±  2 standard errors.  
 
Figure 6.2 further shows that initially the estimated parameters show some fluctuation 
with increased standard errors. This is due to a small number of observations that are used for 
estimating additional observation of parameter of interest. Once the information that is used 
for predicting t+1 observation increases, the estimated parameter stabilises and their 
corresponding errors are reduced. In addition, unfavourable developments in domestic 
economy may also explain initial fluctuations in the estimated parameters. These include 
government initiated nationalisation policy that peaked in year 1975 and subsequent floods 
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that hit the country in 1976. In addition, elections were held in 1977. The ruling party won a 
majority of the seats. This invoked protests by the opposition parties which were followed by 
military coup and declaration of martial law in September, 1978. These factors may account 
for initial large standard errors. However, once more information becomes available; standard 
errors of the estimated parameters are substantially reduced.  
 Figure 6.2 further shows that all variables stay within  tβ ±  two standard error band. 
The interest rate estimate first declines and even shows positive sign for short period.  
However, for the later period, it is although negative but is not significantly different from 
zero. The negative interest rate coefficient confirm the theory that argues that as the 
opportunity cost of holding money increases, people prefer to hold their nominal balances in 
terms of assets that earn interest rate then in cash. On the other hand, the estimated parameter 
of exchange rate shows negative sign for the initial period. However, for the later period, it is 
positive and significantly different from zero. The estimated coefficient of foreign price, on 
the other hand, is of positive sign for the entire sample period. Initially, it increases and then 
fluctuates around its unity value. The positive estimated parameters of both foreign price and 
exchange rate confirm theoretical predication that exchange rate and foreign price changes 
influence domestic prices positively. Furthermore, exchange rate changes dominate foreign 
price changes. This could be due to monetary authorities’ management of exchange rate with 
corresponding implications for domestic price level (Liu and Burkett, 1995 and Mahdavi and 
Zhou, 1994). The estimated coefficient of domestic income shows pattern similar to foreign 
price. It first increases and then fluctuates around it unity value. Furthermore, the estimated 
domestic income parameter plot shows that it is significantly different from zero. Positive 
estimate of domestic income confirms the theory that suggest that as income increases people 
demand more money in order to finance their increased number of transactions. All the 
estimated parameters except interest rate fluctuate around unit value. On the other hand, 
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interest rate fluctuates between zero and minus one. These findings confirm that the structural 
changes that have taken place over the given sample period have caused parameter instability.    
 
6.7.1 Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention Index 
 
 We need the estimates of tη  in equation (6.6) for constructing an exchange market 
pressure and intervention index for Pakistan. This in turn requires the estimate of interest rate 
2tb  and exchange rate 2ta  which we obtain by estimating real money demand (6.1) and price 
equation (6.2) using Kalman filter approach. It gives separate estimates of interest rate 2tb , 
exchange rate 2ta  and tη  for each quarter. Based on Weymark (1995) macroeconomic model, 
exchange market pressure index is given as: tttt fsEMP ∆+∆= η . The rise and fall of exchange 
market pressure is associated with depreciation and appreciation of Pakistan currency against 
US $ in the foreign exchange market.   
 Figure 6.3 shows quarterly estimates of exchange market pressure based on two stage 
least square, Johansen (1988) cointegration and Time Varying Parameter (TVP) approach. 
TVP estimates of Exchange Market Pressure indicate downward pressure on domestic 
currency over the entire sample period. This suggests that in the absence of Central Bank 
intervention, domestic currency would have lost its value against US dollar in the foreign 
exchange market. Exchange Market Pressure mean value of 0.032 further supports this 
interpretation. Furthermore, all three approaches yield identical results and show downward 
pressure on domestic currency over the entire sample period. The correlation coefficient of 
0.97 suggests strong relationship between two stage least square and cointegration approach 
estimates of exchange market pressure. On the other hand, fixed and time varying parameter 
estimates of exchange market pressure yields weak correlationship that range between -0.08 to 
0.13. Furthermore, the estimates of exchange market pressure obtained from time varying  
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Figure 6.3 Exchange Market Pressure 
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Note: The correlation coefficient between 2SLS and Johansen estimates of Exchange Market Pressure is 0.97. Similarly, 
the correlation coefficient between Time Varying Parameter and 2SLS and Johansen estimates of Exchaneg Market 
Pressure is of 0.92 and 0.96 respectively. The average values of Exchange Market Pressures values from 2SLS, 
Johansen and Kalman filter method are 0.005, 0.005 and 0.06 respectively. Similarly the variance of Exchaneg Market 
Pressure from three approaches is 0.00091, 0.000404 and 0.001104 respectively. 
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parameter approach are more volatile then those obtained using fixed parameter approaches. 
Standard error estimates of 0.548, 0.030 and 0.020 for time varying parameter, two stage least 
square and Johansen’s cointegration approach estimates of exchange market pressure further 
support this interpretation. The difference in the results could be due to the estimate of tη . Its 
time varying parameter value is three times its value obtained from fixed parameter 
approaches.66 This result more volatile time varying parameter estimate of exchange market 
pressure estimate. Furthermore, the fixed parameter approaches assume parameter constancy 
and do not permit to evaluate the effects of structural changes on parameter constancy. On the 
other hand, time varying parameter approach allows the parameters to take account of the 
effects of new information on the estimation process. This may also explain why we have 
more volatile time varying parameter estimate of exchange market pressure then that obtained 
from fixed parameter approach. Furthermore, the use of different econometric techniques may 
explain weak correlation between time varying and fixed parameter estimates of exchange 
market pressure.    
Figure 6.4 shows monetary authority’s response to exchange rate fluctuations. It 
reflects the pressure that Central Bank relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange reserves and is given as: 
tt
t
t
t
fs
f
∆+∆
∆
=
η
ω
1
. 
It is evident from Figure 6.4 that Kalman filter estimates of intervention index suggest 
active central bank intervention in foreign exchange market. The intervention index mean 
value of 0.71 indicates that foreign exchange reserve and exchange rate changes absorbed 
seventy one and thirty nine percent of the pressure respectively. 
 
                                                 
66
 Two stage least square, Johansen cointegration and time varying parameter estimates of tη  are -1.101, -0.068 
and -2.964 respectively.    
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Figure 6.4 Intervention Index )( tω  
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Note: The average values of intervention index from 2SLS, Johansen and TVP method are 0.608, 0.729 and 
0.747 respectively. Similarly, the correlation coefficient between 2SLS and Johansen estimates f intervention 
index is 0.501. The correlation between 2SLS and TVP and between Johansen and TVP estimates of intervention 
index is 0.357 and 0.393 respectively. The standard deviation estimates of intervention index from three methods 
are 0.906, 0.778 and 1.318 respectively.   
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Figure 6.5 predicted and observed exchange rate 
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Note: dotted lines denote predicted exchange rate and is more volatile. Solid lines, on the other hand, denotes observed 
exchange rate. This is less volatile.  
 
Exchange Market Pressure is measured as the extent of exchange rate change that 
would be required for restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium in the absence of Central 
Bank intervention. Given the Exchange Market Pressure values, we can calculate the exchange 
rate level that would prevail in the absence of Central Bank intervention by adding market 
pressure to one period lagged observed exchange rate: 
obs
tt
predicted
t SEMPS 1)1( −+=         (6.15) 
where  predictedtS  refers to unlogged exchange rate that would prevail in the absence of Central 
Bank intervention. 1−tS  denotes one period lagged unlogged exchange rate. Figure 6.5 
indicates that observed exchange rate is less volatile than the predicted exchange rate. 
Predicted and observed exchange rate standard deviation of 18.866 and 18.380 further 
supports this interpretation. It shows that despite instable estimated parameters, Central Bank 
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intervention policy is successful in reducing exchange rate which is unexpected. This finding 
is unexpected because the formulation of effective monetary policy requires stable parameters. 
In our case, Central Bank’s intervention policy is successful in its objective of reducing 
exchange rate volatility even in the absence of stable estimated parameters.      
 
6.7.2 Summary of the Results of Three Methods.  
 
 In this section, we present the summary of results from three approaches namely two 
stage least square, Johansen (1988) cointegration approach and time varying parameter 
approach.  
It is apparent from Table 6.1 that all approaches yield almost identical results.67 All 
three approaches give negative estimate of η  suggesting that exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserves move in the opposite direction. Whenever there is a pressure on domestic 
currency, Central Bank relieves it by purchasing and selling foreign exchange reserves. 
However, the time varying parameter estimate of η  is three times larger than that obtained 
from fixed parameter approaches. This may account for more volatile time varying parameter 
estimate of exchange market pressure. All three approaches further reveal that it is 
depreciating pressure that has remained dominant over the entire sample period.   
The intervention index shows that the Central Bank actively intervened in the foreign 
exchange market and allowed limited role to market forces in determining exchange rate level. 
The intervention index values range between 0.61 to 0.71. This indicates that foreign exchange 
reserve changes absorbed sixty one to seventy one percent of the pressure. Exchaneg rate 
changes relieved the remaining twenty nine to thirty nine percent of the pressure.  
  Table 6.1 further indicate 0<tω  for nineteen to twenty four quarters. This shows that  
 
                                                 
67
 We take the average value of TVPtη  to compare it with SLSt2η  and Johansentη .   
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Table 6.1 Summary of results from three approaches 
 
2SLS Johansen Kalman Filter 
η  
-1.101 -0.068 -2.964 
tEMP  0.005 0.005 0.032 
tω  0.61 0.73 0.75 
0<tω  24 Quarters 24 Quarters 19 Quarters 
1=tω  24 Quarters 24 Quarters 24 Quarters 
tω <1 41 Quarters 41 Quarters 41 Quarters 
tω >1 28 Quarters 28 Quarters 33 Quarters 
)(−tEMP  -0.019 -0.010 -0.141 
tω  1.031 1.035 1.098 
)(+tEMP  0.022 0.017 0.166 
tω  0.303 0.523 0.414 
Note: 2SLS refers to two stage least square method. Similarly, η  denotes eta. Similarly EMP refers to exchange 
market pressure. tω  and tω  intervention index mean value for the entire sample period, and intervention index 
different values. + and  - indicates appreciating and depreciating pressure.     
 
in these quarters, Central Bank leaned with the wind – that the Central Bank purchased foreign   
exchange reserves ( 0>∆ tf ) when domestic currency was already under pressure to depreciate 
( 0>∆ ts ) and vice versa. 1=tω  for twenty four quarters. This implies that in these quarters 
proportionate changes in foreign exchange reserves were equal to the pressure ( tt EMPf =∆ ). 
This did not allow the exchange rate to change which is consistent with fixed exchange rate 
arrangement. For forty-one quarters, we have tω <1 implying that both foreign exchange 
reserves ( 0>∆ tf ) and exchange rate changes ( 0>∆ ts ) restored foreign exchange market 
equilibrium. Exchange rate also changed though less than that warranted by the pressure. This 
kind of monetary response to exchange market pressure is consistent with managed floating 
exchange rate system. Similarly, tω >1 for twenty-eight to thirty-three quarters. This can be 
interpreted as, in these quarters, proportionate changes in foreign exchange reserves 
( tt EMPf >∆ ) were more than that warranted by the pressure. This resulted the actual 
exchange rate different from that implied by the prevailing pressure.   
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Table 6.1 further reveals that the Central Bank’s response varies with the prevailing 
pressure. Intervention index exceeds its unity ( tω >1) value whenever there was a pressure on 
domestic currency to appreciate. On the other hand, intervention index does not exceed its 
unity value ( tω <1) when domestic currency was under pressure to depreciate. This may reflect 
changes in the Central Bank’s objectives. In case of appreciating pressure, Central Bank may 
be targeting to maintain domestic exporters competitive advantage in international market. On 
the other hand, Central Bank response to depreciating pressure may reflect its preference for 
minimizing the effect of exchange rate changes on domestic prices–that the Central Bank may 
by trying to maintain domestic price stability.     
 
6.8 Conclusion  
 
 In this chapter, we estimated exchange market pressure and intervention index for 
Pakistan using Weymark (1995) time varying model. Rolling regression estimates of real 
money demand and price equation do not support parameter stability. This could be due to the 
structural changes that have taken place in the economy over the given sample period. In order 
to overcome this weakness of fixed parameter approach, we used a time varying parameter 
approach in particular a Kalman filter approach. It allows us to evaluate the effects of 
structural changes on parameter constancy.   
 Time varying parameter estimates of real money demand and price equation shows 
parameter instability. Although in the initial period, ± 2SE is quite high suggesting deviation 
of predicted values from their actual values. This is due to limited available information for 
predicting next period estimated parameters. However, once the information required for 
predicting one period ahead value increases, predicted values adjust to their actual values quite 
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fast. Furthermore, the results indicate that estimated parameters are significantly different 
from zero.  
 Estimates of exchange market pressure and intervention index based on time varying 
parameter approach shows downward pressure on average over the entire sample period. 
Furthermore, the intervention index mean value suggest active Central Bank intervention. It 
shows that foreign exchange reserves and exchange rate changes absorbed seventy one and 
twenty nine percent of the pressure respectively. Intervention index values suggest that Central 
Bank response varies with the prevailing pressure. It shows that intervention index do not 
exceed its unity value when the domestic currency is under depreciating pressure. This may 
reflect Central Bank’s intention to limit the effects of exchange rate changes on domestic 
prices. On the other hand, intervention index exceeds it unity value in the presence of 
appreciating pressure. It can be interpreted that in such a case, Central Bank may be trying to 
maintain competitive advantage of domestic exporters in international market. The estimates 
of exchange market and intervention index values are almost the same as obtained in previous 
chapters thus providing further evidence in their support.  
 In the last three chapters, we assumed direct Central Bank intervention that takes the 
form of purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves. Interest rate is another channel that 
Central Bank may use for restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium. In such a case, the 
exchange market pressure indices that drop interest rate do not fully reflect the extent of 
foreign exchange market disequilibrium. Eichengreen et al. (1996) constructed such an index 
that is simple sum of percent changes in exchange rate, relative interest rate differential and 
relative percent changes in foreign exchange reserves. In the chapter that follows, we use 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) approach for constructing exchange market pressure for ten 
countries. Furthermore, we evaluate the determinants of exchange market pressure in a panel 
of ten countries.     
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Chapter Seven 
Comparing the importance of Openness, macroeconomic indicators and 
policy variables as determinants of Exchange Market Pressure 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter empirically examines the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure in a panel of 
ten countries. Using a statistical approach to constructing Exchange Market Pressure, we 
examine whether this is affected by a range of macroeconomic indicators, policy variables and 
measures of openness. Fixed effect parameter approach shows that exchange market pressure 
is negatively associated with trade openness and reserve import ratio and positively related to 
the real exchange rate. However, the approaches that addresses endogenity problem show that 
exchange market pressure is better explained by trade openness, capital openness and real 
domestic income. Hence weaker currencies are those less open to trade and capital, with lower 
domestic real income. Thus our finding supports the relevancy of some macroeconomic 
variables and measures of openness.  
E.L. Classification: E31, E51, E52, E58 
Keywords: Exchange Market Pressure, Openness Measures, Monetary Policy, Inflation  
        Targeting, Monetization.     
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7.1 Introduction 
Exchange Market Pressure reflects the extent of foreign exchange market 
disequilibrium that arises due to nonzero excess demand of domestic currency. It is fully 
reflected in exchange rate changes in the absence of Central Bank intervention. It is argued 
that exchange rate changes have implications for domestic macroeconomic variables. They 
influence domestic prices through Purchasing Power Parity, wage setting behaviour of the 
firms, interest rate changes through Uncovered Interest Rate parity, stability of domestic 
financial system, unemployment and production levels and thus have direct or indirect 
consequences for the welfare of virtually all economic participants (Isard, 1995). 
Central Bank’s frequently intervene in the foreign exchange market and stabilise 
external value of domestic currency with a view to avoid undesirable consequences of 
exchange rate changes. In case of direct intervention, Central Bank sales and purchase foreign 
exchange reserves to restore foreign exchange market equilibrium. There may be the case that 
Central Bank may intervene indirectly. In such a case, Central Bank uses both interest rate and 
foreign exchange reserves as instruments of monetary policy for relieving pressure on 
domestic currency. 
Exchange rate regime also determines the nature of intervention. In case of a fixed 
exchange rate regime, Central Bank uses foreign exchange reserve changes for restoring 
foreign exchange market equilibrium. On the other hand, exchange rate changes relieve 
pressure under a free float. However, under a managed float or intermediate exchange rate 
regime, Central Banks can use exchange rate, interest rate and foreign exchange reserve 
changes as instruments of monetary policy for relieving market pressure. The basic objective 
of foreign exchange intervention is to avoid undesirable consequences of exchange rate 
changes.             
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Exchange Market Pressure is not directly observable. It is measured through the 
channels that the Central Bank uses for restoring foreign exchange market equilibrium. In the 
Girton and Roper (1977) and Weymark (1995) models, exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserve changes measure the extent of foreign exchange market disequilibrium. However, 
these indices differ in assigning weights to the components of exchange market pressure 
index. Girton and Roper (1977) assign equal weight to both components. On the other hand, 
Weymark (1995) uses stochastic macroeconomic model for deriving the weight assigned to 
foreign exchange reserve changes. It converts foreign exchange reserve changes into 
equivalent exchange rate changes and thus ensures that exchange market pressure index is not 
dominated by more volatile component. In addition, both these studies assume indirect foreign 
exchange market intervention. There may be the case that Central Bank may use interest rate 
changes for relieving pressure. Therefore, the exchange market pressure indices that drop 
either exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves or interest rate do not fully reflect the extent of 
foreign exchange market disequilibrium. Eichengreen et al. (1996) constructed such an EMP 
index that is simple sum of weighted average of exchange rate, relative foreign exchange 
reserve and interest rate changes. The weights assigned to three components are based upon 
the inverse of their volatility. This assigns low weight to more volatile component and thus 
ensures equal importance of all components. Hence this approach has the advantage that it is 
not conditional upon macroeconomic assumptions used by Girton and Roper (1977) and 
Weymark (1995). 
 There are two approaches in the literature to foreign exchange market disequilibrium. 
One approach uses binary variable as a dependent variable that takes either zero or one value. 
It is constructed using extreme Exchange Market Pressure values. The second approach uses 
Exchange Market Pressure index that takes the form of continuous variable for measuring 
foreign exchange market disequilibrium. This chapter uses the second approach for evaluating 
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the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure in a panel of ten countries. It has the advantage 
that it allows us to extract more information from the data (Mandilaras and Bird, 2008).    
We set out a number of objectives. Firstly, we wish to construct an Exchange Market 
Pressure index for Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom. In order to do so, we use the Eichengreen et al. (1996) 
statistical approach and use both interest rate and foreign exchange reserve defences of the 
exchange rate level as EMP components. It has the advantage that it is not conditional upon 
stochastic macroeconomic model for deriving Exchange Market Pressure components’ 
weights. This may be very useful in a large panel study since we are not dependent upon the 
applicability of a particular macroeconomic model to each country.  
Second, we evaluate the effects of inflation targeting monetary regime on Exchange 
Market Pressure. We check what happens to pressure on domestic currency when Central 
Bank shifts its focus from exchange rate stability to domestic objective of stabilizing inflation. 
It is argued that the shift in the objectives of monetary policy from exchange rate stability to 
inflation targeting might increase market pressure on domestic currency.  
Third we test the relevance of exchange rate regime for Exchange Market Pressure 
using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) exchange rate classification. Particularly, we test the bipolar 
view that compared to fixed and fully flexible exchange rate systems; intermediate exchange 
rate arrangements are more volatile. They are an attempt by a country open to capital inflows 
to have a fixed exchange rate and monetary independence. Sooner or later a conflict arises 
between domestic objective and stable exchange rate which results the collapse of fixed 
exchange rate regime. Another possible explanation of nonviability of pegged exchange rate 
regime is that it raises the belief that exchange rate regime will remain unaltered. This reduces 
the perception of risk borrowing in foreign exchange market and removes the need for 
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hedging. Then when exchange rate crises struck, it is devastating in terms of its effects on 
overall economy (Fischer, 2001).  
Fourth, we check how the integration of the countries with the rest of the world 
influences Exchange Market Pressure. We measure country’s integration using trade openness 
and capital openness. The literature provides conflicting views about the impact of capital 
openness on Exchange Market Pressure. One strand of the literature argues that financial 
openness increases countries’ exposure to foreign speculative attacks. On the other hand, there 
are some studies that support the evidence that countries’ capital openness reduces pressure on 
its currency. Particularly, Dooley and Isard (1980) and Fischer (2001) argue that investors 
aware of being unable to withdraw their funds will not be willing to invest in the country. We 
therefore test, which of these effect is more dominant.  
Similar to capital openness, the academic literature provides arguments for and against 
the effects of trade openness on the build up of foreign Exchange Market Pressure. A 
weakening of a country’s export sector results stops in the inflow of foreign currency and thus 
makes its currency vulnerable to market pressure. Secondly, trade openness and financial 
openness go together. Increased trade is conditional upon multinational corporations that need 
to be able to move their capital across borders (Frankel and Cavallo, 2004). This reduces 
countries’ ability to effectively implement capital controls. The optimistic view about the 
impact of trade openness on market pressure emphasizes that strong trade links reduce 
countries’ default probabilities. International investors being aware of countries’ reduced 
default probabilities would not withdraw their capital. This will reduce downward market 
pressure on the currencies of the countries having strong trade links with the rest of the world.  
Other questions that we address are: how growth in domestic monetary aggregates, 
reserve imports ratio, real GDP and real exchange rate influence Exchange Market Pressure. It 
is argued that the increase in domestic monetary aggregates reduce domestic monetary 
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authorities backing of foreign liabilities. This makes it difficult for the domestic monetary 
authorities to defend the currency when it is under downward pressure. This explains positive 
association between Exchange Market Pressure and domestic monetary aggregates. Contrary 
to this, the literature suggests negative relationship between reserve import ratio and Exchange 
Market Pressure. It states that increase in reserve import ratio convey the signal to the market 
participants about the potential of defending the value of domestic currency when it is under 
pressure. This stabilises the expectations of domestic economic agents and thus reduces 
downward pressure on domestic currency.  
There is a negative association between output growth and Exchange Market Pressure, 
The second generation currency crisis models argue that an increase in domestic output 
inversely affect the devaluation expectation and hence reduce downward pressure on domestic 
in the foreign exchange market. Real exchange rate on the other hand is positively associated 
with market pressure. Overvalued exchange rate deteriorates the domestic exporters’ 
competitiveness in the international market and thus puts pressure on domestic currency to 
depreciate. Our approach has the advantage that that it uses continuous instead of binary 
variable for measuring pressure in foreign exchange market. On the other hand, currency 
crises literature measures pressure in foreign exchange market in terms of dummy variable 
that takes either zero or one value. 
The rest of the paper is as: In section 7.2, we discuss theoretical studies that argue 
about the possible determinants of Exchange Market Pressure. In section 7.3, we provide 
discussion on Eichengreen et al. (1996) exchange market pressure index. Section 7.4 and 7.5 
contains data discussion and descriptive statistics. Section 7.6 discusses fixed effect panel 
estimate approach. In section 7.7, we discuss panel estimates of exchange market pressure 
regression equation and section 7.8 concludes.  
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7.2 Determinants of Exchange Market Pressure 
 The empirical exchange market pressure literature can be divided in two categories. 
There are some studies that have focused on the estimation of exchange market pressure and 
its determinants for different countries and regions. On the other hand, there are large numbers 
of studies that initially estimate exchange market pressure and subsequently construct 
currency crises index using extreme exchange market pressure values. Contrary to exchange 
market pressure index, a currency crises index is a binary variable that takes the value of zero 
or one otherwise when there is a crisis. Since currency crises denotes extreme exchange 
market pressure values therefore, the determinants of both exchange market pressure and 
currency crises are almost the same which we review in this section.   
 First generation currency crisis models emphasize the importance of macroeconomic 
variables as the determinants of speculative attacks. Krugman (1979) argues that inconsistency 
between domestic macroeconomic policies and fixed exchange rate regime results in the 
collapse of fixed exchange rate regime. Krugman (1979) further asserts that increased 
monetizing of budget deficits leads to the collapse of fixed exchange rate system. Several 
authors have further extended Krugman’s (1979) model. Connolly (1986) extended it to a 
crawling peg exchange rate and argued that a rise in domestic credit more than that warranted 
by the rate of crawl leads exchange rate regime to collapse. He argues that a real exchange rate 
appreciation deteriorates a current account deficit and puts pressure on the domestic currency 
to depreciate. Flood and Garber (1984) derived a speculative attack timing using simplified 
linear model. They argued that fixed exchange rate regime collapses either due to weak 
fundamentals or arbitrary speculative behaviour and show that a speculative attack occurs 
when shadow exchange rate equals fixed exchange rate. Speculative attack occurs because it 
offers an opportunity to speculators to profit at official expense (Obstfeld, 1986). These 
studies emphasize the importance of fiscal policy in the genesis of currency crises. Calvo 
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(1987) on the other hand, evaluated the relationship between real exchange rate, current 
account and speculative attack in cash in advance model. He argued that domestic stabilization 
policies increase domestic absorption. An increase in current account deficit thus puts pressure 
on domestic currency to depreciate. The preceding studies assume unsterilised foreign 
exchange market intervention which reduces domestic monetary base by the scale of sale of 
foreign exchange reserve and vice versa. Flood et al. (1996) addresses this issue and shows 
that domestic monetary authorities offset the effect of foreign exchange intervention on 
domestic monetary base by purchasing and selling domestic government securities.68 It 
changes the relative supply of domestic and foreign currency bonds in the hands of private 
sector with no effect on domestic monetary base.    
 Krugman (1979) model and its extensions argue that speculative attacks occur due to 
inconsistency between domestic macroeconomic policies and fixed exchange rate 
arrangements. Particularly, they argue that increased monetization of government budget 
deficit results real exchange rate appreciation. This deteriorates current account deficit and 
results exchange rate depreciation. They further argue that economies with weak fundamentals 
are prone to speculative attacks. Krugman (1979) model and its extensions are called first 
generation currency crises models. 
 A number of alternative explanations are also provided in the literature on pressure on 
domestic currency in foreign exchange market. They argue the possibility of speculative 
attacks on domestic currency in the absence of inconsistency between macroeconomic policies 
and exchange rate parity. The models that explain market pressure on these lines are called 
second generation currency crises models. They show that the trade off that government faces 
between domestic macroeconomic objectives and the maintenance of fixed exchange rate 
arrangements results in multiple equilibria and leads to self fulfilling speculative attacks. 
                                                 
68
 The author shows that Mexican authorities sterilised foreign exchange intervention during December 1994 
Mexican currency crises. 
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 Kydland and Prescott (1977) provide the basis for second generation currency crises 
models. They favour rules over discretion because discretion implies the selection of best 
policies given the current circumstances. It is argued that the decisions of rational economic 
agents depend not only on the current policy decisions but also upon their expectation of 
future policy actions. In such circumstances, the discretionary policies based upon the current 
and the past economic conditions would not yield optimal outcomes. Contrary to Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Flood and Isard (1989) developed escape clause models. They argue that a 
rule base monetary policy is impractical in a world that (a) lacks knowledge about the 
macroeconomic structure of the economy and the disturbance, (b) assimilation of information 
from those events that contains new information is costly and time taking and (c) delaying 
policy reactions until new information is gathered can be costly to society. Owing to these 
factors, they emphasized the importance of mixed strategy that contains the elements of both 
rules and discretion over ruled based monetary policy. Mixed strategy requires monetary 
authorities to follow clearly defined rules in normal times but to override them in exceptional 
circumstances.69 Obstfeld (1986) discusses the possibility of speculative attack in the absence 
of inconsistency between domestic macroeconomic policies and fixed exchange rate provided 
that in the post attack period, loose monetary policy is followed. Jeane (1997) distinguishes 
between fundamentals and self-fulfilling motivated speculative attacks and argue that both 
complement each other in the build up of speculative attack. When the economic fundamentals 
are neither good nor bad, it generates self-fulfilling expectations which make it costly for 
monetary authorities to maintain fixed exchange rate parity and thus collapse occurs. Instead 
of focusing on post attack policy shift, Flood and Marion (2000) argue that currency crises 
may result from shifts in speculative opinion about exchange rate risk. They incorporate risk 
premium into asset market returns. This introduces nonlinearity and provides a mechanism 
                                                 
69
 A policy rule is a mapping from the policy maker’s information set to the set of possible actions (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1990).  
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through which multiple equilibria can occur even when the policy is invariant to attack. 
Multiple equilibria are the result of private speculative behaviour instead of post-attack 
government policy switch.70  
 The third version of currency crises models was developed after East Asian currency 
crises.71 It focuses on the role of contagion in the generation of currency crisis. Contagion is 
defined as devaluation in one country that causes financial troubles in other countries 
(Choueiri, 1999). Initially researchers focused on asset price co-movement and capital flows 
across countries and named its significant presence as evidence of contagion. The ERM crises 
1992, Mexican financial crises in 1994 that affected the entire region and East Asian currency 
crises 1997 further increased the importance of contagion in the context of currency crises 
literature.   
The theoretical literature argues that contagion works through two channels: (a) trade 
contagion or (b) liquidity contagion (Choueiri, 1999). Currency depreciation in one country 
increases trade deficit of the second country and thus exerts pressure on its currency to 
depreciate. Secondly, a fall in import prices decreases consumer price index in the second 
country which in turn reduces demand for domestic money balances. Given that money supply 
is fixed, the residents of the second country swap their excess domestic money balances for 
foreign currency. This makes the second country vulnerable to speculative attacks 
(Eichengreen et al. 1996). On the other hand, liquidity contagion arises when crises in one 
country drives investors to sell off their assets in another country to raise funds (Valdes, 
1996).  
                                                 
70
 Flood and Marion (2000) departs from first generation currency models in four ways. First it introduces 
stochastic time varying risk premia in the interest parity condition. Second, it models the constraints that prevent 
monetary authority from undertaking strong defense of the currency by assuming that monetary authority 
continuously sterilizes the effects of foreign exchange intervention on monetary base. Third, fiscal policy is bond 
financed rather than being monetized. Fourth, they relax the assumption of purchasing power parity and argue 
that goods prices are set a period in advance at a level that is expected to clear the market. This assumption 
enables portfolio holders to ignore goods price variance and concentrate on exchange rate variance.  
71
 Gerlach and Smets (1994) evaluated the effects of the Finnish marka depreciation in 1992 on subsequent 
speculative attacks on Swedish krona.  
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 The studies discussed above define currency crises literature in terms of three 
generation models. First generation models attribute currency crises in terms of inconsistency 
between domestic macroeconomic policies and fixed exchange rate regime. They argue that 
increased monetization of government budget deficit results the collapse of fixed exchange 
rate regime. Contrary to first generation models, second generation currency crises models 
emphasize the possibility of currency crises in the absence of inconsistency between domestic 
macroeconomic policies and fixed exchange rate. They argue that the trade-off that 
government faces between domestic macroeconomic objectives and stable exchange rate 
results multiple equilibria and hence the collapses of fixed exchange rate arrangements. The 
third generation currency crises models focus on the role of contagion in terms of exchange 
rate regime collapse. They show that contagion works through two channels (a) trade 
contagion or (b) liquidity contagion. Trade contagion works when currency depreciation in 
one country causes pressure on second country currency to depreciate. On the other hand, the 
liquidity channel works when investors withdraw their funds from non-crises countries in 
order to compensate for liquidity losses from the countries under speculative attack. This kind 
of contagion is called liquidity contagion.     
The studies discussed above mainly focus on currency crises but they can be useful for 
Exchange Market Pressure, since they highlight important potential determinants. Girton and 
Roper (1977) first derived the Exchange Market Pressure index and estimated EMP equation 
for Canada. It includes domestic and foreign monetary aggregates, domestic and foreign 
income as its determinants. Burdekin and Burkett (1990) applied Girton and Roper (1977) to 
Canada in dynamic form. They include US and Canadian GNP deflator along with Canadian 
and US three month Treasury Bill rate as an additional determinants. Connolly and da Silveira 
(1979) applied Girton and Roper (1977) monetary model of Exchange Market Pressure to 
Postwar Brazilian experience. Small country assumption enabled them to derive a simple one-
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country equation of managed float that depend upon four essential ingredients: (a) money 
demand, (b) money supply, (c) purchasing power parity, and (d) monetary equilibrium. The 
single equation Exchange Market Pressure model includes domestic credit, foreign price and 
domestic income as its determinants. Kim (1985), Thornton (1995) and Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Bernstein (1999) slightly extended Connolly and da Silveira (1979) version of Girton and 
Roper (1977) and included money multiplier as an additional Exchange Market Pressure 
determinant. 
Wohar and Lee (1992) too extended the Girton and Roper (1977) model and allowed 
domestic prices to deviate from purchasing power parity. They included foreign real income, 
foreign money supply and foreign interest rate as additional regressors in Girton and Roper’s 
(1977) Exchange Market Pressure equation for Japan. Pollard (1999) applied Wohar and Lee 
(1992) specification of Girton and Roper (1977) model to Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad & Tobago. The estimated regression equation include net central bank credit as a 
percentage of high-powered money, money multiplier, foreign money supply, deviation from 
purchasing power parity, domestic and foreign real income, interest rate differential, foreign 
price and foreign interest rate as EMP determinants. Kamaly and Erbil (2000), on the other 
hand, adopted a vector auto regression approach and estimated Exchange Market Pressure 
equation for MENA Region. The estimated regression equation included domestic credit, 
foreign price, deviations from purchasing power parity, domestic real income and interest rate 
as EMP determinants.  
Girton and Roper (1977), Connolly and da Silveira (1979), Inchul (1985), Thornton 
(1995), Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999), Wohar and Lee (1992), Pollard (1999) and 
Kamaly and Erbil (2000) used nominal exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes as 
components of Exchange Market Pressure. Karfakis and Moschos (1999) on the other hand, 
followed the Sachs et al. (1999) approach and defined Exchange Market Pressure as the sum 
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of percentage changes in nominal effective exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve 
changes. They used an inverse of variance approach for assigning weights to the components 
of Exchange Market Pressure. The estimated EMP regression equation for Greece used Greek 
and OECD consumer price indices, the broad definition of money supply, banking claims on 
the private sector, the current account balance and net capital movement as its determinants. 
Contrary to Girton and Roper’s (1977) model, Pentecost et al. (2001) derived an 
Exchange Market Pressure measure from a short-term wealth-augmented monetary model of 
foreign exchange market. The resulting EMP index includes the change in interest rate 
differential, in addition to reserve and nominal exchange rate changes. They use a principal 
component technique for deriving the weights and signs of the components of EMP. The 
estimated EMP equation for several European countries shows that EMP can be explained by 
differential money growth, real exchange rate, changes in long-term interest rate differentials 
and wealth accumulation.72  
The preceding studies focus on domestic and foreign country macroeconomic variables 
as Exchange Market Pressure determinants. Hallwood and Marsh (2003) on the other hand, 
include changes in central parity and deviations from central parity along with macroeconomic 
variables as the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure. Modeste (2005) evaluated the 
impact of foreign debt burden on Guyana. Other variables that he used for explaining Guyana 
Exchange Market Pressure include domestic credit, growth in the relative price of crude oil, 
macroeconomic uncertainty, growth in real exports and foreign price.  
To summarise, the empirical Exchange Market Pressure literature includes domestic 
credit, foreign money supply, domestic and foreign output, domestic and foreign GNP 
deflator, domestic and foreign interest rate, foreign price, money multiplier, deviations from 
purchasing power parity, net Central Bank credit as percentage of high powered money, 
                                                 
72
 The sample countries include Belgium, France, Netherlands, UK, Austria, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Spain, Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal.  
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current account balance, net capital movement, accumulation of wealth, change in the central 
parity, deviation from central parity, foreign debt burden, growth in the relative price of crude 
oil, macroeconomic uncertainty and growth in real exports as its determinants.                        
7.3. An Exchange Market Pressure Index  
 
 Eichengreen et al. (1996) derived an Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index using a 
statistical approach. They argued that the components of exchange market pressure index that 
restore foreign exchange market equilibrium depend on the structure of the economy and 
therefore, must be drawn from exchange rate models. However, it is argued that the exchange 
rate models that link exchange rate with macroeconomic variables have little power to predict 
exchange rate changes in short and intermediate horizons. Due to these weaknesses of 
exchange rate models, Eichengreen et al. (1996) used a statistical approach to derive an index 
of Exchange Market Pressure given as:  
))]%(%())(()%[( *
,
*
tititititit ffiisEMP ∆−∆−−∆+∆≡ γβα     (7.1)  
The exchange market pressure index is a weighted sum of exchange rate changes )( its∆ , 
relative interest rate change )( *itit ii −∆  and foreign exchange reserve changes )( itf∆ . its  
denotes exchange rate or the price of US $ in domestic currency, hence a rise in its  is 
associated with the domestic currency depreciation. The asterisks denote the foreign 
counterpart of domestic variables. Measuring Exchange Market Pressure using only exchange 
rate changes will not be appropriate as the monetary authorities may alleviate, for example, 
upward pressure by raising interest rate and spending foreign exchange reserves. Therefore, 
interest rate and foreign exchange reserve are the channels that Central Bank may use for 
alleviating pressure. An increase in exchange rate, a rise in interest rate and a loss of foreign 
exchange reserves imply an increase in exchange market pressure. The parameters α , β  and 
γ  are the weights assigned to components of exchange market pressure index. They are 
 190 
determined by taking the inverse of standard deviation of each component of index. This 
weighting scheme is adopted to assign low weight to more volatile components and therefore, 
avoid them dominating the index. 
7.4 Data 
 
 The data for all variables except monetary aggregates, and financial openness index are 
taken from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistic dataset. 
Logged annualised data from 1976 to 2005 are used. Foreign exchange reserves refer to total 
reserves minus gold in US dollars. Similarly, the bilateral nominal exchange rate for Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and United Kingdom 
refers to domestic currency per unit of US dollar. Hence a rise in the exchange rate is 
associated with deprecation of domestic currency against the US dollar. We use inter-bank 
money market rates to denote short-term interest rate. We obtained M2 data from IMF IFS 
data set for Australia, Korea and United Kingdom. It refers to money plus quasi-money. For 
the rest of the countries, we obtain M2 data from Thomson Data-stream. Thomson Data-
stream contained M2 data up to 1999 for Italy and Germany. For the remaining years, we 
obtained M2 data for these countries from Bundesbank and Italian Central Bank Monthly and 
Annual Reports. Bundesbank Annual Reports contained annualized M2 data up to 2002. For 
the remaining three years, we converted German monthly M2 data to Annualized data using 
Eviews 6.0 student version default frequency conversion setting. We have used M1 due to 
absence of M2 data for Pakistan. Trade openness refers to current account to GDP ratio. We 
have used Chin and Ito’s (2008) index to measure financial openness. We adjusted nominal 
money balances and nominal GDP with GDP deflator to get their real values. Reserve import 
ratio refers to division of reserves by imports. Remittance data for all countries except the UK  
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics of Panel Data  
 
itEMP  itm  itOP  itOPK  itrem  itresm  itq  ity  
Mean 0.04 3.971 0.001 1.359 8.584 -0.649 1.068 2.849 
Median 0.119 3.884 -0.009 2.500 8.901 -0.642 0.297 4.143 
Maximum 5.845 6.759 0.315 2.500 10.097 0.264 3.382 6.937 
Minimum -6.398 2.278 -0.275 -1.831 5.608 -1.508 -0.294 -14.206 
Std. Dev. 1.906 0.894 0.076 1.456 1.182 0.333 1.239 5.784 
Corr: Coeff  -0.024 -0.277 -0.076 -0.112 -0.247 -0.064 -0.029 
Note: In this table, we have descriptive statistics for Exchange Market Pressure ( tEMP ), monetary aggregate 
( tm ), trade openness ( tOP ), capital openness ( tOPK ), real exchange rate ( tq ), remittances ( trem ), reserve 
import ratio ( tresm ) and real Gross Domestic Output ( ty ). Std. Dev. denotes standard deviation of the variables 
included in the analysis. Corr: Coeff denotes correlation coefficient between exchange market pressure and other 
variables included in the analysis.        
 
(after 1987), Canada and Singapore are taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators data set and refers to Workers’ Remittances and Compensation of Employees Paid. 
Real exchange rate refers to nominal exchange rate times price ratio.   
Table 7.1 describes the basic statistic of data used in the study. Positive mean value of 
Exchange Market Pressure is associated with depreciating pressure over the entire sample 
period. This can be interpreted that if the Central Bank had abstained from intervening in the 
foreign exchange market, the currencies of these countries would have depreciated by four 
percent. However, positive Exchange Market Pressure mean value does not imply that all 
countries faced downward pressure. Individual country estimates of EMP for Japan, Malaysia 
and Singapore are of negative sign implying upward pressure on their currencies.73 Median 
value of 0.119 separates higher half of sample from lower one. EMP values range from 
minimum of -6.398 to maximum of 5.845. Standard deviation measures the dispersion of EMP 
from its mean value and its value is 1.906. Trade openness ( tOP ) and capital openness 
( tOPK ) also show similar descriptive statistics. Trade openness and capital openness show 
positive mean values. Positive trade openness mean value imply current account surplus as 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The remaining variables except reserve import 
                                                 
73
 Individual country descriptive statistics are given in Appendix A3.  
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Table 7.2: De Facto Classification of Exchange rate Regime 
No Separate Legal Tender 1 
Preannounced peg or currency board arrangement 1 
Preannounced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to ±  2%  1 
De facto peg 1 
Preannounced crawling peg 2 
Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±  2% 2 
De facto crawling peg 2 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±  2% 2 
Preannounced crawling band that is wider than ±  2% 2 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±  5% 3 
Noncrawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±  2%  3 
Managed floating  3 
Freely floating  4 
Freely falling (includes hyperfloat) 5 
Notes: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
 
ratio ( itresm ) show positive sign for both mean and median. Similarly, maximum and 
minimum values for almost all variables show positive and negative signs. Standard deviation 
which shows dispersion from mean shows positive sign for all variables and its value range 
between 0.076 for trade openness ( itOP ) to 5.784 for real Gross Domestic Product ( ity ). The 
correlation coefficient between Exchange Market Pressure and the remaining variables is of 
negative sign. This suggests that an increase in these values is associated with decrease in 
Exchange Market Pressure ( itEMP ). However, estimated correlation coefficient value is quite 
low suggesting a weak relationship between Exchange Market Pressure and independent 
variables.  
 Table 7.2 shows exchange rate classification based on de facto exchange rate policy. It 
is based on dual or multiple markets and multiple exchange rate practices in the post World 
War II period. It is evident from Table 7.2 that least flexible exchange rate regimes are 
assigned low value. A new exchange rate category, named freely falling, is introduced. It 
denotes the countries whose twelve month inflation rate exceeds forty percent. No separate  
 
 193 
legal tender refers to an exchange rate regime under which a country adopts another country’s 
currency as legal tender or the country becomes part of wider union that adopts the same 
currency as legal tender. In a pegged exchange rate or currency board arrangement, a 
country’s domestic monetary base is determined by foreign exchange reserves particularly 
anchor country currency at a fixed rate. Under a preannounced horizontal band exchange rate 
arrangement, currency is allowed to fluctuate in a fixed band around central parity. Crawling 
peg exchange rate refers to exchange rate system in which currency is adjusted periodically in 
response to changes in macroeconomic indicators. A managed float system can be defined as a 
monetary arrangement in which the Central Bank frequently intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market to avoid undesirable exchange rate changes. However, intervention is not 
aimed at maintaining any particular exchange rate level. Free float is the opposite of a fixed 
exchange rate system. Under this system, market forces determine the value of foreign 
currency in terms of domestic currency units.  
Table 7.3 shows the evolution of exchange rate regime for each country. It indicates 
that from October 1972, Australia adopted a de facto moving band around the US dollar. 
However, Australian dollar was allowed to fluctuate by +/- 2% around the band. From 
November 1982 to December 12, 1983, Australia followed managed float exchange rat 
regime. This suggests that in this period, the Australian Central Bank frequently intervened in 
the foreign exchange market to smooth undesirable exchange rate changes. However, the 
Australian Central Bank did not aim at maintaining any particular exchange rate level. From 
December 12, 1983 to December, 2007 Australia followed freely float. This implies that in 
this period, Australian Central Bank let the market forces to determine its currency value.  
  
Table 7.3 Country specific de facto Exchange Rate Regime classification 
Country Date Classification Comments 
Australia October 1974 to November 1982 De facto band around US $ Horizontal +/-2% band. Officially pegged to a basket of currencies.  
 November, 1982 to December 12, 1983 Managed float  
 December 12, 1983 to December, 2007 Freely floating  
Canada May 31st, 1970 to May 2002 De facto moving band around US $ +/-2% Band 
 June 2002 to December 2007 Managed floating  +/-5% Band 
Germany January 1973 to January 1st, 1999 Peg to US $  
 January 1st, 1999 to December, 2007 Currency union Euro 
Italy 
October 1975 to December 1982              
 
Managed float                                    
 
There were dual rates. Different exchange rate arises for outward transfer 
of resident owned capital.  
 January 1983 to September13th, 1992 De facto crawling band around DM +/-2% Band 
 September 13th, 1992 to March 1993 Freely floating  
 April 1993 to July 1995 De facto crawling band around DM +/-2% 
 August 1995 to November 1996 De facto crawling peg to DM  
 December 1996 to January 1st, 1999 De facto peg DM  
 January 1st, 1999 to December, 2007 Currency Union Euro 
Japan February 12th, 1973 to November 1977 De facto moving band around US $ +/-2% 
 December 1977 to December 2007 Freely floating  
Korea May 1974 to February 27, 1980 Peg to US $ Parallel premia rose to 28% in February 1980  
 February 27th, 1980 to July 1980  De facto crawling peg to US $ Officially pegged to a basket of currencies and the SDR 
  March 2nd, 1990 to September 2nd, 1991 Pre announced crawling band around US $ +/-0.4% Band. This fits into crawling peg definition.  
 September 2nd, 1991 to July 1st, 1992 Pre announced crawling band around US $ +/-0.6% band. This fits into crawling peg definition 
 July 1st, 1992 to October 1st, 1993 Pre announced crawling band around US $ +/-0.8% band. This fits into crawling peg definition 
 October 1st, 1993 to November 1st, 1994  Pre announced crawling band around US $ +/-0.1% band. Pre announced crawling band around US $ 
 November 1st, 1994 to December 1st, 1995 De facto crawling peg to US $ Pre announced band is +/-1.5% 
 December 1st, 1995 November 1997 De facto crawling peg to US $ Officially the preannounced band is +/-2.25% 
 December 17, 1997 to June 1998 Freely falling The won was allowed to freely float 
 July 1998 to November 2004 Managed floating  
 December 2004 to December 2007 De facto crawling band around US $ +/-5% 
Notes: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
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Table 7.3 Country specific de facto Exchange Rate regime classification (Continued) 
Country Date Classification Comments 
Malaysia September 5th, 1975 to July 1997 De facto moving band around US $ Band is +/-2%. Officially Ringgit is pegged to a basket of 
currencies 
 August 1997 to September 30, 1998 Freely floating  
 September 30th, 1998 to June 2005 Peg to US $  
 July 2005 to December 2007                     
 
De facto band around US $                        
 
+/-2% band. Officially it is a managed float against an 
undisclosed basket of currencies 
Pakistan September 17, 1971 to January 8th, 1982 Peg to US $/parallel Market In December 1971 the parallel market premium peaks at 212% 
 January 8th, 1982 to January 1984            
 
De facto crawling peg to the US $/Parallel Market  
 February 1984 to August 1989              
 
De facto crawling peg to the US $/Parallel Market Band width is +/-2%. If the parallel rate is used the band width is 
+/-5%. 
 September 1989 to April 1991 De facto crawling peg/Parallel Market  
 May 1991 to April 1994                           
                                    
 
De facto crawling band around the US $/ Parallel 
Market                                           
 
Band width is +/-2%. If the parallel rate is used the band width is 
+/-5%. From August 1993 through May 1998 the parallel market 
premium is in single digit.   
 May 1994 to July 22nd, 1998                      
 
 
De facto crawling peg/Parallel Market              
 
 
A more precise description of the post-November 1996 period is 
mini pegs lasting a few months interspersed with a regular 
devaluation.   
 July 22, 1998 to May 19, 1999                
 
De facto crawling band/Dual Market/Multiple 
Exchange Rates  
Band width is +/-2% (on the basis of the parallel market rate) 
 
 May 19th, 1999 to December 2007      
 
De facto crawling peg to US $/Parallel Market  
Singapore June 21st, 1973 to December 2007 De facto moving band around the US $ +/-2% band. Officially adjusted on the basis of a basket of 
currencies. 
UK 
 
June 23rd, 1972  to October 8th, 1990 
 
Managed Floating        
 
Until the dissolution of the sterling Area on October 24, 1979 and 
the dismantling of capital controls, the UK had a dual rate system  
 October 8th, 1990 to December 12, 1992 Pre announced band around ECU/DM  +/-6% band 
 September 12th, 1992 to December 2001 Managed floating  
 January 2001 to December 2007 De facto moving band around Euro +/-2% band 
Notes: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Table 7.3 further shows two exchange rate regimes for Canada over the entire sample 
period. These include de facto moving with a +/- 2% moving band around the US dollar from 
May 31st, 1970 to May, 2002. For the latter period, Canada maintained managed float. 
Similarly, Germany followed peg to the US dollar from January 1973 to January 1st, 1999. 
Since January 1st, 1999, Germany has been following currency union with the Euro as legal 
tender. Italy, on the other hand, adopted a managed float at the very beginning of sample 
period. From January 1983 to September 13, 1992 Italy followed de facto crawling with a +/-
2% band around the Deutschemark. From September 13, 1992 to March 1993, the Italian 
twelve-month inflation rate was greater than forty percent. Therefore, for this period the 
Italian exchange rate is classified as freely falling. This was followed by a de facto crawling 
band with a +/- 2% moving band, de facto crawling peg and de facto peg to the Deutschemark 
from April, 1993 to January 1st, 1999. On January 1st, 1999 Italy entered into the European 
Monetary System and adopted the Euro as official legal tender. Therefore, for the post-1999 
period, the Italian exchange rate regime is characterised as currency union, with the Euro as its 
legal tender. Japan, on the other hand, followed a de facto band with +/- 2% moving band 
around the US dollar. For the remaining period, Japan’s exchange rate was free float, which 
suggests the absence of Central Bank intervention.  
Table 7.3 further reveals ten phases in Korean exchange rate policy. Initially Korean 
won was pegged to US dollar. From February 27th, 1980 to July 1980, Korea followed de facto 
crawling peg to US dollar. From March 2nd, 1990 to November 1st, 1994, Korean exchange 
rate regime can be classified as crawling peg with varying band around US dollar. This was 
followed by de facto crawling with changing band around US dollar for November 1st, 1994 to 
November 1997. From December 17th, 1997 to June 1998, Korean exchange rate regime can 
be classified as freely falling. It reflects that in this period, Korean twelve month inflation rate 
exceeded 40 percent level. Managed float characterised the Korean exchange rate regime  
Figure 7.1 Exchange Market Pressure ( itEMP ) 
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Figure 7.2 Trade Openness ( itOP ) 
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Figure 7.3 Capital Openness ( itOPK ) Index 
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Figure 7.4 Remittances ( itrem∆ ) 
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Figure 7.5 Reserve Import Ratio ( itrim ) 
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Figure 7.6 Real Exchange Rate ( itq ) 
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Figure 7.7 Real Domestic Income ( ity∆ ) 
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Figure 7.8 Real Monetary Aggregates ( itm∆ ) 
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during July 1998 to November 2004. This was a period in which the Korean Central Bank 
intervened in foreign exchange market to smooth undesirable exchange rate changes. Since 
December 2004 to December 2007, Korea has maintained a de facto crawling band around the 
US dollar with a +/-5% fluctuating band. A similar pattern is visible in Malaysian exchange 
rate policy. Malaysia pursued a de facto band of +/-2% around the US dollar, which was 
followed by free float. However, in the post East Asian currency crisis period, Malaysian 
exchange rate arrangements are characterised as pegged to US dollar. 
 Initially, Pakistan pursued a fixed exchange rate system and pegged its currency to the 
US dollar. Between January 1982 and July 1998, Pakistan followed a de facto crawling peg 
with a varying band around the US dollar. From 22nd July, 1998 to May 19th, 1999, multiple 
exchange rate arrangements characterised Pakistan’s exchange rate regime. This was replaced 
by de facto crawling peg to US dollar for the remaining period. Singapore is a unique case in 
the sample countries. It has followed de facto moving band around the US dollar with +/-2% 
moving band over the entire sample period. On the other hand, the UK initially followed 
managed float, which was followed by preannounced band of +/-6% around the Deutschmark. 
In the Post Exchange Rate Management crisis period, UK adopted a managed float which was 
replaced by a de facto moving band of +/-2% around Euro in January 2001.   
7.5 Econometric Methodology   
 
In the empirical study of the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure, we use fixed 
effects Panel Estimation also known as Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimation. 
Our specification is a linear regression model that allows intercept ( itc ) to vary across 
individual countries. It is given as follows: 
,ititiit uxcEMP ++= θ        ),0(~ 2uit IIDu σ      (7.2) 
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where itx  is a vector of independent variables [ k ] and θ  denotes vector of parameters [ h ]. 
itu  is an error term with zero mean ]0[ =ituE  and constant variance Furthermore, it is 
assumed that all itx  are independent of all itu  that is ]0[ =itituxE . Subscript i  on intercept 
term suggests that intercept is allowed to vary across countries to take account of differences 
in the structure of their economies.  
Equation 7.2 is a Fixed Effect Panel estimation method due to the fact that although it 
allows intercept to vary across different countries, each individual country intercept is not 
allowed to vary over time that is it is time invariant. After introducing a dummy variable for 
each country to denote differences in the structure in their economies, we write equation 7.2 
as:   
ititij
N
j
jit uxdcEMP ++= ∑
=
θ'
1
        (7.3) 
 However, the introduction of too many regressors renders regression model unattractive. In 
order to avoid this problem, we estimate regression model in deviation from individual means 
which enables us to eliminate the individual effects iα . The regression model in deviation 
form is as follows: 
iiii uxcEMP ++= θ'           (7.4) 
where  iEMP  is a mean of the dependent variable and is defined as ∑
=
−
=
T
t
iti EMPTEMP
1
1
 and 
ix  and iu  are defined in similar way. Therefore, we can write equation 7.3 as: 
)()( iitiitiit uuxxEMPEMP −+−=− θ        (7.5) 
Equation (7.5) is a regression model in deviation from individual means and does not contain 
individual country effects iθ . The ordinary least square estimate of θ  obtained from this 
transformed model is called a fixed effect estimator and is given as: 
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7.6 Results  
7.6.1 Empirical Specification  
 
 In this section, we specify the fixed effects panel estimates for the determinants of 
Exchange Market Pressure. Given the aggregation of data, we evaluate the effect of exchange 
rate regime, monetary policy regime, monetary aggregates, trade openness, capital openness 
and macroeconomic variables on exchange market pressure. We construct dummy variables 
D1 using different exchange rate regime data from Rogoff and Reinhart (2004). It takes a 
value of 1 for de facto peg, pre-announced crawling peg, de facto band and managed float, and 
zero otherwise. The estimated model is given as: 
ititititititititiit yresmqmremOPKITERRcEMP ∆+∆++∆+∆++++= 87654321 θθθθθθθθ   
itOP+         (7.7) 
itERR  denotes a dummy variable that denotes different exchange rate regime. We construct it 
using different exchange rate regime data from Rogoff and Reinhart (2004). It takes a value of 
1 for de facto peg, pre-announced crawling peg, de facto band and managed float, and zero 
otherwise.74 The proponents of a bipolar view pronounce soft peg exchange rate arrangements 
as unsustainable.75 They are an attempt by a country open to capital inflows to have a fixed 
exchange rate and monetary independence. Sooner or later a conflict arises between domestic 
objectives and stable exchange rate which results in the collapse of exchange rate regime as is 
in the model of a currency crisis (See Krugman, 1979). Another possible explanation of the 
nonviability of pegged exchange rate is that it raises the belief that the exchange rate regime 
                                                 
74
 We assign zero value to freely floating and freely falling exchange rate regime.  
75
 Soft peg exchange rate arrangements include fixed exchange rate pegs, adjustable exchange rate pegs, and 
narrow band exchange rate systems (Fischer, 2001, pp. 6). 
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will remain unaltered. This reduces the perception of risk borrowing in foreign exchange 
market and removes the need for hedging. Then when exchange rate crises struck, it is 
devastating in terms of over all economy (Fischer, 2011). Thus we expect 1θ  to be positive 
when the country is following a soft peg exchange rate regime.   
 itIT  denotes inflation targeting monetary regime. An inflation targeting regime is 
defined as the numerical value to which Central Bank commits and implements forward 
looking monetary policy to minimise the difference between the actual and targeted inflation 
rate.76 A well functioning inflation targeting regime is conditional upon floating exchange rate 
regime (Mishkin and Savastano, 2001). It is argued that due to the impossible Trinity, a 
Central Bank can not maintain the twin objectives of stable exchange rate and domestic prices. 
Thus under an inflation-targeting monetary regime, domestic monetary authorities give more 
weight to stable domestic prices to the benign neglect of stable exchange rate. It is argued that 
a shift in the focus of monetary policy on domestic objective of stable price may increase 
exchange market pressure (Petursson, 2009). However, empirical evidence shows that 
inflation targeting reduces instead of increases pressure on the domestic currency (Edwards, 
2006 and Petursson, 2009). This may be due to the fact that inflation targeting is a transparent 
and predictable monetary policy framework that reduces the possibility of unexpected shocks. 
This in turn increases exchange rate stability.77 
 The theoretical literature suggests that Exchange Market Pressure and monetary 
aggregates are positively correlated. This can be explained that a rise in money supply reduces 
foreign currency backing of short-term domestic liabilities of banking system (Glick and 
Hutchison, 2005). This makes it difficult for domestic monetary authorities to defend the 
currency if the monetary perception turns against it. Second, a rise in money supply increases 
                                                 
76
 See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001) for a detailed discussion on inflation 
targeting monetary policy.   
77
 Our variable for inflation targeting regime takes a value of one for such a regime, and zero otherwise.  
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domestic prices. This makes domestically produced goods less competitive in the international 
market, which deteriorates the current account deficit and puts pressure on domestic currency 
to loose its value against foreign currency. In addition, an increase in domestic monetary 
aggregates increases nominal cash balances of domestic residents which they swap for foreign 
currency. This increases pressure on domestic currency to depreciate (Girton and Roper, 
1977).  
 It is argued that increased capital openness can affect Exchange Market Pressure. The 
literature on international capital inflows has focused on two types of controls on cross border 
capital movements: (a) restriction on capital inflows and (b) controls on capital outflows.78 
However, the idea of restricting capital inflows has grown much in popularity. Stiglitz (1999) 
argues that “volatile markets are an inescapable reality. Developing countries need to manage 
them. They will have to consider policies that help stabilise the economy and help it absorb 
some of the shocks that volatile markets cause. These could include sound bankruptcy laws 
and Chilean–style policies that put some limits on capital flows”.79 Krugman (1998) also 
support the imposition of exchange controls in order to avoid destabilising impact of sudden 
capitol outflows. Tobin (1978) went a step further and suggested the imposition of a global tax 
on all spot conversions of one currency into another, proportional to the size of the transaction. 
Eichengreen et al. (1993) support Tobin’s (1978) idea and favour the imposition of a Tobin tax 
to avoid destabilising effect of short term capital inflows. On the other hand, McKinnon 
(1993) argued that increased capital inflows lead the real exchange rate to appreciate. This 
makes domestic exports less competitive in the international market and increase current 
                                                 
78
 There are two types of controls on capital outflows: (a) Preventive controls and (b) curative controls. 
Preventive controls take the form of taxes on funds remitted abroad, dual exchange rates and outright prohibition 
of funds transfers (Edwards, 1999). On the other hand, curative controls are imposed when the country is facing 
crisis-like circumstances. These controls enable the country to lower the interest rate and put in place pro growth 
policies (Krugman, 1998).    
79
 Chile imposed capital controls on two occasions: in 1978 – 1982 and 1991 – 1998. In both periods, investors 
wishing to bring their capital to Chile were required to make some non-interest bearing deposits with the Chilean 
Central Bank (Edwars, 1999)  
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account deficit of the country. This in turn puts pressure on the domestic currency to 
depreciate in the foreign exchange market. Moreover, capital openness increases the 
vulnerability of a country to external shocks even in the absence of weak fundamentals. This 
occurs due to investor’s herding behaviour, boom-bust cycles and the fluctuating nature of 
capital inflows (Schmukler, 2004). On the other hand; capital controls also have distortionary 
effects. Dooley and Isard (1980) and Fischer (2001) argue that investors aware of being unable 
to withdraw their funds will not be willing to invest in the country. This will increase 
downward pressure on domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. 
 The empirical literature overwhelmingly rejects the hypothesis that restrictions on 
capital controls insulate the economy from external shocks. Capital controls acts like 
investment irreversibility. Investors being unable to withdraw their capital would not be 
willing to invest in the country (Dooley and Isard, 1980). Furthermore, capital controls signal 
inconsistency between pegged exchange rates and macroeconomic policies. Thus the capital 
controls intended of restricting capital outflows may infact provoke capital outflows due to 
loss of investor’s confidence in the economy (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997). Moreover, foreign 
investors would be less likely to withdraw their capital from the country if they knew that the 
controls on capital would not be imposed. Empirical literature that rejects the null that capital 
controls do not insulate economy from external shocks measure pressure in foreign exchange 
market in terms of dummy variables that takes either zero or one value (Edwards, 2005; Glick 
et al. 2006; Glick and Hutchison, 2011). Furthermore, they use restrictions on capital 
transactions to denote capital account openness.  
Previous theoretical studies provide conflicting views on the effects of trade openness 
on Exchange Market Pressure. The first view emphasises that trade openness makes countries 
more vulnerable to external shocks. A weakening in a country’s export market results in a 
sudden stop in capital inflows and thus makes it more vulnerable to speculative attacks on its 
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currency. Secondly, trade openness and financial openness go hand–in-hand. Increased trade 
requires multinational corporations which in turn need to be able to move their capital across 
borders freely. In such an environment, it would be difficult for countries to effectively 
enforce capital controls (Frankel and Cavallo, 2004). Similarly, the view that the countries 
more open to international trade experience less pressure on their currencies works through 
different channels. Rose (2005) argues that a strong trade link reduce countries default 
probabilities. International investors aware of countries reduced default probabilities due to 
increased trade/GDP ratio would be less willing to withdraw their capital. This will reduce 
downward pressure on their currencies. In this chapter, we test this relationship and identify 
which effect of trade openness is more dominant.   
A rise in remittances sent by domestic residents living abroad should expected to be 
associated with a fall in Exchange Market Pressure. Hence more capital inflows are associated 
with stronger currencies and less downward pressure. Similarly, a higher reserve import ratio 
suggests country’s ability to repay its foreign currency liabilities. Increased reserve import 
ratio is thus associated with lessening pressure in foreign exchange market. Hence we expect a 
negative sign for the reserve import ratio. Furthermore, the theoretical literature suggests that 
an over-valued exchange rate is associated with a rise in pressure on the domestic currency. 
An over-valued real exchange rate makes it difficult for domestic exporters to compete in the 
international market. This deteriorates current accounts and thus puts pressure on domestic 
currency to depreciate.  
7.6.2 Empirical Evidence 
 In this section, we provide empirical evidence for the determinants of Exchange 
Market Pressure (equation 7.7) in a panel of ten countries. Particularly, we test if the empirical 
evidence confirms the theoretical predictions as discussed in the previous section. We adopt a 
general to specific approach, by eliminating insignificant estimates. The panel estimates of  
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Table 7.4 Panel Estimates of EMP Determinants 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
C 
-0.462 0.087 -4.669 -4.541 -4.337 a  
 (-0.06) (0.01) (-1.890) (-1.85) (-3.30) 
itERR  -0.201     
 (-0.33)     
itIT  -0.162     
 (-0.32)     
itOPK  0.107 0.115 0.087   
 (0.68) (0.77) (0.60)   
itm∆  0.268 0.191 -0.653 -0.69  
 (0.17) (0.13) (-0.72) (-0.77)  
itrem∆  0.310 0.344 0.143 0.171  
 (0.62) (0.71) (0.362) (0.44)  
itresm  -1.121 -1.063 -1.054 -1.053 -1.176 
 (-2.10 a ) (-2.24 a ) (-1.92) (-1.93) (-2.511 a ) 
itOP  -7.876 -7.917 -7.907 -7.875 -6.267 
 (-4.56 a )  (-4.62 a ) (-4.62 a ) (-4.61 a ) (-4.05 a ) 
itq∆  4.727 4.752 3.967 3.902 3.386 
 (2.63 a )  (2.67 a ) (2.83 a ) (2.79 a ) (2.78 a ) 
ity∆  -2.084 -2.222    
 
(-0.66) (-0.72)    
2R  0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.15 
F-statistic 3.425 3.936 4.209 4.544 4.12 
Prob(F-statistic) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW statistic 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.65 
Note: This table investigates the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure, using LSDV approach. a denotes 
significance level at 5 percent level. The variables include in the analysis are: monetary aggregate ( itm ), trade openness 
( itOP ), capital openness ( itOPK ), real exchange rate ( tiq ), remittances ( itrem ), reserve import ratio ( itresm ) and 
real Gross Domestic Output ( ity ). itERR  denotes fixed exchange and managed floating exchange rate arrangement. 
Similarly, itIT  refers to inflation targeting monetary regime. ∆  refers to difference operator. DW denotes Durbin 
Watson statistic. Small letters denote logged values. t values are given in parenthesis.    
 
of Exchange Market Pressure using fixed effect parameter approach are given in Table 7.4. 
 It is argued that soft peg exchange rate regimes are unsustainable and therefore, 
increase pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. Thus we expect 1θ  to be of positive 
sign. Contrary to our expectation, Table 7.4 shows insignificant estimate of exchange rate 
regime ( itERR ) suggesting that exchange rate regime does not have any significant effect on 
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Exchange Market Pressure. Thus our results are different from those obtained by Mandilaras 
and Bird (2008) who found that fixed and intermediate exchange rate regime reduce pressure 
for Latin American & Caribbean (LAC) countries. This indicates that some kind of exchange 
rate management in these countries would reduce market pressure on their currencies.  
Similarly, theoretical literature suggests that a shift in the focus of monetary policy 
from exchange rate stability to inflation targeting would increase pressure on domestic 
currency to depreciate.80 However, our estimate of Inflation Targeting Regime ( itIT ) is 
insignificant, which suggests that inflation targeting monetary policy does not explain 
variation in Exchange Market Pressure. A rise in domestic monetary aggregates increases the 
holding of nominal cash balances of domestic residents which they swap for foreign currency. 
This increases pressure on domestic currency to depreciate. Contrary to the theoretical 
predictions, our estimate of monetary aggregate although positive, is insignificant. This 
implies that domestic monetary aggregates do not influence Exchange Market Pressure. 
 The previous theoretical literature provides conflicting arguments about the effects of 
trade and capital openness on Exchange Market Pressure. One strand of literature argues 
increased trade and capital openness of country will increase pressure on its currency to 
depreciate. The other strand of literature supports the view that increased trade and capital 
openness of a country would reduce downward pressure on its currency. Our estimate of 
capital openness although positive but is insignificant implying that capital openness is not 
associated with an increase in exchange market pressure. The differences between our findings 
and those of earlier empirical literature may be attributed to our having measured pressure in 
the foreign exchange market in terms of continuous instead of binary variables taking either 
zero or one value. Furthermore, we used Chin and Ito (2008) index instead of restrictions on 
capital accounts to denote capital account openness. Chin and Ito (2008) measured capital 
                                                 
80
 Our variable for inflation targeting regimes takes a value of one for such a regime and zero otherwise. 
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account restrictions in terms of continuous variables. It has the advantage of conveying more 
information then the binary variable that takes either zero or one value.  
On the other hand, a significant negative estimate of trade openness shows that a 
country’s openness to trade reduces pressure on their currencies to depreciate. Our finding is 
similar to Rose (2005), who argues that strong trade links reduce a country’s default 
probabilities. Since investors, being aware of countries’ reduced default probabilities, would 
not withdraw their capital, this in turn reduces pressure on their currencies to depreciate. 
Frankel and Cavallo (2004) also obtained results that provide evidence that countries with 
open trade are less prone to market pressure on their currencies.  Similarly, Sachs and 
Williamson (1985) compared Latin American and East Asian countries and showed that the 
latter were less prone to market pressure due to their higher trade to GDP ratio. This is because 
East Asian countries invested their borrowing in export industries. This resulted in far greater 
exports for East Asian countries than for their counterparts in Latin America. The resources 
generated from increased exports were enough for East Asian countries to service their future 
debt payments.  
Table 7.4 further shows that although the estimate of remittances is positive, it is not 
significantly different from zero. However, the estimated parameters of reserve import ratio 
and the real exchange rate are significant and are of negative and positive signs. The 
significant negative estimated parameter of reserve import ratio confirms their theoretical 
predictions that increase in foreign capital inflow is associated with decrease in pressure on 
domestic currency. Similarly, a positive and significant estimated parameter of real exchange 
rate suggest that an over-valued real exchange rate reduces competitiveness of domestic 
exporters in the international market and thus puts pressure on domestic currency to 
depreciate.  
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Table 7.5 Panel Estimates of Exchange Market Pressure Determinants (Uses Lagged 
Regressors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
C 0.024 0.339 0.336 0.302 
 (0.02) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28) 
itERR (-1) 0.239    
 (0.64)    
itIT (-1) 0.078    
 (0.20)    
itOPK (-1) -0.216 -0.214 -0.215 -0.211 
 (-1.65 b ) (-1.65 b ) (-1.98 a ) (-2.09 a ) 
itm∆ (-1) -0.083 -0.022 -0.023  
 (-0.35) (-0.10) (-0.118)  
itrem∆ (-1) 0.081 0.098 0.097 0.096 
 (0.56) (0.69) (0.72) (0.72) 
itresm (-1) 0.006 -0.100 -0.100 -0.101 
 (0.014) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.26) 
itOP (-1) -3.361 -3.367 -3.367 -3.378 
 (-1.97 a )  (-2.00 a ) (-2.01 a ) (-2.02 a ) 
itq∆ (-1) -0.131 0.005 
  
 (-0.37)  (0.02)   
ity∆ (-1) -0.011 -0.171 -0.167 -0.177 
 
(-0.03) (-0.57) (-1.29) (-1.916 a ) 
2R  0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
F-statistic 3.884 4.136 4.2285 4.442 
Prob(F-statistic) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW statistic 1.89 1.90 1.91 1.90 
Note: This table uses one period lagged variables on the right hand side for evaluating the determinants of Exchange 
Market Pressure. a  and b denotes significance level at 5 and 10 percent level. The variables included in the analysis 
are: monetary aggregate ( itm ), trade openness ( itOP ), capital openness ( itOPK ), real exchange rate ( tiq ), 
remittances ( itrem ), reserve import ratio ( itresm ) and real Gross Domestic Output ( ity ). itERR  denotes fixed 
exchange and managed floating exchange rate arrangement. Similarly, itIT  refers to inflation targeting monetary 
regime. ∆  refers to difference operator. DW denotes Durbin Watson statistic. Small letters denote logged values. t 
values are given in parenthesis.    
 
 It is evident from Table 7.4 that 2R  values range between 0.15 and 0.21. It shows that 
the estimated models explain fifteen to twenty-one percent variations in the dependent 
variable. We cannot reject the null of no serial correlation due to higher Durbin Watson 
statistics. Furthermore, F-statistic values are quite high, with zero probability of obtaining  
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Table 7.6 Panel Estimates of EMP Determinants (uses lagged variables as instruments) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
C -0.248 0.053 0.076 0.075 
 (-0.19) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
itERR  0.230    
 (0.58)    
itIT  -0.003    
 (-0.006)    
itOPK  -0.229 -0.227 -0.221 -0.219 
 (-1.67 b ) (-1.67 b ) (-1.96 a ) (-2.14 a ) 
itm∆  -0.062 -0.014 -0.006  
 (-0.25) (-0.066) (-0.04)  
itrem∆  0.102 0.117 0.120 0.119 
 (0.69) (0.81) (0.861) (0.87) 
itresm  -0.010 -0.133 -0.132 -0.124 
 (-0.022) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.31) 
itOP  -4.802 -4.712 --4.703 -4.706 
 (-2.08 a )  (-2.138 a ) (-2.14 a ) (-2.15 a ) 
itq∆  -0.159 -0.023 
  
 (-0.44)  (-0.08)   
ity∆  0.001 -0.148 -0.171 -0.175 
 
(0.01) (-0.49) (-1.37) (-1.94 a ) 
2R  0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 
F-statistic 3.884 4.141 4.290 4.442 
Prob(F-statistic) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW statistic 1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82 
Note: This table uses one period lagged variables on the right hand side for evaluating the determinants of Exchange 
Market Pressure. a  and b denotes significance level at 5 and 10 percent level. The variables included in the analysis 
are: monetary aggregate ( itm ), trade openness ( itOP ), capital openness ( itOPK ), real exchange rate ( tiq ), 
remittances ( itrem ), reserve import ratio ( itresm ) and real Gross Domestic Output ( ity ). itERR  denotes fixed 
exchange and managed floating exchange rate arrangement. Similarly, itIT  refers to inflation targeting monetary 
regime. ∆  refers to difference operator. DW denotes Durbin Watson statistic. Small letters denote logged values. t 
values are given in parenthesis.    
 
them. This can be interpreted as being able to reject the null that all estimated parameters are 
equal to zero. These test statistics suggest that we have a reasonably well-specified model.    
Table 7.4 uses fixed effects panel estimates along with stationary data on domestic 
macroeconomic variables. However, the estimates of the determinants of exchange market 
pressure given in table 7.4 suffer from potential endogenity issue since all variables are 
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contemporaneously correlated. Further, two of the significant variables namely reserve import 
ratio and real exchange rate share terms with exchange market pressure. This makes 
contemporaneous correlation among these variables highly likely. We adopt two approaches to 
address this issue. First, we estimate equation (7.7) using lagged variables on the right hand 
side. Second, we use lagged variables to instrument the endogenous variables.   
The estimates of the panel determinants of exchange market pressure lagged regressors 
and instrumental variable approach are different from those obtained from Fixed Effect panel 
approach.81 Contrary to table 7.4, table 7.5 and 7.6 shows exchange market pressure is well 
explained by trade openness ( itOP ), capital openness ( itOPK ) and real domestic income 
( ity∆ ). The negative sign of trade openness, capital openness and real domestic income 
suggest that an increase in these variables reduce pressure on the currencies of the sample 
countries to depreciate. Hence the countries that want to avoid pressure on their currencies 
have to keep their trade and capital account open with the rest of the world. They also have to 
keep in check the developments in domestic real income in order to avoid pressure on their 
currencies.             
7.7 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, we examined the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure in a panel 
of ten countries. We used Eichengreen et al.’s (1996) statistical approach to construct 
Exchange Market Pressure. It has the advantage of not being based upon the assumptions of 
macroeconomics models used by Girton and Roper (1977) and Weyamrk (1995), which could 
be problematic for such a large number of countries. Our basic objective was to evaluate the 
effects of a range of macroeconomic indicators, policy variables and measures of trade 
                                                 
81
 Standard instrumental variable was unsuccessful due to limited number of observations. Similarly, we also 
used Generalised Method of Moments approach. However, the results obtained from this approach were 
unsatisfactory.  
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openness on Exchange Market Pressure. Prior to this study, Bird and Mandilaras (2006) 
evaluated the effects of fiscal deficit, exchange rate regime, federal fund rate, short-term to 
total debt ratio and domestic credit from banks as percent of GDP on Exchange Market 
Pressure for the East Asia & the Pacific and Latin American & Caribbean (LAC) regions in a 
panel framework. Mandilaras and Bird (2008) on the other hand, focused on Latin American 
& Caribbean (LAC) countries and found foreign debt, intermediate and fixed exchange rate 
regime, US interest rate and domestic credit as the significant determinants of Exchange 
Market Pressure for these countries. This shows that ours is a first study to examine the effects 
of a range of macroeconomic indicators, policy variables and measures of openness (both 
trade and capital openness) on Exchange Market Pressure in a panel of ten countries.  
 Insignificant estimates of exchange rate regime and inflation-targeting dummies 
indicate that policy variables do not have any significant effect on market pressure. The 
theoretical literature argues that more open economies have more exposure to speculative 
attacks. This may increase their vulnerability to foreign currency speculative attacks. 
However, empirical evidence is at odds with the theoretical literature. It shows that more open 
economies are less prone to speculative pressure. The fixed effect panel estimates of exchange 
market pressure equation indicate insignificant and significant estimates of capital and trade 
openness. However, when we take account of the endogenity issue, we get significant negative 
estimates on both these variables. This shows that an increase in trade and capital openness 
reduces pressure on the currencies of the sample countries.   
Similarly, the fixed effect estimates of exchange market pressure shows significant 
negative and positive estimates of reserve import ratio and real exchange rate. On the other 
hand, the endogenity adjusted estimates of exchange market pressure shows insignificant 
estimates for all variables apart from domestic real income. This implies that an increase in 
domestic real income is associated with decrease in market pressure. Thus, we conclude from 
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our empirical estimate that some macroeconomic variables along with trade and capital 
openness are important determinants of exchange market pressure in a panel framework. On 
the other hand, policy regime variables such as inflation-targeting monetary policy and 
exchange rate regime do not have any significant effect on the build up of foreign exchange 
market pressure for the panel of ten countries that we have included in our analysis.   
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Appendix A1 
Monetary Policy Review 
 There are wide differences in the monetary policies pursued by the countries included 
in the analysis. In this section, we briefly discuss the objectives and evolution of the monetary 
policy of each member country. Output growth and stable prices remained the ultimate 
objectives of monetary policy in Australia from 1977 to 1992. In order to attain these 
objectives, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) targeted the growth of M3 from 1977 to 
January, 1985. Later, the focus shifted to a number of economic variables. However, there was 
no articulated monetary policy from 1988 to 1992. In 1993 inflation targeting replaced output 
and price stability as the ultimate objectives of monetary policy. The Canadian monetary 
authority initially targeted the growth of M1 monetary aggregate. The Canadian monetary 
authorities started targeting exchange rate stability on April 3rd, 1978. This policy remained in 
practice until the second quarter of 1984. During the mid-1980s, the Bank of Canada 
emphasised the importance of both inflation and exchange rate stability and yet the monetary 
policy lacked any clear framework. This ended in 1991, when the Bank of Canada and the 
Canadian Government agreed on targeting the inflation rate as the sole objective of monetary 
policy (Dodge, 2004). After the break down of the Bretton Wood system, the German 
monetary authorities started targeting the growth of monetary aggregates. An annual monetary 
target was first announced for 1975. It targeted the growth of Central Bank Money Stock, a 
weighted sum of currency held by non-banks, and demand, time, and saving deposits at 
statutory notice. In 1988, however, the Bundesbank switched to the simple sum M3, that 
included currency held by non-banks, demand, time, and saving deposits at statutory notice as   
 221 
Table A.1 Monetary Policy of Sample Countries  
Country Time Period Monetary Policy 
Australia April 1976 to January 
1985 
February to April 1985 
May 1985 to 1987 
1988 to 1993 
 
May 1993 onwards 
Treasurer on the joint advice of Treasury and the Central Bank set the target for M3 monetary aggregate 
(Macfarlane, 1999). The ultimate objective was output growth and stable prices. 
No guiding principle for monetary policy.  
A number of economic variables were taken into account in the formulation of monetary policy. 
However, more attention was given to exchange rate stability (Greenville, 1997). 
There was no articulated monetary policy framework. Discretionary monetary policy framework was in 
place. 
Stable prices became the sole objective of monetary policy. 
Canada Fall 1976 to March 1978 
April 3rd, 1978 to June, 
1984. 
1984 to 1990 
 
February, 1991 onwards 
Targeted the growth of M1 monetary aggregate with a view of stabilising domestic prices.   
Monetary authorities used stable exchange rate target as an explanation for the conduct of Monetary 
policy.  
There was an increased emphasis on price stability and exchange rate stability yet the monetary policy 
lacked any clear framework (Howitt, 1993).  
Bank of Canada and Canadian Government agreed on inflation targeting as the sole objective of 
monetary policy (Dodge, 2002). 
Germany 1975 to 1987 
1988 to 1998 
Monetary authorities targeted the growth of Central Bank Money Stock.82 
Monetary authorities targeted the growth of M3 monetary aggregate.83 
Italy 1975 to 1994 
 
1994 to 1998 
Monetary authorities targeted the growth of total domestic credit which suggests the supremacy of fiscal 
policy over monetary policy.84  
Bank of Italy was made fully independent.85 However, in the post independent period, it pursued 
multiple and conflicting objectives.   
                                                 
82
 Central Bank Money Stock comprised of a weighted sum of currency held by non-banks, and demand, time, and saving deposits at statutory notice (Neumann and Von Hagen, 
1993).  
83
 M3 consisted of currency held by nonbanks, demand, time, and saving deposits at statutory notice.  
84
 During this period, Bank of Italy remained subservient to Treasury. It accommodated fiscal policy. In 1981, it was freed from its obligation of acting as residual buyer of 
Treasury Bills. Yet its autonomy was not complete. Over draft facility made it necessary for the Italian Central Bank to finance fourteen percent of Treasury Annual expenses. 
Even until February 1992, power to change discount rate vested with Treasury (Bartolini, 2002, Fratianni and Spinelli, 1997 and Spinelli and Tirelli, 1993).   
85
 On 26th November, 1992, Parliament passed the law that restricted Treasury to borrow from Bank of Italy (BI). The same law authorised BI to change reserve requirement 
ratio. Finally, as of 1st January, 1994, BI was not required to participate in the Treasury auctions (Fratianni and Spinelli, 1997).  
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Table A.1 Monetary Policy of the countries included in the analysis (continued)  
Country Time period Monetary Policy 
Japan 1976 to 1985 
February, 1985 to 
1998 
 
April 1998 onwards 
Monetary targeting (M2 + currency deposits) aimed at stabilising exchange rate and price stability.   
Bank of Japan followed both loose and tight monetary policy with a view of recovering economy from 
recessionary conditions, strengthening exchange rate against US dollar and controlling rise in prices. 
Bank of Japan was given the mandatory power to stabilise prices.86 
Korea 1976 to 1978 
1979 to 1997 
1998 to 2005 
Bank of Korea (BOK) targeted the growth rates of M1 monetary aggregate (Kim and Park, 2005).  
Korean monetary authorities targeted M2 and M2 plus MCT.87 
The revised BOK act which was implemented 1998 empowered the bank to target inflation rate.88 
Malaysia Prior to 1994 
1995 to 1998 
1998 to 2005 
Central Bank targeted the growth of monetary aggregate to stabilise domestic output and prices.89  
Interest rate targeting. 
Monetary policy aimed at maintaining fixed exchange parity against US dollar. 
Pakistan Prior to 1981 
1982 to 2005 
Monetary policy targeted fixed exchange rate parity against US dollar.   
Monetary policy has been targeting the growth of monetary aggregates.90   
Singapore 1976 to 2005 Monetary Authority in Singapore targets exchange rate stability with a view of stabilising domestic prices 
and output growth (Parrado, 2004). 
UK 1976 to 1990 
 
October 1990 to 
September 1992. 
October 1992 to 2005 
From 1976 to 1985, monetary authorities targeted the growth of broad monetary aggregates. In 1986, focus 
shifted from broad monetary aggregates to narrow money M0.91  
Sterling entered into Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and monetary authorities targeted at maintaining 
fixed exchange rate against member currencies.  
A new monetary framework was established with the sole objective of controlling inflation rate. 
                                                 
86From February 1999 to August 2000, Bank of Japan adopted zero interest rate policy. Later on from 19th March, 2001 till the end of the sample period, it pursued the policy of quantitative easing. 
The objective was to recover the economy from recessionary conditions and stop downward trend of domestic prices.   
87
 MCT includes currency deposits and trust cash.  
88
 The Act was implemented on 1st April, 1998. In the year 1998, BOK based Consumer Price Index set the target inflation rate of 9 ± 1% (Kim and Park, 2005, and Bank of Korea: Monetary 
Policy in Korea).   
89
 Central Bank relied on statutory reserve requirement, minimum liquidity requirement, volume and direction of credit, interest rate ceiling, discount operations and moral suasion for 
implementing monetary policy.   
90
 Prior to 1991, State bank of Pakistan implemented monetary policy using ad hoc changes in reserve requirements, direct credit and regulated interest rate for its implementation. In the post 1991 
period, SBP has relied on market based interest rate for carrying out its monetary operations (Bushra and Abbas, 2008).   
91
 Refer to King (1997) for further discussion on the switch of monetary aggregates from £M3 to £M0 
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its monetary targets (Neumann and von Hagen, 1993).  
  The Italian Central Bank remained subservient to the Federal Treasury and targeted 
credit growth. It was required by law to act as a residual buyer of the Central Government 
treasury. However, it was granted full autonomy in 1994. Despite this, the Italian Central 
Bank did not adopt the single objective of either monetary or inflation targeting. Instead it 
pursued multiple and often conflicting objectives until the implementation of European 
Monetary System in 1999. On the other hand, the Bank of Japan from the very beginning 
has targeted the growth of monetary aggregates with a view to stabilising domestic prices 
and output. However, the Bank of Japan Act was revised in 1997 and implemented on 1st 
April, 1998. The Bank of Japan was given a mandate to stabilise domestic prices and there 
was no mention of stable output or full employment (Ito, 2006). However, instead of 
targeting stable prices, the Bank of Japan followed the policy of zero interest rate and 
quantitative easing. The objective was the recovery of the economy from recession and the 
halting of deflationary pressures. The Bank of Korea has followed a monetary policy 
similar to bank of Japan. Initially it targeted the growth of M1 monetary aggregate. Later, 
in 1977 it switched to M2 plus MCT.92. However, the revised Bank of Korea Act 1998 
gave it more autonomy and enabled it to pursue the single objective of inflation targeting. 
Malaysian monetary policy can be divided into three phases. Initially it targeted the growth 
of monetary aggregates. However, in 1994, it shifted its focus from monetary targeting to 
interest rate targeting which continued till 1998 when country adopted fixed exchange rate 
parity against US dollar.  
 Pakistan’s monetary policy was initially targeted at maintaining fixed exchange rate 
parity. However, in 1982 it shifted its focus from the exchange rate to monetary targeting 
to stabilise domestic prices and output. Singapore is a unique case. Monetary authorities in 
Singapore, instead of inflation or monetary aggregates, have targeted the exchange rate to 
stabilise domestic prices and output. There are three phases of the United Kingdom’s 
                                                 
92
 MCT includes currency deposits and trust cash.  
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monetary policy. Initially it targeted the growth of monetary aggregates. In 1990, the UK 
formally entered into exchange rate management and the monetary policy was aimed at 
maintaining fixed exchange rate parity against member countries. From 1992 onwards, the 
monetary authorities in UK have been targeting the growth of domestic prices (King, 1997; 
Cobham, 1997).  
The main message that we derive from the above discussion is that except for Italy, the 
monetary policy of the sample countries has either targeted the growth of monetary 
aggregates or inflation controls. Conversely, the Italian Central Bank neither pursued 
monetary targeting nor inflation targeting. It remained subservient to the Central 
Government treasury and acted as a residual buyer of Central Government securities. 
Singapore is a unique case; it targeted exchange rate stability.  
 Monetary targeting ultimately aims at attaining the twin objectives of stable output 
and prices. Similarly, stable output and domestic prices have remained the ultimate 
objective of the Singapore Monetary Authority, which targeted exchange rate. On the other 
hand, inflation- targeting monetary policy has the sole objective of controlling domestic 
price. It is also called constrained discretionary monetary policy. In the short-term, 
inflation-targeting Central Banks can direct their monetary policy to respond to shocks 
hitting the economy. However, in the long term they have to conduct their monetary policy 
under the constraint that the actual inflation rate remains close to the targeted one.   
. 
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Appendix A2  
 The data on all variables except monetary aggregates ( itm ) and Capital Openness 
are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics 
dataset. Foreign exchange reserves (Line 1L.DZF) refers to total reserves minus gold in US 
dollars. Similarly, nominal bilateral exchange rate (Line DE-ZF) for Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and United Kingdom refers to 
national currency per unit of US dollar. Hence a rise in the exchange rate denotes the 
depreciation of domestic currency against the US dollar. The short-term interest rate (Line 
60.BZF) is the rate on short-term lending between financial institutions. M2 (Line 35 L.ZF) 
refers to money plus quasi-money and is taken from IMF’s IFS data set for Australia, 
Korea and United Kingdom. For the remaining countries, M2 is taken from Thomson Data-
Stream. For Italy and Germany, the Thomson data set contained M2 data up to 1999. For 
the remaining period, German and Italian M2 were taken from Bundesbank and Italian 
Central Bank Monthly and Annual Reports. Bundesbank Annual reports reported M2 data 
up to 2002. We converted monthly M2 data to get annualised data for Germany for the 
remaining three years using Eviews 6.0 student version default frequency conversion 
setting.  For Pakistan, due to the absence of M2, we used M1 data. We generated a trade 
openness proxy by taking the ratio of current account (Line 78ALD) to nominal GDP (Line 
99BCZF). Similarly, we used Chin and Ito’s (2008) index to measure financial openness. 
Real GDP is simply a ratio of nominal GDP (99B.CZF) to GDP Deflator (Line BRZF). 
Similarly, reserve import ratio refers to reserve (Line 1LDZF) to imports (71DZF). 
Remittance data for all countries except the UK (after 1987), Canada and Singapore are 
taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicators data set and refer to Workers 
Remittances and Compensation of Employees Paid (Line B.M.TRF.PKWR.CD.DT). Real 
exchange rate refers to nominal exchange rate times price ratio. 
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Appendix A3 
Country Specific Descriptive Statistics 
Australia tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean 0.197 3.466 -0.032 1.373 8.779 -0.629 0.142 3.762 
Median 0.118 3.463 -0.033 1.434 8.752 -0.592 0.129 3.746 
Maximum 4.193 3.864 -0.010 2.500 9.376 -0.379 0.296 3.985 
Minimum -3.510 3.152 -0.052 -0.086 8.319 -1.196 0.041 3.569 
Std. Dev 1.821 0.239 0.009 1.020 0.286 0.211 0.069 0.127 
JB 
0.001 
(0.997) 
2.291 
(0.318) 
0.185 
(0.912) 
2.833 
(0.243) 
1.406 
(0.495) 
11.796 
(0.003) 
1.759 
(0.415) 
1.729 
(0.421) 
Canada tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean 0.142 3.785 -0.014 2.500  -1.067 0.095 -14.039 
Median 0.212 3.839 -0.016 2.500  -1.047 0.088 -14.044 
Maximum 2.386 3.970 0.027 2.500  -0.789 0.196 -13.864 
Minimum 3.499 3.521 0.041 2.500  -1.508 0.018 -14.206 
Std. Dev 1.373 0.140 0.041 0.000  0.210 0.050 0.102 
JB 
1.012 
(0.603) 
2.688 
(0.261) 
2.652 
(0.266)   
2.558 
(0.278) 
1.421 
(0.491 
1.512 
(0.469) 
Germany tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean 0.318 4.004 0.011 2.500 9.847 -0.719 0.148 4.520 
Median 0.483 4.078 0.006 2.500 9.839 -0.649 0.150 4.559 
Maximum 5.194 4.162 0.079 2.500 10.097 -0.399 0.386 4.641 
Minimum -4.216 3.753 -0.019 2.500 9.556 -1.238 -0.062 4.373 
Std. Dev 2.119 0.139 0.026 0.000 0.164 0.216 0.122 0.095 
JB 
0.730 
(0.694) 
3.427 
(0.180) 
5.949 
(0.051)  
2.262 
(0.323) 
3.097 
(0.215) 
0.545 
(0.761) 
3.239 
(0.198) 
Italy tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean 0.094 3.967 -0.023 0.818 9.168 -0.757 3.234 6.337 
Median 0230 4.006 -0.045 0.447 9.336 -0.719 3.235 6.348 
Maximum 4.982 4.061 0.315 2.500 9.882 -0.461 3.382 6.442 
Minimum -3.483 3.886 -0.275 -1.831 8.385 -1.178 3.089 6.191 
Std. Dev 2.144 0.052 0.170 1.671 0.417 0.181 0.082 0.077 
JB 
0.413 
(0.813) 
3.036 
(0.219) 
1.362 
(0.506) 
2.587 
(0.274) 
2.178 
(0.337) 
2.075 
(0.354) 
0.659 
(0.719) 
1.999 
(0.368) 
Note: In this table we see descriptive statistics for Exchange Market Pressure ( tEMP ), monetary aggregate 
( tm ), trade openness ( tOP ), capital openness ( tOPK ), real exchange rate ( tq ), remittances ( trem ), 
reserve import ratio ( tresm ), and real Gross Domestic Product ( ty ). Std. Dev. and JB Denotes standard 
deviation and Jarque-Berra normality test. Probability values are given in parentheses.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 227 
Descriptive Statistics of Individual Countries  
Japan tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean -0.893 4.421 0.022 2.270 8.972 -0.330 2.012 6.578 
Median -0.332 4.561 0.024 2.500 9.108 -0.389 2.002 6.635 
Maximum 3.449 4.812 0.040 2.500 9.559 0.264 2.189 6.700 
Minimum -5.404 3.854 -0.009 1.167 8.114 -0.759 1.876 6.365 
Std. Dev 2.264 0.315 0.012 0.401 0.459 0.319 0.080 0.106 
JB 
0.372 
(0.830) 
3.341 
(0.188) 
6.493 
(0.038) 
21.917 
(0.000) 
2.156 
(0.340) 
1.652 
(0.438) 
1.134 
(0.567) 
3.373 
(0.185) 
Korea tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean 0.061 6.209 0.001 -0.484 8.353 -0.618 3.021 6.577 
Median 0.213 6.206 -0.008 -0.086 8.592 -0.645 3.004 6.618 
Maximum 2.144 6.759 0.097 -0.086 9.523 -0.052 3.259 6.937 
Minimum -2.558 5.670 -0.093 -1.136 6.301 -1.059 2.915 -6.155 
Std. Dev 1.018 0.364 0.043 0.518 0.868 0.338 0.075 0.254 
JB 
3.025 
(0.217) 
1.959 
(0.375) 
0.121 
(0.941) 
4.907 
(0.086) 
6.311 
(0.043) 
2.299 
(0.317) 
9.890 
(0.007) 
2.392 
(0.302) 
Malaysia tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean -0.029 3.244 0.008 1.354 8.282 -0.384 0.428 3.360 
Median 0.149 3.211 -0.003 1.246 8.312 -0.390 0.423 3.359 
Maximum 5.845 3.789 0.159 2.500 9.754 -0.204 0.583 3.718 
Minimum -4.241 2.630 -0.133 -0.086 7.024 -0.579 0.237 2.969 
Std. Dev 2.100 0.357 0.084 1.031 0.931 0.117 0.111 0.236 
JB 
1.158 
(0.560) 
2.019 
(0.364) 
1.559 
(0.458) 
2.595 
(0.273) 
2.205 
(0.332) 
1.583 
(0.453) 
1.771 
(0.413) 
1.159 
(0.308) 
Pakistan tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean 0.753 3.949 -0.028 -1.160 6.155 -0.846 1.633 4.521 
Median 0.634 4.021 -0.036 -1.136 6.095 -0.886 1.666 4.551 
Maximum 5.349 4.250 0.051 -1.136 7.000 -0.076 1.837 4.781 
Minimum -3.391 3.603 -0.084 -1.831 5.608 -1.397 1.379 4.188 
Std. Dev 1.894 0.174 0.030 0.131 0.365 0.343 0.143 0.177 
JB 
0.251 
(0.882) 
1.793 
(0.408) 
5.837 
(0.054) 
735.995 
(0.000) 
1.266 
(0.531) 
1.831 
(0.400) 
1.959 
(0.375) 
2.063 
(0.356) 
Note: In this table we see descriptive statistics for Exchange Market Pressure ( tEMP ), monetary aggregate  
 ( tm ), trade openness ( tOP ), capital openness ( tOPK ), real exchange rate ( tq ), remittances ( trem ), 
reserve import ratio ( tresm ), and real Gross Domestic Product ( ty ). Std. Dev. and JB denote standard 
deviation and Jarque-Berra normality test. Probability values are given in parentheses.   
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Descriptive Statistics of Individual Countries  
Singapore tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean -0.326 2.868 0.071 2.246  -0.315 0.159 2.932 
Median -0.039 2.902 0.096 2.500  -0.288 0.162 2.932 
Maximum 5.648 3.342 0.229 2.500  -0.124 0.234 3.319 
Minimum -5.341 2.278 -0.130 -0.086  -0.563 0.076 2.491 
Std. Dev 1.827 0.346 0.106 0.572  0.129 0.044 0.256 
JB 
19.233 
(0.000) 
2.029 
(0.363) 
2.014 
(0.365) 
108.303 
(0.000)  
1.815 
(0.404) 
1.081 
(0.582) 
2.152 
(0.341) 
Korea tEMP  tm  tOP  tOPK  trem  tresm  tq  ty  
Mean 0.116 3.756 -0.010 2.182 9.338 -0.845 -0.197 3.938 
Median -0.077 3.818 -0.012 2.500 9.309 -0.836 -0.203 3.933 
Maximum 5.455 4.211 0.029 2.500 9.588 -0.497 -0.004 4.098 
Minimum -6.398 3.326 -0.051 -0.782 9.138 -1.099 -0.294 3.803 
Std. Dev 2.043 0.296 0.018 0.861 0.119 0.153 0.062 0.094 
JB 
12.530 
(0.002) 
2.336 
(0.311) 
0.043 
(0.979) 
109.274 
(0.000) 
0.921 
(0.631) 
1.018 
(0.601) 
7.265 
(0.026) 
1.847 
(0.397) 
Note: In this table we see descriptive statistics for Exchange Market Pressure ( tEMP ), monetary aggregate 
( tm ), trade openness ( tOP ), capital openness ( tOPK ), real exchange rate ( tq ), remittances ( trem ), 
reserve import ratio ( tresm ), and real Gross Domestic Product ( ty ). Std. Dev. and JB denote standard 
deviation and Jarque-Berra normality test. Probability values are given in parentheses.   
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, we have examined Exchange Market Pressure and monetary 
authorities’ response to market pressure on Pakistan. Exchange market pressure refers to 
money market disequilibrium that arises due to non-zero excess demand of money. It is 
therefore not directly observable; the channels that restore money market equilibrium are 
used for measuring the extent of foreign exchange market disequilibrium. In a fixed 
exchange rate system, money market operations denoted as Central Bank’s buying and 
selling of foreign exchange reserves are used for measuring foreign exchange market 
disequilibrium. On the other hand, exchange rate changes reflect foreign exchange market 
disequilibrium under a flexible exchange rate system. Simultaneous changes in exchange 
rate and foreign exchange reserves characterise foreign exchange market disequilibrium 
under a managed float. 
 Pakistan’s exchange rate regime has evolved in different phases. After its 
emergence, Pakistan adopted a fixed exchange rate regime. This system continued till 8th 
January, 1982, when Pakistan switched from a fixed exchange rate to a managed float 
system. Since its switch to managed float, the exchange rate of Pakistan has consistently 
depreciated against US dollar, but at the same time, the country’s foreign exchange 
reserves have also increased substantially. This makes Pakistan a suitable country to 
evaluate whether it is upward or downward pressure that has remained dominant over the 
entire sample period and evaluate the monetary authority’s response by constructing 
exchange market pressure and the intervention index over the given sample period. We 
adopt Weymark’s (1995) approach to evaluate the pressure on Pakistan’s domestic 
currency and the monetary authority’s response to exchange rate fluctuations. This 
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approach has the advantage of enabling us to examine what fraction of pressure the Central 
Bank relieves through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves. The intervention 
index values are then used to identify the extent that the Central Bank allows the exchange 
rate to adjust to its market determined value. It is therefore ideally suited to single country 
analysis.    
 In Chapter Four we used difference data and the two-stage least square approach. 
Difference data is used to overcome a non-stationary problem that yields spurious 
regression when used with the ordinary least square technique. In addition, we used the 
two-stage least square approach to address the endogenity problem. The endogenity 
problem arises when the dependent and one or more independent variables are 
simultaneously determined. This does not yield unbiased parameter estimates. We used the 
instrumental variable technique to overcome the endogenity problem. It is argued that the 
instruments used must be correlated with endogenous variables but not correlated with the 
model’s error term. The results indicate weakening pressure and active Central Bank 
intervention. The intervention index mean value of 0.61 suggests that Central Bank 
relieved sixty one percent of the pressure by the sale and purchase of foreign exchange 
reserves. Exchange rate changes absorbed the remaining thirty one percent of the pressure. 
The use of difference data, although overcomes the non-stationary issue, results in the loss 
of vital information about a long-term relationship if one exists. It is argued that the linear 
combination of non-stationary variables yields a non-stationary outcome. It may be the 
case that a linear combination of non-stationary variables may result in stationary 
variables. Such an outcome provides evidence for the presence of a long-term relationship. 
The fifth chapter tests the presence of a long-term relationship using Johansen’s (1988) and 
Johansen and Juselius’ (1990) approach. The results indicate the presence of a long-term 
relationship among the variables of interest. The exchange market pressure and 
intervention index based on Johansen’s (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’ (1990) approach 
show dominant depreciating pressure and active Central Bank intervention. The 
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intervention index mean value of 0.73 shows that exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserve changes relieved twenty-seven and seventy-three percent of the pressure 
respectively. The evidence thus gathered from the cointegration approach further supports 
the Chapter Four’s finding of dominant downward pressure during the 1980s, 90s and 
2000s for Pakistan and active Central Bank intervention. 
 The preceding two chapters used a fixed parameter approach. However, a fixed 
parameter approach is considered to be one of the important factors in the poor 
performance of exchange rate models. It is argued that economic conditions do not remain 
time invariant. They keep changing with the passage of time. A fixed parameter approach 
has the disadvantage of not taking into account of the effects of structural changes on 
parameter constancy. This is an issue that we addressed in Chapter 6, uing the Kalman 
filtering approach. The basic objective is to evaluate the effects of structural changes on 
parameter constancy. The structural changes that have taken place over the given sample 
period include: Pakistan’s switchover from a fixed to a managed float exchange rate 
system, the introduction of an interest-free banking system in 1981 and the subsequent 
replacement of interest-bearing deposits with a system based on a profit and loss sharing 
principle on July 1st, 1985 (Khan, 1994; Ahmad and Khan, 1990), the denationalisation of 
public sector banks, the enhancement of Central Bank authority over the financial system, 
the imposition of sanctions on the country in the wake of nuclear explosions and the lifting 
of these sanctions after Pakistan’s decision to cooperate with the international community 
in its war against terrorism. The results indicate parameter instability over the entire 
sample period. The Kalman filter estimates of exchange market pressure and intervention 
index show dominant depreciating pressure and active Central Bank intervention. The 
intervention index mean value suggests that the Central Bank relieved seventy-five percent 
of the pressure by the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserve. Exchange rate 
changes absorbed rest of the pressure. This further confirms our earlier finding in Chapters 
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Four and Five that provide evidence of weakening pressure and active Central Bank 
intervention. 
 In the last three chapters, we used Weymark’s (1995) approach and constructed 
exchange market pressure and intervention indices for Pakistan. We were primarily 
interested in checking the direction of pressure and the fraction of pressure that the Central 
Bank relieved through the purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves. In these 
chapters, we assumed direct foreign exchange intervention that is reflected in foreign 
exchange reserve changes. It may be the case that the Central Bank intervenes indirectly by 
changing the interest rate to influence prevailing pressure on domestic currency. In such a 
situation, the interest rate constitutes another channel that monetary authorities can use for 
warding off pressure. In such a case, interest rate constitutes a valid component of 
exchange market pressure index and the studies that drop the interest rate do not reflect the 
true extent of the pressure.  
There is ample evidence that Central Banks do use interest rates for fending off 
speculative attacks. Dominguez and Kenen (1992) and Edison (1993) show that 
governments that adhered to the exchange rate rules of the European Monetary System 
used the interest rate as a monetary policy instrument for keeping the exchange rate within 
the band prescribed by the European Monetary System. Shah et al (2009) and Hussain and 
Jalil (2007) use pure intervention data and show that Central Bank intervention is effective 
as it affects exchange rate level and reduces exchange rate volatility.93 Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) constructed an Exchange Market Pressure index that consists of percent changes in 
exchange rate, relative interest rate differential changes and relative percent changes in 
foreign exchange reserves. They use the inverse of variance approach for assigning 
weights to the components of Exchange Market Pressure. This ensures that more volatile 
components do not dominate the pressure index.  
                                                 
93
 Pure intervention refers to a Central Bank’s purchase and sale of foreign exchange reserves aimed at 
targeting exchange rate stability.    
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Chapter Seven used Eichengreen et al.’s (1996) approach and examined the 
determinants of the Exchange Market Pressure index in a panel of ten countries. It 
examined whether Exchange Market Pressure is affected by a range of macroeconomic 
indicators, policy variables and measures of openness. The results indicate that exchange 
market pressure is negatively related to reserve import ratio, trade openness and the real 
exchange rate. This has an important policy implication for countries that want to avoid 
pressure on their currencies, i.e. they have to keep in check the developments of 
macroeconomic indicators and measures of openness. Particularly, they have to maintain a 
high reserve import ratio, keep their external trade open to the rest of the world and 
maintain a competitive real exchange rate to avoid speculative attacks on their currencies.  
To summarise, this thesis has found that downward pressure has remained 
dominant over the entire sample period for Pakistan and active Central Bank intervention. 
It further shows that the Central Bank allowed limited flexibility for the exchange rate to 
adjust to its equilibrium value. This may be due to the fear of the monetary authorities that 
exchange rate changes may influence domestic macroeconomic variables. Particularly, it 
may reflect their fear that exchange rate changes may increase domestic prices and the 
foreign debt burden of the country. Finally, panel determinants of exchange market 
pressure show that reserve import ratio, trade openness and real exchange rate explain 
exchange market pressure. This implies that in order to avoid pressure on domestic 
currency, monetary authorities have to keep in check the developments in these variables. 
Contribution to the Literature 
 This thesis contributes to the literature by finding that it is downward pressure that 
has remained dominant over the entire sample. Further, it finds active Central Bank 
intervention. This may reflect monetary authorities fear that exchange rate changes may 
influence country’s foreign debt burden and domestic price level. Further, we find active 
Central Bank intervention. It shows the extent that Pakistan’s Central Bank allows to 
market forces in the determination of domestic currency’s value in the foreign exchange 
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market. This has an important policy implication that monetary authorities are not 
independent in formulating an independent monetary policy. Lastly, we find that trade 
openness; capital openness and real domestic income are the important determinants of 
exchange market pressure in a panel of ten countries.     
Policy Recommendations 
 In this thesis, we have used Weymark’s (1995) and Eichengreen et al.’s (1995) 
approaches. We used Weymark’s (1995) approach to identify the direction of pressure and 
evaluate monetary authorities’ response function. The results indicate downward pressure 
and active Central Bank intervention. Furthermore, we found evidence that Central Bank 
intervention is successful in reducing exchange rate volatility. This shows that Central 
Bank intervention is of considerable importance in reducing exchange rate volatility.  
 The estimates of panel determinants of Exchange Market Pressure show that 
Exchange Market Pressure is explained by trade openness, capital openness and domestic 
real income. This has policy implications, in that the countries that want to avoid pressure 
on their currencies have to monitor the developments of these variables. They should keep 
their trade and capital account open with the rest of the world. At the same time, they have 
to monitor the growth of domestic real income. This will enable them to avoid pressure on 
their currencies in the foreign exchange market.        
Limitations of the Study 
 In this study we used general changes in foreign exchange reserves to proxy 
Central Bank foreign exchange market intervention. However, this is not a perfect proxy to 
represent Central Banks’ foreign exchange market intervention. This is evident from 
Mastropasqua et al. (1988), who report that for the period 1983-1985, French Central Bank 
intervention in the foreign exchange market amounted to US $2.7 billion. For the same 
period, there were US $9.6 billion changes in foreign exchange reserves. This shows the 
extent of the difference between the general changes in foreign exchange reserve and the 
changes that occur due to a Central Bank’s foreign exchange intervention policies. It may 
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even be the case that a Central Bank may use a stand-by credit facility (SCF) provided by 
the International Monetary Fund to countries to meet their short term financial needs.94 In 
such a case, it is not necessary for the Central Bank to raise the interest rate or change 
foreign exchange reserves to restore foreign exchange market equilibrium. Even Central 
Banks do not provide information about off balance sheet transactions and forward market 
intervention aimed at relieving market pressure.   
 Another issue is of frequency of data. Quarterly data is not a suitable proxy to 
approximate Central Bank intervention. Central Banks relieve pressure within hours or 
days by either raising interest rates or changing foreign exchange reserves. In such a case, 
quarterly data may not be of sufficient periodicity to measure the extent of the market 
pressure and Central Bank’s intervention policy. Sometimes countries may even restrict 
capital movements across countries to avoid defaulting on foreign payments or the collapse 
of exchange rate regime. Given these data limitations, it is important to be cautious in 
interpreting the results of this study.    
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94
 SCF is offered by the International Monetary Fund to low-income countries that have attained a certain 
level of economic development but need financial support to cope with short-term financial needs. It helps 
countries to continue the programmes that are aimed at fostering economic growth and macroeconomic 
stability in the country.   
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